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ABSTRACT 
This thesis contends that a return to a phenomenological analysis of Alain Robbe- 
Grillet's film and fiction is a relevant and useful undertaking at the start of the twenty 
first century, providing the opportunity to reassess Robbe-Grillet's entire Muvre, both 
films and novels. It addresses the limitations of earlier phenomenological studies, 
analysing works not yet subjected to phenomenological analysis, and exploring important 
themes into which phenomenology can provide original insights, especially since the 
development of new phenomenological critical theories. 
The structure of this thesis demonstrates the coherence of a phenomenological 
approach across the works of Robbe-Grillet. The introduction contextualises the 
contribution of the thesis, indicating oversights to be rectified in existing studies. The 
first chapter charts the development of phenomenology, highlighting areas of relevance to 
the insights outlined in the thesis. Chapter two demonstrates that both the 
phenomenological reduction, and Robbe-Grillet's formal strategies of challenging 
cultural expectations, result in a "making strange" of perceptual experience, with 
repercussions for the subversion of conventional fictional and filmic narratives. 
Subsequent chapters explore further consequences of the reduction, beginning in chapter 
three with the embodiment of consciousness, which impacts upon the presentation of 
narrative perspective in Robbe-Grillet's film and fiction. The fourth chapter examines 
Robbe-Grillet's rendering of a lived experience of time, rather than an objective 
measurement of it, thus analysing another consequence of embodied existence, and of the 
"making strange" that results from undermining cultural expectations. Another mode of 
bodily existence, sexuality, was neglected in previous phenomenological studies, and is 
examined in the fifth chapter, in the light of feminist readings of phenomenology, making 
a new contribution in its reassessment of the debates around cultural stereotypes and 
subversion. Chapter six examines the complex relations surrounding intersubjectivity, 
another area not previously * addressed, and elucidates the problematics of Robbe- 
Grilletian inter-human relationships. 
The thesis concludes that earlier phenomenological studies have not fully worked 
through all of the implications of the phenomenological reduction in Robbe-Grillet's 
works in terms of cultural subversion, nor have they accounted fully for the 
interdependency of various modes pf human embodiment (perception, situation in space 
and time, sexuality and intersubjectivity) as they are enacted in Robbe-Grillet's 
narratives. 




Pour Un Nouveau Roman 
........................................................................... 
Barthes and chosisme ............................................................................... 13 
Morrissette and psychological interpretations ................................................... 15 
The generation game ................................................................................ 20 
Politics ................................................................................................ 25 
Post-modernism ..................................................................................... 28 
Feminist objections ................................................................................. 29 
Phenomenological approaches ..................................................................... 31 
Scope of thesis and plan ............................................................................ 38 
CHAPTER ONE Phenomenology .......................................................... 46 
Husserl and the influence of Brentano on phenomenology .................................... 49 
Phenomenology in France: Sartre ................................................................ 60 
Phenomenology in France: Merleau-Ponty 
..................................................... 65 
The body-subject 
............... : .................................................................... 68 
Time 
................................................................................................... 73 
The body as a sexual being ........................................................................ 77 
Intersubjectivity 
..................................................................................... 79 
Beyond philosophy: Merleau-Ponty and phenomenology in art, fiction and cinema ...... 
84 
CHAPTER TWO The Reduction: making strange .................................... 
87 
The reduction in Le Voyeur: unconventional descriptions and the return to phenomena.. 94 
Loss of personal identity .......................................................................... 100 
The phenomenological reduction in Robbe-Grillet's cinema ................................ 106 
The phenomenological reduction in LAnWe Deridire 6 Marienbad ...................... 107 
The phenomenological reduction in LImmortelle ............................................ III 
The phenomenological reduction in La Reprise and Cest Gradiva qui vous appelle .... 114 
Conclusion 
............................................................................................ 117 
CHAPTER THREE The Body-subject: narrative perspectives ...................... 119 
Bodily situation ..................................................................................... 120 
Literary narrative perspective .................................................................... 
126 
Cinematic point of view ........................................................................... 134 
Sensory perception .................................................................................. 140 
The perceptual field ............................................................................... 141 
Non-signifying objects ............................................................................ 145 
The invasion of unsolicited perception ......................................................... 148 
Perception and imagination ....................................................................... 149 
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 152 
CHAPTER FOUR Time: the strangeness of the present .............................. 
154 
The past and the future in the present ........................................................... 155 
Making strange: the disruption of chronology ................................................ 159 
Phenomenological time versus objective time ................................................. 173 
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 176 
CHAPTER FIVE The body as a sexual being: sexuality and subversion ........ 178 




Bricolage: women as dolls ....................................................................... 187 
Bricolage: la siHnelle saunion .................................................................. 
192 
Bricolage: vampires, horror and fake blood ................................................... 194 
Blood, religion, myth and danger ................................................................ 199 
Feminism and phenomenology ................................................................... 
211 
Phenomenology: the link between perception and sexuality ................................ 214 
Phenomenology: the master and slave relationship .......................................... 222 
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 224 
CHAPTER SIX Intersubjectivity: mirrors, doubles, paranoia and lies ........ 226 
Oneself ............................................................................................. 229 
Oneself and the other ............................................................................... 242 









The film and fiction of Alain Robbe-Grillet have been the subject of much 
academic scrutiny since the 1950s. He is undoubtedly a challenging writer and 
filmmaker, in terms of both the form and content of his works, and this is an important 
part of his attraction for academic enquiry. That is, the many varied approaches 
employed in the analysis of his literary and cinematic awre can, in part, be attributed to 
the difficulty initially experienced in making sense of his works. Given the abundance of 
books, articles and essays already devoted to Robbe-Grillet, in addition to his own 
copious comments in the form of essays, articles and interviews, the appearance of yet 
another study of his works may at first seem somewhat redundant. Yet, it is testimony to 
the quality of Robbe-Grillet's works and to the richness of his ideas that new studies are 
constantly being published on his artistic endeavours, suggesting that comment upon 
them has not yet been exhausted, and that he is still an important figure in French culture. 
Furthermore, Robbe-Grillet, a few months away from his eightieth birthday, has 
2 
celebrated his long career with the publication of another novel, as well as a screenplay. 
' 
Here, then, is scope for further comment on Robbe-Grillet, as these recent works mark a 
return to the two genres within which he has always worked, namely the novel and 
I 
screenplay, following a period during which he had focused upon a semi-fictional form of 
autobiography. These works, at the time of writing, have yet to be subjected to much 
academic scrutiny, although an indication of the literary quality of La Reprise was its 
nomination for the Prix Gmicourt in 2001, Robbe-Grillet remains, therefore, an 
important figure in the French culture of the twenty-first century. 2 
Robbe-Grillet came to prominence as a novelist as part of the Nouveau Romati in 
the 1950s, together with a group of writers published by the Editions de Minuit, including 
Claude Simon, Michel Butor, Nathalie Sarraute and others. Although not a literary 
school, their works nevertheless displayed some common concerns, not least of which 
was a rejection of literary convention or realist mimesis in favour of an interest in 
experimentation with novelistic form. By the early sixties, Robbe-Grillet's career as a 
novelist had branched out into writing cin&romans, a hybrid form that can function as 
screenplays, but can also be read as novels. In this respect, his career is comparable to 
that of Marguerite Duras, another Mittuit novelist whose early forays into film also 
included writing a screenplay for the director Alain Resnais. 3 Both Robbe-Grillet and 
Duras later became directors in their own right. Common to both was that the avant- 
garde style of their novels was reflected in their films, linking them with the Nouveau 
1 Namely, La Reprise and Cest Gradiva qui vous appelle. At a film retrospective at the CWma Lux, Caen, 
in June 2002, Rcnd Prddal (NN ho at the time was preparing a book on Robbe-Grillct's films) revealed that 
the latter was unlikely ever to be made into a film, given the difficulty of securing funding for the project. 
2 The enduring influence of Robbe-Grillet tipon French literature was attested to by a group of young 
French writers at a discussion evening in his honour at the Centre Pompidou in Paris in November 200 1. 
3 Marguerite Duras, Hiroshima mon amour (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), and Alain Robbe-Grillet, L Ann& 
DerWre 6 Afarienbad (Paris: Editions Fai lu, copyright Les Editions de Afinuit, 196 1), 
3 
CiWma of which Robbe-Grillet, Duras, Resnais and Jean-Luc Godard were part. The 
evolution of Robbe-Grillet's twin careers developed along broadly similar lines, although 
his films and novels are separately conceived projectS. 4 Initially, then, his earliest films 
and novels tended to follow the mental processes of one or more characters, presenting 
their perceptions in such a way as to focus upon objects, filtered through a disturbed or 
obsessed mind. This phase was displaced by the Nouveau Nouveau Roman period of his 
work, which represented a change in terms of its consciously self-reflexive play of forms, 
often generated by a set of recurrent themes or motifs borrowed from popular culture. 
This was reflected in his cinema of the same era, with LEden et qprýs, for example, 
structured according to a list of themes repeated across the film. The idea of generating 
and constructing texts was taken further in Robbe-Grillet's collaborations with 
photographers and artists, wherein the impulse for the texts written by Robbe-Grillet 
were paintings and photographs, published alongside the texts. Parts of the resultant texts 
were then pieced together to form novels, published in their own right without the 
images. 5 Following this, Robbe-Grillet's work took a different turn in the 1980s with the 
move towards auto-fiction, a semi-fictional form of autobiography. His autobiography 
was in three parts, collectively titled Rontanesques, to suggest their novel-like form. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, he made only two films, La Belle Captive and Un Bruit qui rend 
fou. These films still bore the marks of the self-reflexive devices of his films of the late 
1960s and 1970s, and contained many inter-textual and inter-filmic references to his 
novels and previous films. Following his series of auto-fictions, Robbe-Grillet has 
4 For example, he would not consider malcing one of his novels into a film. 
5 Topologie d'une cit6jantime and Souvenirs A triangle dor. For details of the composition of these 
novels, see Bruce Morrissette's IntertextualAssemblage in Robbe-Grilletfrom Topology to the Golden 
Triangle (Fredericton, Canada: York Press, 1979). 
4 
returned to the novel and cini-roman in the twenty first century, with the publication of a 
novel and a screenplay. Like the two previous decades' films, these works demonstrate a 
continuing obsession with the themes that have always haunted his works, for example, 
alienation, eroticism, the lAyrinth, and continue to display an interest in self-reflexivity 
and the subversion of readerly expectation. 
It is the aim of this thesis to show that there is still great profit to be gained from 
an approach that has, for some considerable time, been all but abandoned. A 
phenomenological approach has the advantage of elucidating many important areas of 
Robbe-Grillet's work, from a unified theoretical standpoint. The topics it encompasses 
include his formal strategies'of questioning received ideas surrounding literature and 
cinema, and thereby open up the debate around cultural myth and stereotype, and the 
extent to which Robbe-Grillet is successful in achieving the subversion he aims for. 
Phenomenology also addresses the way in which Robbe-Grillet renders, in filmic or 
fictional terms, the embodiment of consciousness, the relation of consciousness to the 
objects of perception, and the way in which the embodied nature of consciousness affects 
the human experience of time, sexuality, and intersubjectivity. The phenomenological 
analyses to which Robbe-Grillet's novels were subjected in the earlier part of his career6 
can now be updated to incorporate a renewed critical interest in phenomenology as an 
f IM7 approach to I as well as to literature. This means that it is possible, for the first time, 
to analyse Robbe-Grillet's films and novels, together, from a phenomenological 
6 Book-Icngth studies were produced by Victor Carrabino, The Phenomenological Novel ofAlain Robbe- 
Grillet (Parma: C. E. M., 1974), and Olga Bernal, Alain Robbe-Grillet. le roman de I'absence (Paris: NRF 
Gallimard, 1964). 
' See, for example, Allan Casebier, Film and PhenomenoloSy (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 
1991) and Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 
1992). 
5 
standpoint, and from a standpoint of the debates surrounding phenomenology at the start 
of the twenty first century. Equally, this renewed phenomenological study of Robbe- 
Grillet's works allows for those novels written after the earlier phenomenological 
analyses to be subjected to phenomenological analysis for the first time. Furthermore, 
the present study will be one of the first to examine Robbe-Grillet's most recent works, 
La Reprise and Cest Gradiva qui vous appelle, in the context of his previous output. 
This thesis seeks to address the limitations of earlier phenomenological studies 
devoted to Robbe-Grillet, on severial fronts. Firstly, earlier phenomenological studies 
omit to mention his films, as a consequence of which no phenomenological analysis of 
his films currently exists. Secondly, Merleau-Ponty's later work, which offers a different 
perspective on the nature of intersubjectivity to that offered in his earlier work, is not 
covered by these studies. " Thirdly, they omit to mention the relationship between bodily 
existence and sexuality, a striking omission given that so much of Robbe-Grillet's work 
deals with sexuality and eroticism. This oversight is all the more surprising considering 
that, for Merleau-Ponty, perception and sexuality were always linked, and that bodily 
existence was necessarily sexual existence. 
The point of re-visiting phenomenological readings of Robbe-Grillet is to 
demonstrate that, following the decline of an interest in phenomenology, and since the 
influence of the structuralist readings of his works that began to dominate in the 1970s, 
the phenomenological approach has been unjustly sidelined. In the 1970s, Renato Barilli 
recognised that phenomenology might still be applicable to the Nouveau Nouveau 
8 In the case of Olga Bernal's phenomenological study of Robbe-Grillet, this is unsurprising since her book 
was published in the same year as Merleau-Ponty's Le Visible et Pinvisible. 
6 
Roman, in spite of Robbe-Grillet's increasing interest in a structure engendered by 
generative themes: 
Si, d'un c6t6, it ne faut pai interpr6ter Robbe-Grillet en entier avec des 
modOes qui sont de nos jours, s'iI faut penser qu'il ya eu un Robbe- 
Grillet H au. mod6le ph6nom6nologique et que celui-ci est un instrument 
toujours utilisable, it Wen reste pas moins qu'il est possible d'appliquer, 
r6trospectivement, les mod6les d'aujourd'hui au. premier Robbe-Grillet, et 
inversement, qu'une partie des mod6les ph6nom6nologi Tles sont encore 
quelque peu rentables pour les nouveaux d6veloppements. 
This thesis would go further than Barilli in claiming that the phenomenological approach, 
as it was left in the mid 1970s, left some unfinished business, and that it is indeed a very 
profitable means of understanding Robbe-Grillet, given the developments that have been 
made in phenomenological critical theory since then. Furthermore, this thesis would 
contend, whilst acknowledging that Robbe-Grillet structures his works according to 
generative themes and ludic self-references, that his art retains its embodied narrative 
structures. The objects upon which Robbe-Grillet's works focus still reveal an embodied 
consciousness, as Lise Frenkel remarked in a reply to Barilli's comments. She suggested 
that, even in a film such as Glissements progressifs du plaisir, which is structured around 
the generating elements of the shoe and the bottle, "il ya rapport symbolique ou f6tichiste 
entre l'objet et le sujet. Vobjet parle du sujet, et, donc, c'est une 6manation du sujet". lo 
This view is supported by a remark made by Robbe-Grillet in the same discussion: 
"C'est vrai que ( ... ) 
fai tenu A pr6ciser que le mat6riau qui servirait A 1'6tablissement des 
s6ries 6tait obligatoirement pour moi un signifi6, c'est-A-dire, comme I'a fait remarquer 
9 Renato Barilli, discussion of his paper 'Neutralisation et Diffdrence', in Jean Ricardou, ed., Colloque de 
Cerisy Robbe-Grillet vol. I (Paris: Union Gdndrale d'tditions, 1976), p. 437. 
10 Lise Frenkel, quoted in discussion on Barilli, in Jean Ricardou, ed., Colloque de Cerisy Robbe-Grillet 
vol. 1, p. 428. 
7 
Barilli, un objet intentionnel. "11 His films and novels continue to centre upon one or 
more characters through whose embodied consciousness objects in the world are 
mediated, and, as in his early narratives, no privileged omniscient perspective is allowed, 
the bodies of the protagonists form the centrepoints for his narratives. These bodies, 
furthermore, remain phenomenological ones, they are always already in the world, a 
world of cultural significance that they cannot shake off. Thus, Robbe-Grillet's 
narratives continue to render bodily perception and situation, time, sexuality and 
I 
intersubjectivity in the same way that they did during his early career, from an embodied 
perspective whose mediation of the world is always via the culture of which, as 
phenomenology teaches us, it is already a part. Therefore, this thesis seeks to offer an 
enriched understanding of his filmic and fictional narratives via a revised evaluation and 
understanding of his formal strategies. 
In reviewing the wealth of commentaries on Robbe-Grillet, the sheer range of 
critical approaches is remarkable. An early indication of this was Roland Barthes' 
comment in his preface to Bruce Morrissette's Les Romans de Rohbe-Grillet. 12 In this 
discussion, Barthes identifies two Robbe-Grillets, the chosiste and the subjective. As 
studies of his works proliferated, more and more Robbe-Grillets surfaced; so many in 
fact, that one might be tempted to argue that it is possible to identify almost as many 
Robbe-Grillets as there are studies of his works. In spite of the overwhelming volume of 
works devoted to Robbe-Grillet, it is nevertheless possible here to identify the major 
contributions to scholarly understanding of Robbe-Grillet, contributions which have been 
" Robbe-Grillet, quoted in discussion on Barilli, in Jean Ricardou, ed., Colloque de Cerisy Robbe-Grillet 
vol. I p. 410. 
8 
influential in driving forward the debates surrounding his works. As a means of 
contextualising the usefulness of this thesis, it is necessary to evaluate the commentaries 
provided by previous studies devoted to Robbe-Grillet. The following survey will 
provide an account of the development of reaction to his works that is both representative 
of the field and that foregrounds those figures whose contributions may be considered as 
being of most importance. 
Pour Un Nouveau Roman 
Before turning to evaluate the contributions made by those previous studies, it is 
first important to consider the claims Robbe-Grillet makes about his own works. It is 
fortunate for scholars of Robbe-Grillet that he has shown a constant willingness to give of 
his time and his opinions in numerous media interviews, colloquia and other public 
meetings. As well as these public appearances, he has taken up his pen to write about his 
aims as a novelist and filmmaker, and he justifies and comments at length on his choice 
of methods and subject matter. One of the best examples of this is the collection of 
articles he wrote that were gathered together and published under the title Pour Un 
Nouveau Roman. 13 In this collection, Robbe-Grillet set out his vision of the novel, in 
what came to be seen as a manifesto for the group of writers who took their name from 
this work, the writers of the nouveau roman. Pour Un Nouveau Roman expounds an 
eschewal of past conventions of literature, particularly those of the nineteenth century 
realist novel, as exemplified by Balzac. For Robbe-Grillet, realism is constructed from a 
series of commonly accepted meani of representing reality. Anthropomorphic metaphor, 
12 Bruce Morrissette, Les Romans de Robbe-Grillet (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1963). 
9 
for example, is common in this literary genre. An empty chair might be a symbol of an 
absent person in the Balzacian novel, whereas for Robbe-Grillet, it is merely an object. It 
is neither significant nor absurd, it simply is. Robbe-Grillet surely makes a justifiable 
point here; it would appear that, in realism, the extent to which a literary description of an 
object is considered realistic depends upon the extent to which it fits into codified, 
expected conventions: 
D6ji l'observateur le moins conditionn6 ne parvient pas A voir le monde 
qui 1'entoure avec des yeux libres. ( ... 
)A chaque instant, des franges de 
culture (psychologie, morale, m6taphysique, etc. ) viennent s'ajouter aux 
choses, leur donnant un aspect moins 6tranger, plus compr6hensible, plus 
rassurant. ( ... 
) Nous sommes habitu6s A ce que cette litt6rature ( ... 
) 
fonctionne come une grille, munie de verres diversement color6s, 
14 
qui 
d6compose notre champ de perception en petits carreaux assimilables. 
Robbe-Grillet- claims that such literary techniques are outdated, and proposes to rid 
objects in literature of, for example, deceitful metaphoric devices, in favour of 
descriptions of objects as simple objects. Vision has a kind of cleansing power for 
Robbe-Grillet, it removes the apparent psychological depth which surrounds objects in 
the realist novel and instead allows their surfaces to be described, so that objects as they 
really are may be laid bare. Hence, it is the object itself, not the culturally loaded or 
I 
metaphoric meaning it has acquired, that is to be foregrounded in the Nouveau Roman. 
Robbe-Grillet's Nouveau Roman project is set in the context of the changing face 
of literature since Balzac. One might summarise his position by saying that it is as 
though the reader of the Nouveau Romati, after having read realist literature, is suffering 
from a hangover, the intoxicating effects of which mean that he or she is unable to adjust 
13 Alain Robbe-Grillet Pour Un Nouveau Roman (Paris: Gallimard, [n. d. ], V published by Les Editions de 
Minuit, 1963). 
14 jbid, pp. 20-2 1. 
10 
to the subsequent developments in literature. What is surprising about this, for Robbe- 
Grillet, is that the novel has beq undergoing a process of evolution ever since the 
nineteenth century, and that the Nouveau Roman is only a continuation of that process: 
Et, depuis [Balzac et Stendhal], I'dvolution n'a cess6 de s'accentuer: 
Flaubert, Dostolievsky, Proust, Kafka, Joyce, Faulkner, Beckett... Loin de 
faire table rase du pass6, c'est sur les noms de nos pr6d6cesseurs que nous 
nous sommes le plus ais6ment mis d'accord; et notre ambition est 
seulement de les continuer. Non pas de faire mieux, ce qui n'a aucun 
sens, mais de nous placer A leur suite, maintenant, A notre heure. 15 
Robbe-Grillet identifies certain features of the novel that are considered necessary in 
"good quality" realist literature, features that are deemed to give the novel its depth and 
reality. These include, for example, characterisation whereby a character has a first name 
and a surname, a family background, a character which dictates the manner in which he 
or she will behave, and facial featutes that reflect this character. As Robbe-Grillet points 
out, even before the time when he began writing, Camus and Sartre already had included 
characters in LEtranger and La Nausie who did not conform to these expectations. 
Thus, conventional notions of characterisation, handed down from nineteenth century 
realism, had already been outdated for some years, as is evidenced by Robbe-Grillet's 
listing of writers since realism in the quotation above. In Robbe-Grillet's Nouveau 
Roman therefore, characters often have no name, or if they do, it is reduced to the most 
basic form of reference, as with the simple initial designating A... in La Jalousie, for 
example. A similar process of naming characters is to be found in the cin&roman 
L'Immortelle; the principal character or narrateur, N, is named by an initial for the reader 
of the cing-roman. The attentive viewer may, however, notice that L very briefly 
remarks that he has a Greek name, Andrd. Similarly, in other nouveaux romanciers' 
11 
works, such as Butor's La Modification, the protagonist (and, by implication the reader? ) 
is referred to as vous, his name is scarcely ever revealed to the reader. 
In a similar vein, the idea that a novel must tell "a story", and that it must be told 
in a smooth, continuous manner, without the interruptions, gaps, or other unexplained 
episodes that are characteristic of the New Novel is another outmoded feature of realist 
literature, claims Robbe-Grillet; such features would be considered "faults", according to 
realist conventions. Robbe-Grillet also outlines other features he considered important to 
the Nouveau Roman, including its lack of political engagement, for example, stemming, 
for him, from the need for writers to be engaged with the possibility of an artistic, rather 
than a political revolution. 
In a fýrther reaction against realist literature, Robbe-Grillet suggests in Pour Un 
Nouveau Roman that, just as a rejection of realism signals an end to anthropomorphism 
and metaphor, so it entails a rejection of omniscient narration. That is, in realist 
literature, the narrative persP'ective is frequently that of an all-knowing, God-like 
narrator, one who has knowledge of the actions and thoughts of all the characters. This, 
to Robbe-Grillet, bears no resemblance to reality; nobody (with the possible exception of 
I 
a god) has access to all events and thoughts at the same time: 
Qui d6crit le monde dans les romans de Balzac? Quel est ce narrateur 
omniscient, omnipr6sent, qui se place partout en rnýme temps, qui voit en 
mEme temps 1'endroit et 1'envers des choses, qui suit en m6me temps les 
mouvements du visage et ceux de la conscience, qui connalt A la fbis le 
pr6sent, le pass6, et I'avenir de toute aventure? Qa ne peut Etre qu'un 
Dieu. 
. C'est Dieu seul qui peut pr6tendre 6tre objectif Tandis que dans 
nos livres, au contraire, c'est un homme qui voit, qui sent, qui imagine, un 
homme situ6 dans Fespace et le temps, conditionn6 par ses passions, un 
homme comme vous et moi. Et le livre ne rapporte rien d'autre que son 
15 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, p. 146. 
12 
exp6rience, limit6e, incertaine. C'est un hornme d'ici, un hornme de 
maintenant, qui est son propre narrateur, enfin. 16 
1 
It is this reaction against an omniscient narration that leads the Nouveau Ronzan to 
describe events from a human perspective, one which, by definition, cannot have access 
to all events at once, which can only narrate what is experienced at any one time. This is 
what leads Rqbbe-Grillet to claim that: "le nouveau roman ne s'int6resse qu'A I'homme 
et A sa situation dans le monde" 17 and that "le nouveau roman ne vise qu'A une 
subjectivit6 totale. "18 Robbe-Grillet, then, is making two important claims about his 
literature and that of his Notiveau Roman colleagues: firstly that objects are described 
just as objects, and secondly that they are described from a human perspective. The 
importance of these two points is reflected by early critical responses to Robbe-Grillet's 
works, especially the reactions of Roland Barthes and Bruce Morrissette. The key to the 
difference between the positions of Barthes and Morrissette in terms of their analyses of 
Robbe-Grillet is that whereas Barthes sees the description of objects as having no further 
significance, for Morrissette, they hint at a human mind which is perceiving these objects, 
often because*they have some kind of significance for the state of mind of the perceiver. 
This is summed up by Robbe-Grillet when he comments: 
Wme si l'on trouve beaucoup d'objets, et d6crit avec minutie, il ya 
toujours et d'abord le regard qui les voit, la pens6e qui les revoit, la 
passion qui les d6forme. 19 
In order to examine this further, it is apt at this point turn to consider how critics have 
variously responded to Robbe-Grillk's works. 
16 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, p. 149. 
17 Ibid, p. 147. 
18 Jbid, p. 148. 
13 
Barthes and chosisme 
There is a similarity between what Robbe-Grillet claims for his New Novel in 
terms of describing objects juit as objects and the interpretation of his works proposed by 
Roland Barthes, one of the first commentators to have devoted serious study to Robbe- 
Grillet's novels. The approach suggested by Barthes is variously known as the chosiste 
I 
or ecole du regard interpretation of Robbe-Grillet's work; that is, things themselves are 
of importance, descriptions are favoured over explanations, the world is rendered in terms 
which give it no meaning beyond the bare fact of its existence. 20 Barthes outlines his 
reading of Robbe-Grillet in 'Litt6rature Objective' and 'Litt6rature Litt6rale' .21 Robbe- 
Grillet's literature could be considered objective, for Barthes, in that it was concerned 
with the description of objects in a way that was not culturally loaded: 
L'6criture de Robbe-Grillet est sans alibi, sans 6paisseur et sans 
profondeur: elle reste A la surface de Fobjet et la parcourt 6galement, sans 
privil6gier telle ou telle de ses qualit6s ( ... 
) le langage ( 
... 
) est charge de 
"peindre" l'objet ( 
... 
) l'objet de Robbe-Grillet West pas compos6 en 
profondeur; il ne prot6ge pas un cocur sous sa surface (et le r6le 
traditionnel du litt6rateur a 6t6 jusqu'ici de voir, derri6re la surface, le 
secret des objets); non, ici, l'objet Wexiste pas au deli de son 
phdnom&ne. 22 1 
It is striking that Robbe-Grillet and Barthes both identify the same feature in Robbe- 
Grillet's works, namely the surface of objects, as being of importance: "la surface des 
19 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, p. 147. 
20 Not all reactions to Robbe-Grillet the chosiste were favourable, see for example Pierre de Boisdeffre, La 
Cafeti&e est sur la table ou contre le nouveau roman (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1967). 
21 Both these and other articles analysing Robbe-Grillet's works are reproduced in Barthes' (Euvres 
CompMtes 3 Tomes (Paris: Editions du Scuil, 1993). 'Littdrature Objective' is also reproduced in Frangois 
Jost ed., ObliquesIRobbe-Grillet, 16 - 17 (Nyons: Editions Borderie, 1978), pp. 69-73. 22 Roland Barthes, Uttdrature Objective' in Franqois Jost ed., ObliqueslRobbe-Grillet, p. 69. 
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choses a cess6 d'Etre pour nous le masque de leur cocur". 23 Barthes' observations are 
certainly consistent with what Rýbbe-Grillet states as his aims of overthrowing the 
conventions of realism in Pour Un Nouveau Roman. However, this thesis will argue that 
such a subversion of literary conventions can also be explained by the process of 
phenomenological reduction, which turns attention to objects as they appear in 
perception. The advantage of this approach over Barthes' chosisme is that it allows for 
an examination of many other thematic aspects of Robbe-Grillet's works, and 
demonstrates that these objects are never entirely stripped of their cultural significance; 
the fact that they have been foregrounded in the Robbe-Grillet's narratives is because 
they do have a meaning for the consciousness that perceives them. 
Barthes' other main essay on Robbe-Grillet, entitled Titterature litt6rale', 
I 
concerns the use of objects in the production of the story, with particular reference to Le 
Voyeur; they are 'literal' objects, since, without them, the crime does not exist: 
11 est remarquable que nous ne connaissons du crime ni des mobiles, ni des 
dtats, ni m8me des actes; ( ... 
) Les donn6es de Phistoire ( 
... 
) sont rHuites 
ä quelques objets surgis peu ä peu de l'espace et du temps sans aucune 
contiguit6 causale avec. 24 
However, in spite of the influence this approach had during the early part of his career, 
critics began to realise that to claim that Robbe-Grillet's work deals uniquely with 
chosiste descriptions does not do justice to all aspects of his work. As mentioned above, 
Robbe-Grillet outlines another possible approach in Pour Un Nouveau Roman, when he 
claims that nouveaux romans are always narrated from a human point of view, and this 
23 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, p. 27, original emphasis. 
24 Roland Barthes, (Euvres Completes, p. 1213. 
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influenced thý subsequent phase of critical comment on his works, the psychological 
interpretation. 
Morrissette and psychological interpretations 
Opposed to Barthes' chosiste interpretation is the claim that Robbe-Grillet's 
novels are deeply psychological. A psychological account of his work would assert that, 
I 
in many cases, a disturbed or traurnatised mind is at work in the narrative, that the 
workings of the narrator's mind can be deduced by the reader, via a series of narrative 
devices. Therefore, placing emphasis solely on the neutral description of objects no 
longer reveals the whole picture, in this interpretation. This is the position argued by 
Bruce Morrissette, whose work Les Romans de Robbe-Grillet has become an essential 
reference point for subsequent studies on Robbe-Grillet. Morrissette aims at a 
recuperation of the "stories" told by Robbe-Grillet's novels; he explains them by a close 
examination of the plot of each novel, and by revealing the novels' implied psychology. 
Barthes' introduction to Morrissette's study was noteworthy for its condemnation of 
Morrissette's reading of Robbe-Grillet; indeed, as Morrissette himself admits, Barthes' 
remarks included; 
expressions of regret at seeing the old "non-significant" Robbe-Grillet of 
the "mat surfaces" threatened with replacement by a Robbe-Grillet who 
creates levels of meaning, employs things or objects not in neutral 
isolation or detachment but in a referential manner - as objective 
correl4tives or supports of human emotions: in a word, by a Robbe-Grillet 
who, for all the newness of his techniques, composes novels. 25 
25 Bruce Morrissette, Alain Robbe-Grillet (NeNv York and London: Columbia University Press, 1965), 
pp. 8-9, origirW emphasis. 
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Morrissette devotes a great deal of effort to explaining exactly what he means by 
I 
"objective correlatives" in Les Romans de Robbe-Grillet. Whereas a chosiste 
interpretation of Robbe-Grillet's novels would have it that the surface of objects revealed 
nothing more of significance, the psychological implications of Morrissette's reading 
meant that they were deeply significant. Thus, the obsessive attention paid to objects by 
the characters in Robbe-Grillet's novels is indicative of a psychological state wherein a 
character's consciousness, disoriented by some shock or trauma, fixes upon certain 
objects. These objects, for the reader, become associated with the character's state of 
mind. The millipede in La Jalousie, for example, becomes associated, for the reader, 
with adultery, since it is the thing upon which the (absent-present) narrating 
consciousness of that novel focuses; during moments when it feels jealous. 
It is important to outline in what way Morrissette considers these "objective 
correlatives" are to be differentiated from conventional literary devices such as 
metaphors or symbols. Unlike the conventional symbol, the association of objects and 
emotions in Iýobbe-Grillet's works does not rely on analogies of form and function, there 
is no perpetuation of an already existing literary device. That is, Robbe-Grillet allows no 
anthropomorphic metaphors in his fiction; there is a correlation between a state of mind 
and the object of consciousness, but again, the object never stands for that state of mind 
in the way that a pre-established symbol does in, for example, realist literature. 
Morrissette, whilst acknowledging that some critics do not agree that Robbe-Grilletian 
things are not artificially created symbols, nevertheless argues that, in his view, they are 
different from analogies, because: 
Pour Robbe-Grillet, si l'objet peut "supporter" une passion, une obsession, 
ou toute autre charge affective, c'est pour la simple raison que Fhomme ne 
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saurait exister que par la perception des objets. L'ontologie n6o- 
existentielle de Robbe-Grillet, rdp6tons-le, place Phomme au milieu 
d'objets qui, devenant les supports de ses pens6es-images et de, ses 
sentiments-images lui permettent d'exister, et sans lesquels il cesserait 
d'exister, car il n'y aurait plus alors dans son esprit que le ndant absolu. 26 
In saying this, Morrissette is effectively appealing to an existential-phenomenological 
account of human consciousness to back up his arguments. He refers several times in Les 
Romans de Robbe-Grillet to phenomenology, to demonstrate that the objects described in 
Robbe-Grillet's works are perceived from a human perspective. So, in spite of the 
supposed "implied psychology" that he reads into Robbe-Grillet's novels, there is also a 
reliance upon another theoretical framework, that of phenomenological philosophy. 
Morrissette also examines other important aspects of Robbe-Grillet's works; he 
concentrates on, for example, the question of narrative perspective in Le Voyeur, 
elucidating the way in which, although narrated in the third person, the reader is 
nevertheless able to grasp Mathias' mental states, to appreciate the tension he feels. An 
understanding of what is happening in the mind of Mathias can also help to explain the 
way in which scenes in the novel aTe joined together in what may at first appear a rather 
disjointed manner: 
Rien de plus coh6rent dans Le Voyeur que le rapport constant entre la 
psychologie implicite de Mathias et Fenchalinement des sc&nes: retours en 
arri&re, visions projet6es dans le futur, d6formations de la r6alit6, sc6nes 
fig6es ( 
... 
) tout s'explique en fonction de son complexe, ofj se m6lent 
1'6rotisme, la terreur de 1'6chec, la volontd d6sesp6r6e de passer pour un 
hommt normal. Tout est en fonction d'une schizophr6nie sadique ( ... 
)27 
Thus, the question of the non-chronological presentation of events is also understandable 
in psychological terms, for Morrissette. 
26 Morrissette, Les Romans de Robbe-Grillet, p. 68. 
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It is notable that, as with his explanation of Robbe-Grillet's use of "objective 
correlatives", Morrissette's reading of La Jalousie also leans upon phenomenological 
philosophy. In a book that deals ostensibly with the psychology (or implied psychology) 
of Robbe-Grillet's novel, this is rather unexpected. He identifies a "je-n6ant" at the heart 
of the novel, a centre (or lack thereof? ) from which the narration emanates; a human 
consciousness that is conscious of the objects in its environment. Morrissette claims that 
the justification for Robbe-Grillet's technique of objels-supporls or corrilalifs-exterieurs 
is reinforced by what he perceives to be its psychological verisimilitude. 28 That his 
argument should be reinforced by phenomenology rather than couched purely in 
psychological theory appears to be at odds with his aim of elucidating a psychological 
account of Robbe-Grillet's novels. However, Morrissette does not acknowledge that of 
his use of phenomenology at times rivals what he claims is a psychological approach. It 
does, however, indicate that Morrissette sees compelling reasons to claim that there are, 
at the very least, parallels between existential phenomenology and Robbe-Grillet's works, 
if not a demonstrable phenomenological underpinning. 
Morrissette does, however, follow his professed interest in reading Robbe-Grillet 
along psychological lines when examining L'Annýe deridire ti Marienbad. Although 
Marienbad might not apparently be an obvious choice for a book on Robbe-Grillet's 
novels, it nevertheless exists in the form of a cini-roman, a work which reads not so 
much as a novel, as a description of the film, and is therefore different from a 
I 
straightforward screenplay. Morrissette points to the fact that Robbe-Grillet has himself 
27 Morrissette, Les Romans de Robbe-Grillet, p. 106. 
28 Ibid., p. 112, see footnote. 
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1 29 claimed that the cinematic image expresses a kind of 'Wa146 mentale' , and this 
provides the impetus for Morrissette's psychoanalytical reading of the film. Following 
from Robbe-Grillet's suggeition that the film depicts the story of a persuasion, 
Morrissette argues that the house in which the characters find themselves might be seen 
as a clinic, where A is receiving treatment from X, her psychiatrist. Given this 
interpretation of the film, her past 
ýas been suppressed, and other psychoanalytic details 
are present in the form of the Freudian corridors, the narcissistic bedrooms and the 
gunshots as signs of impotence . 
30 This, then, is a more straightforwardly psychological 
reading of Robbe-Grillet. 
It should be mentioned at this point that another commentator on Robbe-Grillet's 
novels has applied the possibility of a psychological reading very strictly and literally to 
his work. Rosanne Weil-Malherbe's brief study 31 is a psychological account of Robbe- 
Grillet's fiction that, whilst acknowledging the infiuence of Morrissette, goes beyond 
Morrissette's psychology by its close adhesion to clinical psychology. Her examination 
of Le Voyezir is a thoroughgoing account of what she sees as the clinical condition from 
I 
which Mathias is suffering. She painstakingly elucidates the symptoms that a patient 
suffering from a particular form of epilepsy might be expected to display, and 
demonstrates that Mathias' behaviour in Le Voyeur is entirely consistent with such 
symptoms. Consequently, the conclusions she draws are somewhat different to those of 
Morrissette. Whilst, for Morrissette, Mathias is a sadistic schizophrenic, for Weil- 
Malherbe, he suffers from psychomotor epilepsy. Morrissette's "diagnosis" would make 
29 Morrissctte, Les Romans de Robbe-Grillet, see Morrissette's summary of Robbe-Grillet's ideas on 
cinema, p. 192. 
30 Ibid., see pp. 198-199. 
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Mathias a rare case, Weil-Malherbý argues, and his position does not fully take account 
of Mathias' behaviour, which swings from searching desperately to find out what 
happened, and behaving awkwardly, to then behaving rationally. Although it is true, she 
argues, that if Mathias were a schizophrenic, then he might suffer from confused states of 
mind, it would not be the case that he would seek to retrace his movements, since he 
would be indifferent to the consequences of his actions. 
Although acknowledging the valuable contribution, and the influence on critical 
understanding of Robbe-Grillet offered by these psychological readings, this thesis 
contends that a phenomenological approach offers a more comprehensive overview. This 
is because it can account for the mental processes of characters in the films and novels, 
I 
but in a different way from the psychological readings offered by Morrissette and Weil- 
Malherbe; that is, it can account for Robbe-Grillet's formal strategies of making strange, 
in addition offering new ways of understanding the rendering of perception, time, 
intersubjectivity and sexuality in Robbe-Grillet's film and fiction. 
The generation game 
During the 1970s, a new approach to Robbe-Grillet's works began to emerge. 
The notion that Robbe-Grillet's works were structured around a system of repeated 
words, images, etc., had already been suggested by G6rard Genette, 32 but his ideas were 
taken further by another figure who came to be strongly associated with this approach - 
the Nouveau Roman author and theorist, Jean Ricardou. Ricardou's theories on Robbe- 
Grillet advanced the idea that his novels were driven by linguistic generators, by a kind of 
3' Rosanne Weil-Malherbe, 'Le Voyeur de Robbe-GriHet: un cas d'ýpilepsie du type psychomoteur', 
French Review, 3 8,1, (October 1964), 469-476. 
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word play. For example, in Pour une INorie A tiouveau romatt, Ricardou makes a 
detailed analysis of the use and re-use of the word rouge in Projet pour une revolution ci 
New York. 33 He identifies a great many linguistic transformations throughout the novel 
such as anagrams or near-anagrams, homophones, etc. His interest here in such linguistic 
elements is strongly reminiscent of Saussurean theories of linguistics, wherein signifiers 
I 
are differentiated from one another on a basic level via graphological differences. 34 
Thus, for Ricardou, the play of signifiers in Robbe-Grillet's works was emphasised over 
that which they signified. However, Ricardou's relationship with the Nouveau Roman 
was not always a happy one; Robbe-Grillet questioned Ricardou's analysis of Projetpour 
une r6whiliond New York at the Colloque de Cerisy. In his communication 'Sur le choix 
des gdndrateurs', 35 Robbe-Grillet expressed his unease with Ricardou's analysis on two 
levels. Firstly, it is Robbe-Grillet's belief that to link words in this way is not concordant 
with any conscious production of meaning; i. e. it is too random a process. Robbe-Grillet 
claimed to prefer a conscious production of meaning, leading to his second point, that the 
meanings of the words, and the themes linking them were important to him, rather than 
the playful re-combinations of sounds and spellings suggested by Ricardou. Robbe- 
Grillet claimed to take elements of the society around him and to use them in a new way, 
so that, rather than to use Ricardou's example of the word "rouge", Robbe-Grillet would 
instead take the "couleur rouge" as a theme that helps to structure the novel. Robbe- 
Grillet suggests that the spilling of blood, the glow of fire, the red flag of revolution are 
32 Gdrard Genette, 'Vertige Fixd' in Frangois Jost cd. ObliquesIRobbe-Grillet, pp. 95-106. 
33 Jean Ricardou, Pour une Worie du nouveau roman (Paris: Seuil, 1971), pp. 223-224. 
34 See Jean Duffy, Structuralism: Theory and Practice (Glasgow: University of Glasgow French and 
Gennan publications, 1992), p. 2. 
35 Alain Robbe-Grillet, 'Sur le choix des g6ndrateurs', in Jean Ricardou and Frangoise van Rossum-Guyon 
eds. Nouveau Roman: hier, aujourdhui 22 vols. (Paris: Union Gdndrale d'Editions, 1972), pp. 157-162. 
22 
all thematic variants that compose Projet pour une rdvolulioit d New York. It is this 
process of generating the text that allows Robbe-Grillet to play with the myths that 
surround him. 
The idea of combining thematic elements of the culture that surrounds him was a 
structural method that preoccupied Robbe-Grillet a great deal throughout his career. It 
was a technique that came to be known as bricolage, a term which, as Roch Smith 36 
notes, was used by Claude Ldvi-Strauss to describe a process of using whatever materials 
came to hand, wherein the resultant structure, rather than the composite materials 
themselves, was of importance. Robbe-Grillet uses this technique in a very systematic 
way in the planning of his film LEden et apris. The issue of Obliques devoted to his 
work reproduces a hand-written table in which twelve themes are combined and re- 
combined across five columns in order to plan out the film. 37 Roy Armes complains, in 
his structuralist analysis of Robbe-Grillet's films, that the claims Robbe-Grillet makes for 
the structure of LEden et apris are not easily identifiable when one attempts to analyse 
the film: 
The lack of marking of the set of themes denies one the aesthetic 
satisfaction of perceiving a fixed pattern underlying their subsequent 
returns and shifts. Without such a marking we cannot sense, at a viewing 
of the film, the order and necessity of its structure or answer so 
fundamental a question as why these particular ten series have been 
chosen out of the almost infinite range of possibilitieS. 38 
Whilst Armes' criticism is quite valid, it comes as no surprise that the serial structure is 
difficult to identify, even on close analysis. Sch6nberg's serialism, upon which Robbe- 
" Roch C. Smith, Understanding Alain Robbe-Grillet (Colombia: University of South Carolina Press, 
2000), see footnote 2, p. 102. 
" Frangois Jost ed., ObliqueslRobbe-Grillet, p. 197. 
38 Roy Armes, The Films ofAlain Robbe-Grillet (Amsterdam: Benjamins B. V., 198 1), p. 134. 
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Grillet's structural system is loosely based, is also virtually impossible to detect in his 
music, even to a trained ear. Serial music, which may be based upon a note row of, for 
example, twelve notes, requires that the notes be repeated in the same order in each 
series, but their pitch, duration and timbre may be varied with each repetition. This 
means that each series may sound radically different from the last. For example, a 
middle C played on a trumpet for four beats in one series could be changed into a top C 
played on a piano for one beat in the next, and so on for the other notes of the series. 
Robbe-Grillet's serialism is even more freely applied in LEden el apres, as he does not 
impose the restriction of using each of the themes (equivalent to musical notes) in the 
same order in each series, further compounding the difficulty of detecting a pattern 
running through the film. However, the point of serialism is not that the structure should 
be noticeable, rather, it is merely a means of organising or structuring music. As to why 
Robbe-Grillet has chosen these particular themes, Armes does not postulate a theory. 
However, they are themes with which he seems to be constantly preoccupied, and which 
appear repeatedly throughout his novels and films, particularly those of the 1970s. 
Armes' study of Robbe-Grillet's cinema is one of a number of structuralist studies 
of his works that focus upon an analysis of the formal and structural elements of his 
f IMS. 39 I Patterns are identified across a given work, establishing links between individual 
words, visuat images or audible elements. These elements are often repeated, re- 
combined, slightly altered each time they appear, or set in opposition to one another, and 
they give the work its structure and impetus. Often, for example, Robbe-Grillet sets up 
pairs of doubles in his works; characters have a look-alike, or a counterpart as is the case 
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with Violette and her sosie, or the artist Duchemin/Dutchman in LEden et qprýs. Also, 
characters may return to a place they have visited before, as with Mathias in Le Voyeur or 
Elias in Trans-Europ Express. Armes notes that events may occur in such a way that 
they could be plotted on a graph as forming aV or aU shape. In other words, at the 
middle of a film one will find a pivotal event, from which one can trace a symmetry of 
events in the first and second halves of the film; in this way, a film might begin and end 
with an event that happens in reverse. In LHoninie qui ment, for example, Boris emerges 
from the woods at the start of the film only to disappear back into them at the end. The 
structure of Robbe-Grillet's films, in other words, often doubles back on itself 
Structuralist analyses of Robbe-Grillet's films and novels, then, are concerned with the 
non-mimetic interplay of literary and cinematic language. Identifying connections such 
as these across a work enables the critic to lay bare the structural devices employed 
within it, and can raise an awareness of the way in which the fonnal aspects of a given 
work combine to construct its meaning. 
However, structuralist analyses, in spite of the dominance that they have enjoyed 
since the 1970s, do not account for everything that occurs in Robbe-Grillet's narratives, 
and this is where the value of returning to phenomenology is to be found. Although 
structuralist studies are an apt means of revealing the generative play that so keenly 
interested Robbe-Grillet, they overlook the fact that his narratives remain rooted in 
I 
embodied perspectives, and they ignore the cultural significance of the generating 
elements themselves. Ben Stoltzfus has recognised this, in his attempt to find a middle 
way between mimetic and reflexive interpretations of Robbe-Grillet's work. He 
39 See also Dorqinique CI'dteau and Franqois Jost, Nouveau Cinema, nouvelle s6miologie (Paris: 10/18 
Union Gdndrale d'Editions, 1978), Andrd Gardies, Le Cinema de Robbe-Grillet (Paris: Editions Albatros, 
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comments that although the serial patterns that structure some of Robbe-Grillet's novels 
signify nothing but themselveg, 
the novels do signify; they are not pure reflexive surfaces. Each novel 
transcends the autonomy of its parts, the adventure of writing, its own 
internal patterning. 40 
Although Stoltzfus concludes from his observation that generative play creates something 
out of nothing, the contention in this thesis is that generative play is not the only reason 
for the creation he identifies. That is, it is equally the case that, in spite of the waning of 
critical interest in phenomenology, it continues to be relevant to reading and viewing 
Robbe-Grillet's art. This manifests itself in the fact that his work continues to signify in 
ways that can be traced back to his early career and to the first phenomenological 
readings of his works in -terms of cultural embodiment. The importance of 
phenomenology as a critical approach has not been exhausted, even though it was 
overtaken by structuralism and consequently neglected as an analytical tool. 
Politics 
in spite of Robbe-Grillet's professed non-committed political stance in Pour Un 
Nouveau Roman, his works have nevertheless been subjected to scrutiny from a 
sociological or political standpoint. Lucien Goldmann's sociological study of the novel4l 
was the first of these, and concerns itself with establishing a link between the forrn of the 
novel and the state of society, in particular capitalist society. Goldmann argued that 
capitalist society, at the time Robbe-Grillet was writing, was characterised by a decrease 
1983), and Andrd Gardies, Alain Robbe-Grillet, Cindma d'aujourd'hui 70 (Paris: Editions Seghers, 1972). 
40 Bcn Stoltzfus, The Body ofthe Text (London: Associated University Press, 1985), p. 3 1. 
41 Lucien Goldniann, Pour Une Sociologie. du roman (Paris: Gallimard, 1965, second edition). 
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in importance of the individual and a corresponding increase in the importance of objects, 
and he saw this reflected in the important role played by objects in the work of Robbe- 
Grillet. Tribute is paid to Goldmann by Jacques Leenhardt at the beginning of his socio- 
political study of La Jalousie, a study which concentrates on the theme of colonialism in 
the novel . 
42 Leenhardt identifies a series of under control/out of control oppositions in 
the novel, such as for example, the way in which the "safe" environment of the interior of 
the house and the grounds visible from it represents an area over which the absent/present 
narrator has a degree of mastery. These areas are analogous with the order and control 
imposed by a colonial framework. Even the banana plants, visible from the house and 
I 
planted in ordered rows, are a demonstration of the extent to which the disorder of nature 
has been ordered by the colonial narrator. Conversely, anything that occurs beyond the 
boundary of the house and its grounds is characterised as dangerous, threatening, and 
represents the other. Thus, whatever happens during A... 's excursions with Franck is 
beyond the narrator's domain, remains unknown him, and cannot be influenced or 
controlled by him. So, there is something in her absence that potentially threatens the 
order established on the plantation. Also, A... 's apparent ease of communication with 
the servant boy is an indication of her identification with what lies beyond the house, 
with a somewhat unfathomable (because it is foreign to the colonialist) and therefore, 
perhaps, threatening environment. A... is therefore identified with danger, the unknown, 
disorder, and ultimately with sexual transgression in the form of adultery. 
42 JacquesLeenhardt, Lecturepolitiqueduroman: LaJalousiedM1ainRobbe-Grillet(Paris: LesEditions 
de Minuit, 1973). 
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In another political analysis of Robbe-Grillet's work, Lynn Higgins has aligned 
13 his output with a specific historical context. In her study of LAimee Demijre 6 
Marienbad, she points to Robbe-Grillet's role as a signatory, in 1960, of the so-called 
Manifeste des 121,44 as evidence of his opposition to the war in Algeria. However, 
Robbe-Grillet, in spite of having signed it, remarked: 
A P6poque de la guerre d'Alg6rie, je signais le Manifeste des 121, et je 
rien, mais je Wai jamais militais pour l'indýpendance du peuple alg6 ' 
f IMS. 45 introduit rien de tel dans mes romans ou mes 1 
His signing of the document signalled the apparent rapprochement of Robbe-Grillet and 
one of his immediate literary predecessors, Jean-Paul Sartre, who, according to Roger- 
Michel Allemand: 
voyait IA le signe d'une entrde dans le rang, d'un engagement du 
romancier en tant que tel, alors qu'il s'agissait uniqement de 1'engagement 
d'un homme priv6, sans que son ceuvre en porte aucune trace. 46 
Nevertheless, Higgins argues that something of the political and historical context of the 
time can be uncovered in the film. She argues that the mysterious initial letters that are 
used instead of names in the film can be understood as having a political significance. A, 
she suggests, might stand for Algeria, saying that Marienbad bears the "thematic impact 
of the historiqal moment of its creation". 47 Her suggestion is supported by the (literal) 
rape of A in the cin&ronian (omitted by Resnais in the film version), which might be 
seen as the metaphorical rape of Algeria, or the use of rape as a part of the war. 
43 Lynn Higgins, New Novel, New Wave, New Politics (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 
1996). 
44 More formally known as Ta Ddclaration sur le droit A l'insoumission dans la guerre d'Algdrie'. 45 Robbe-Grillet quoted in Olivier Corpct, and Emanuelle Lambert, Alain Robbe-Grillet le voyageur du 
nouveau roman: chronologie illustrý 1922 - 2002 (Paris: Editions de I'lMEC, 2002), p. 42. 46 Roger-Michel Allemand, Alain Robbe-Grillet (Paris: Seuil, 1997), p. 95. 47 Higgins, p. 108. 
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Political readings of Robbe-Grillet certainly offer an enlightening way of 
understanding his works. However, the discord between Robbe-Grillet and Sartre on the 
issue reveals, once again, a reason for reading Robbe-Grillet along phenomenological 
lines. If Sartre applauded Robbe-Grillet's personal engagement, he objected to his lack 
of literary engagement, accusing him, according to Allemand, of living in "un monde 
compl6tement abstrait et d6tachd des r6alitds socio-politiques de son temp ei, 48 resulting 
in a lack of human significance in his novels. As Allemand reminds us, the objects 
described by Robbe-Grillet are divested of pre-established meaning, but they are still 
objects described by a human consciousness, by a person who is already in the world. It 
is on this level that Robbe-Grillet considers his novels should engage with human 
significance, rather than on a political level. 
Post-modernism 
Robbe-Grillet's novels have also been examined in the light of critical theories 
since structuralism, by Brian McHale, 49 who again concentrates his study upon Robbe- 
Grillet's novels. McHale compares Robbe-Grillet's novels before and since La Maison 
de rendez-vous, identifying features which, he contends, make Robbe-Grillet (since La 
Maison de rendezz-vous) a post-modernist writer. McHale concentrates upon the 
destabilising of the narrative world in Robbe-Grillet's novels, via such features as the 
splintering of the narrative point of view, the self-erasure of the text, and disjointed 
depictions of time and space, claiming that these are what make Robbe-Grillet a post- 
modernist writer. However, this thesis, in addition to offering an analysis of Robbe- 
48 AlIcniand, p. 93. 
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Grillet's films, which have not been covered by McHale's reading, contends that 
questions of multiple points of view, time and space, etc., may still be accounted for in 
phenomenological terms, even in the later works of Robbe-Grillet's career. 
Feminist objections 
An area of great debate in relation to Robbe-Grillet is the depiction of sexuality in 
his film and fiction. 50 The sadoerotic content of Robbe-Grillet's works means that they 
have been the. subject of some controversy. Understandably, much of the condemnation 
received has been from feminist critics, although not exclusively from females. John 
Fletcher, for example, roundly condemns Robb e-Gril let. 51 Fletcher does take on board 
Robbe-Grillet's professed aims of creating works of hricolage, borrowing from popular 
culture in order to exaggerate and thereby undermine sexual stereotypes, however, he 
remains far from convinced by such justifications. He devotes a chapter of his book on 
Robbe-Grillet to the topic, carrying the following unequivocal warning: 
Robbe-Grillet's view of women's sexuality seems at best misleading and 
at worst sadistic and perverse, and his attempts in articles and interviews 
to argue that he is being ironic, self-aware and amusedly detached from 
these phantasms are not wholly convincing. [A] pornographic work of his 
( 
... 
) Temple aux miroirs, is sold in a sealed polythene cover and shows an 
obsessive and repellent interest in the genitals of little girls. Paedophilia, 
voyeutism and sadism are indeed the hallmarks of most of the works 
considered in this chapter, which are therefore not for the squeamish. 52 
It is against such accusations of pornography, then, that defenders of Robbe-Grillet have 
to make their case. Even Fletcher, amongst his scathing comments, admits that there is 
49 Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (Lodon and New York: Routledge, 1996, l' published by 
Methuen, 1987). 
50 See Raylene L. Ramsey, Robbe-Grillet andAfodernity (Gaincsville: University Press of Florida, 1992). 
51 John Fletcher, Alain Robbe-Grillet (London and New York: Methuen, 1983). 
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great complexity to be found in Robbe-Grillet, thereby perhaps implying that there is 
some hope that not all of his works are purely pornographic. Indeed, the general 
impression one has when dealing with his works, is not that their sole aim is to titillate 
(nor is this the effect they have); the sophistication of Robbe-Grillet's artistic endeavours, 
as Fletcher points out, prevent them from coming across as just pornography. It is 
precisely the subversion of genres (e. g. the vampire story) that leads one to believe that 
there is more at work in Robbe-Grillet's art than pornography. The depiction of sexuality 
in his novels and films, then, has provided rich pickings for commentators. 
I 
Susan Suleiman's article on Projet pour une r6voluflon d New York is one that is 
often mentioned by subsequent commentaries in considering the theme of sadism in 
Robbe-Grillet's works. 53 Although her analysis is a little more forgiving than Fletcher's, 
she still claims that Projet is "definitely a man's book7,54 arguing that it is a novel in 
which male fantasies of sexual power over females are repeated, rather than undermined. 
Suleiman's study suggests that Projet can be read as a male fantasy in more than one 
way, however. The text is self-engendered, it is the word of the male narrator that creates 
the text, thus removing any reliance upon female involvement in the process of textual 
(re)production. 
Whilst those who have taken Robbe-Grillet's side in this debate have followed 
I 
more or less the same line that he has, that is, the idea that he is exaggerating myths in 
order to expose them, what has not yet been attempted in relation to Robbe-Grillet's 
52 Fletcher, p. 58. 
53 Susan Suleiman, 'Reading Robbe-Grillet: Sadism and Text in Projet pour une r6volution 6 New York' in 
Romanic Review 67,1 (January 1977), 43-62, is considered in John Phillips, Forhidden Fictions., 
Pornography and censorship in twentieth-century French literature (London and Sterling, Virginia: Pluto 
Press, 1999). 
54 Ihid, p. 57. 
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depiction of sexuality is an explanation of it that integrates it into a phenomenological 
framework. This thesis will therefore attempt to address this omission in the light not 
only of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, but also of feminist comments upon the relationship 
between phenomenology and femiýism. Doing so allows for the influence of sexuality 
upon embodied perception to be brought into focus, and it also reveals a new assessment 
of Robbe-Grillet's stated aims of undermining sexual stereotypes. 
Phenomenological approaches 
Whilst hints as to the value of a phenomenological reading of Robbe-Grillet are, 
as has been noted, to be found amongst the pages of Morrissette's study of Robbe- 
Grillet's novels, some scholars have taken an even closer interest in this possibility, and 
have argued the case that his work may be best understood not from the context of 
psychology, but from that of phenomenological philosophy. Robbe-Grillet's interest in 
the portrayal of phenomena as perceived, rather than objects with a ready-made 
significance, is similar in intent to the phenomenologists' attempt to produce a 
descriptive philosophy. That is, phenomenology aims to describe the world as it is given 
to consciousness in perception, free from the prejudices and pre-conceptions of science 
and cultural conditioning. This process can be likened to the phenomenological 
reduction, wherein cultural expectations are put out of play (mise horsjeu), or bracketed 
(mise entre parenthises). The result of this process is that phenomena can be 
experienced taken out of their usual context, without any pre-established or expected 
meaning. However, in the absence of any cultural expectations, objects lose their 
familiarity, they appear strange, unexpected. Similarly, Robbe-Grillet's work contains 
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objects which are without obvious significance, allowing for a visual description of the 
surface of the object to take precedence over any symbolic meaning the reader may be 
tempted to colifer upon it. However, in phenomenological philosophy, there is always a 
human being who perceives these objects, who focuses upon certain objects rather than 
others, from among a field of objects. The situated nature of this narrator (or of the 
narrative perspective), in time and space in Robbe-Grillet's work is also analogous to the 
phenomenological account of a consciousness with a bodily situation in the world. The 
consequence of being an incarnate consciousness, for phenomenology, is that all 
I 
phenomena are experienced subjectively. This is the case in Robbe-Grilletian 
descriptions too - the viewpoint of the narrative or the angle of the camera is always that 
of a human being, whether or not it represents the perspective of one of the protagonists. 
Equally, as a result of having a spatial and temporal existence, time, for a 
phenomenologist, can only be experienced in the present. Memories of the past are re- 
experienced now in the present; the past and the future radiate out from one's position in 
the present. In Robbe-Grillet's art, it is often difficult to tell which images and 
perceptions are in the past, which in the present, and which are projections into the future 
or fantasies. Events are frequently relived, jumbled up with present events, which 
suggests, in accordance with the phenomenological account outlined here, that they are 
being re-lived now in the present. 
These, then, are some of the conclusions to be drawn from a phenomenological 
reading of Robbe-Grillet's novels, and some studies have already been devoted to 
elucidating hiý works from this perspective. The most important are those of Olga Bernal 
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and Victor Carrabino. 55 Bernal's study was the first book to be devoted to a 
phenomenological analysis of Robbe-Grillet's novels, and as such, is often a point of 
reference for subsequent studies of his works. Her study naturally only deals with 
I 
Robbe-Grillet's earliest novels, since it was published in 1964. The present study is 
therefore able to go beyond Bemal's contribution in that it covers his novels to date, as 
well as his films. Equally, this thesis will re-assess the early novels covered by Bemal in 
the light of subsequent theoretical developments in phenomenology, and in doing so, 
expand on the rather narrow focus offered by her study. Bemal's main concern was to 
elucidate what she saw as being at the heart of Robbe-Grillet's works, namely, an 
absence. His novels are all structured around an absence of some kind or another, she 
argues, and this is consistent with a phenomenological account of human existence. She 
argues for the link between phenomenology and Robbe-Grillet's novels in the 
introduction to her study: I 
Si tout 6tat de conscience est conscience de quelque chose, I'homme est 
bien oblig6 de sortir de lui-m8me, de chercher le compl6ment, l'objet de sa 
conscience dehors, dans le monde mat6riel auquel il est H 
indissolublement. 56 
Thus, Bernal sees the objects described by Robbe-Grillet as being not chosiste objects, 
but ones perceived by a human consciousness. She also sees Robbe-Grillet's aims as a 
novelist as comparable to those of modem artists; in that their aim is to suppress the idea 
of profundity that is to be found in conventional literature or art. This would also tend to 
support Barthes' view that Robbe-Grillet describes only the surface of things; just as 
5' See also George H. Szanto, Narrative Consciousness., Structure and Perception in the fiction ofKajka, 
Beckett and Robbe-Grillet (Austin and ýondon: University of Texas Press, 1972). Although not as 
rigorous in its application of phenomenological philosophy, Szanto's study bears some similarities to those 
of Bernal and Carrabino in its analysis of the exteriorising of consciousness. 
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modern art suppresses perspective and produces paintings whose pictorial space is 
presented on a flattened ground. This reveals something of the value of a 
phenomenological approach; it spans the range of insights offered by chosiste and 
psychological readings. Robbe-Grillet's refusal to go beyond an examination of the 
surface of things, comes about, for Bernal, because the literature of phenomena is not 
about presenting humankind in terms of richness and profundity, but about presenting 
human existence in terms of a hollow or hole. Furthermore, Bernal makes the case that 
the phenomenological reduction, a, process whereby prejudices and presuppositions are 
"bracketed" so as to allow for perception of the world as it really is, is comparable to 
Robbe-Grillet's art: 
La mise hors circuit de tout ce que nous dtions habitu6s A voir dans la 
peinture classique, Fabsence de tous ces points de rep6re, romanesques que 
nous constatons dans les romans de Robbe-Grillet nous font penser qu'il 
ne s'agit pas ici d'une mise en date rhdtorique des valeurs traditionnelles 
mais d'un effort radical pour retrouver I'aspect originaire des choses. 57 
Bernal considers that no matter how one tries to link Robbe-Grillet to his context in the 
history of French literature, one always returns to the phenomenological attitude, that is, 
the dominant attitude of the period at which he was writing when Bernal's study was 
undertaken. 58 She explains that what differentiates the thought and literature of one of I 
Robbe-Grillet's immediate literary predecessors, Jean-Paul Sartre, from Robbe-Grillet 
himself, is, as mentioned in respect of political approaches to Robbe-Grillet's work, 
Sartre's insistence upon the necessity of human political engagement. Sartre's work 
56 Bemal, p. 12. 
57 Ibid, p. 13. 
58 Ibid, seep. 13. 
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always requires a system of values, be they social, moral, etc. For Robbe-Grillet, on the 
other hand, human beings are not in a situation of values, but a situation of things. 59 
The main thrust of Bernal's argument, then, is that there is a nothingness at the 
centre of Robbe-Grillet's work, that things do not reveal a deeper meaning. The same is 
true of words, she argues, indicating descriptions of objects in Les Gommes that have no 
particular significance to the "story". However, she admits that it is difficult to find 
words that are neutral, as is demonstrated in Wallas' constant attempts to avoid raising 
suspicion about his movements. He finds that he has to create new lies to cover up the 
lies he has already told. She argues further, that in La Jalousie and Le Voyeur there is an 
absence at the centre of each -narrative, in the form of the absent/present narrator of La 
Jalousie and in the form of the absence of the central act (of possible rape and murder) in 
Le Voyeur. Bernal's reading of Robbe-Grillet, whilst persuasive, has its limitations. 
Although, obviously, when BernM was writing in the 1960s, the debates around 
phenomenology differed from present debates, her privileging of the notion of 
tiMnlisation at the centre of being means that her reading of Robbe-Grillet is narrowly 
focused. And, although this study clearly owes a debt to Bernal's, it will also advance 
her understanding of Robbe-Grillet in new ways. To that end, this study re-assesses the 
early novels of Robbe-Grillet, both in the interests of providing a comprehensive survey 
of his novels, and in the interests of bringing new phenomenological arguments to bear 
uponthem. 
Victor Carrabino's phenomenological study of Robbe-Grillet's novels has a wider 
focus than Bernal's, and is, in certain respects, a model for this thesis. His analysis is a 
I 
thoroughgoing exegesis of phenomenological philosophy, presented together with 
59 Bemal, see p. 20. 
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examples from Robbe-Grillet's novels to demonstrate the similarities between the two 
and the way in which phenomenology may helpfully explain various features of Robbe- 
Grillet's works. The present study will return at several points to consider Carrabino's 
important contribution in greater detail. In order to avoid repetition, therefore, it will not 
be outlined in great detail here. Once more, however, the striking omission of 
Carrabino's study is its lack of mention of Robbe-Grillet's films, and more surprisingly, 
given that it was published in 1974, its omission of Merleau-Ponty's later thought. The 
consequence of this is that Carrabiýo makes no mention of intersubjectivity as theorised 
by Merleau-Ponty in his Le Visible el Pinvisible, an important text as it represents a 
development on his thought in PhMoni&iologie de la perception. Equally, Carrabino's 
reading of Robbe-Grillet has other limitations. In his chapter on the epocN, or 
phenomenological reduction, for example, he mentions only one novel, La Jalousie. This 
study will examine a wider range of Robbe-Grillet's works than is analysed by Carrabino. 
These, then are the chief ways in which the work carried out already by Bernal and 
Carrabino may be enriched by a re-examination of Robbe-Grillet's works in the light of a 
phenomenological perspective. 
However, as well as outlining the benefits of a return to a phenomenological 
I 
reading of Robbe-Grillet, is important to anticipate any possible objections. One obstacle 
to be tackled for any re-visiting of phenomenology in relation to Robbe-Grillet is the 
objection to such an approach argued by Stephen Heath . 
60 Heath would reject any 
attempted phenomenological analysis of Robbe-Grillet on the grounds that in his 
theoretical pronouncements, especially in Pour Un Nouveau Roman, Heath sees a 
contradiction between Robbe-Grillet's position and that of phenomenological philosophy. 
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For Heath, Robbe-Grillet's insistence upon the cleansing power of vision would suggest 
that perception is a passive, rather than an active, act of consciousness. Hence the 
contradiction, since for Merleau-Pýnty, this would not be the case; perception requires 
some active participation on the part of the perceiver. 
Heath's analysis, even though it initially appears worrying for anyone attempting 
to align Robbe-Grillet with phenomenology, fails to account for some important 
considerations. Primarily, what is lacking in Heath's analysis is any mention of Robbe- 
Grillet's art. He does not ground his discussion in an examination of Robbe-Grillet's 
novels and films, but in his theories. Whilst it is of course important to consider an 
artist's stated aims, critical theories can oflen suggest valid approaches to an artist's 
ceuvre that may not have even occurred to him or her at the time of producing their works 
of art. Robbe-Grillet claims "Je ne suis pas th6oricien du roman"; 61 furthermore, he has 
I 
admitted that his pronouncements in Pour Un Nouveau Roman are, to some extent, an 
exaggeration of his theoretical position, and that his artistic practice does not always 
follow his theory to the letter. Thus, for example, Robbe-Grillet admitted at the Colloque 
de Cerisy held in his honour, that, having written Pour Un Nouveau Roman, he 
contradicted his theoretical statements in his artistic practice: 
Pendant que j'dcrivais cette condamnation d6finitive de la m6taphore, La 
Jalousie ne cessait de traiter des m6taphores. Le titre m8me (annonce de 
cette immense mdtaphore qui va se d6velopper dans le cours des pages) 
6tait pour moi extr6mement conscient. " 
60 Stephen Heath, The Nouveau Roman: A Study in the Practice of Mriting (London: Elek, 1972). 61 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, p. 7. 
62 Robbe-Grillet quoted in Jean Ricardou ed., Colloque de Cerisy Rohbe-Grillet vol. I (Paris: Union 
Gdndrale Aditions, 1976), p. 35. 
LEEDS UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
38 
What is of paramount importance in the case of Robbe-Grillet, then, is the study of his 
films and novels; after all, it is in his artistic practice that he puts his money where his 
mouth is, so to speak. Furthermore, although Robbe-Grillet does, as Heath indicates, 
emphasise the chosisle view of his descriptions of objects itt Pour Uti Nouveau Roman, 
thereby supporting Heath's arguments that Robbe-Grillet's account of vision might be 
likened to a passive, camera-eye, this is not the whole story. Robbe-Grillet also states in 
Pour Un Nouveau Roman that the objects described are always viewed from a human 
point of view, that they are significant to the character perceiving them, but that they are 
divested of the significance that might have been attached to them in conventional or 
realist literature, since such outmoded literary forms are precisely those that Robbe- 
Grillet seeks to overthrow. In this respect, one can argue against Heath, that Robbe- 
Grillet's theory does show signs of the influence of phenomenology. 
Scope of thesis and plan 
The main body of the present study will be devoted to an in-depth analysis of 
Robbe-Grillet's film and fiction, from the standpoint of phenomenological philosophy. A 
few words to explain the scope of this thesis are firstly in order, however. In the interests 
of a cohesive study, this discussion incorporates Robbe-Grillet's novels and films right 
across his career. 63 However, the autobiographical Romanesques are not included here, 
as they require a rather different approach. Whilst recognising the fact that Robbe- 
Grillet's works naturally reflect episodes of his own experience, life and interests, the 
6' Robbe-Grillet's photo- and picto-novels, consulted at the BiblioWque Nationale in Paris, would add 
nothing of substance to a phenomenological reading, and are not included in this study. However, their 
texts form part of Topologie dune citifant6me and Souvenirs A triangle dor, and therefore feature in this 
study in their incarnation as novels. * 
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question of distinguishing between his own life and his imaginary one in the 
Romanesques merits a study in itself Considerations of fictional narratives of 
I 
embodiment in Robbe-Grillet's works are the focus of this thesis, therefore to stray into 
the territory of facts about his life, to consider whether or not what he relates is fact or 
fiction, would be to move away from the intended focus. Furthermore, some 
commentators have already devoted works to the Romanesques, and have been able to 
supply the depth of detail deserving of such a topiC. 64 These studies have considered 
topics such as self identity at greater length than is possible here (although this study does 
touch upon it in chapter . six). In the 
interests, therefore, of maintaining a 
phenomenological focus upon the consequences of bodily experience as rendered via film 
and fiction, regrettably, the Romanesques have been set aside for the moment. In terms 
of Robbe-Grillet's films, exhaustive enquiries reveal that some titles are unavailable, and 
therefore these too have been sidelined. 65 
It is clear from the foregoing survey of works already published on Robbe-Grillet 
that he is a writer and filmmaker of great complexity, whose works may be elucidated 
profitably by. analyses from a great many different theoretical perspectives. The 
theoretical approach chosen here demands a revisiting for a number of reasons, as 
discussed. But, instead of returning to a purely Merleau-Pontyan perspective, this study 
also takes into account the development of his thought by others. Also, this thesis does 
'54 See, for example, Roger-Michel Allemand and Alain Goulet, Imaginaire, Ecritures, Lectures de Robbe- 
Grillet, d'Un fticide aux Romanesques (Lion-Sur-Mer: Arcane-Beaunieux, 1991), Sjef Houppermans, 
Alain Robhe-Grillet, A utobiographie (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993). 
'55 In November 200 1, at a discussion on his works in at the Pompidou Centre in Paris, Robbe-Grillet 
confirmed in person that Na pris les dis and Un Bruit qui rendfou are unobtainable, and recommended 
contacting the Institut Afýmoires de VEdition Contemporaine, to whom he has donated all of his 
documentation. Although no information was forthcoming from the ITAEC, it was possible to view Un 
Bruit qui rendfou at a film retrospective in Caen in June 2002. As part of the same retrospective, the 
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not focus exclusively on aspects of phenomenological theory that have not been 
previously exploited, such as sexuality and intersubjectivity. These aspects of human 
experience are so much part of bodily experience that to consider them in isolation from 
the overarching phenomenological theory in which this thesis is couched would risk 
distorting the argument. 
By way of introduction to the phenomenological analysis of Robbe-Grillet's film 
and fiction, the first chapter of this thesis will trace the development of the 
phenomenological movement from its German origins to its evolution in France just prior 
to the time when Robbe-Grillet turned to writing. An examination of the development of 
phenomenological philosophy will serve to contextualise a movement that was dominant 
in French thought during the post-war years, at the time when Robbe-Grillet was starting 
out as a writer. In order to begin to look at the value of a Merleau-Pontyan approach to 
Robbe-Grillet, the philosophical background against which his philosophy is set must be 
outlined. Therefore, it will be'necessary to examine the contributions of Franz Brentano, 
the first significant forerunner of phenomenology, whose work was taken up by Edmund 
Husserl, widely considered to be the founder of the movement proper. Following 
Husserl, an interest in phenomenology evolved over the French border, with firstly Jean- 
Paul Sartre, and then Maurice Merleau-Ponty taking up the baton. Although there are, of 
course, more figures in the phenomenological movement than these, those mentioned 
here are significant in the development of the thought of Merleau-Ponty, whose 
philosophy ig to provide the theoretical underpinning for this thesis. This initial 
discussion of the phenomenological movement will therefore provide an overview of the 
INEC exl-dbited a selection of items'documenting Robbe-Griuct's life and works in the Abbaye AMx 
Dames in Caen. 
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concerns of phenomenological philosophers, and the way in which these were taken 
forward by Merleau-Ponty in an, attempt to resolve what he saw as some of the 
shortcomings of his predecessors. The exposition of his concerns will pave the way for 
arguing towards a Merleau-Pontyan analysis of Robbe-Grillet, one that concerns itself 
with the rendering of human embodiment in Robbe-Grillet's film and fiction. Merleau- 
Pontyan phenomenology is an apt means of elucidating the embodiment of 
consciousness, as his argument with his predecessors suggests. Merleau-Ponty's notion 
of the body-subject was intended to resolve the dualism he perceived in the work of other 
phenomenological philosophe'rs, notably Husserl and Sartre. 66 The phenomenological 
issues chosen for consideration are those that are pertinent to this analysis of Robbe- 
Grillet's works. 
Following this outline of & phenomenological movement, the focus will then 
shift to discuss how Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology may be applied to the films and 
fiction of Robbe-Grillet. This discussion will be structured to demonstrate the cohesion 
of bringing together various aspects of Robbe-Grillet's works under a unified theoretical 
standpoint, and in doing so, will follow the topics raised by Merleau-Ponty, in his major 
work, PhenonOzologie de laperception, with other texts by Merleau-Ponty mentioned as 
necessary. It makes sense to use a cohesive theory of the body as the underpinning for 
this study, since it subtends all the other aspects of the thesis. However, in order to lay 
the foundation for this, it is essential firstly to examine the notion of the 
phenomenological reduction, which is the basis from which Merleau-Ponty argues his 
I 
66 The extent to which Merleau-Ponty succeeded in achieving this, particularly in relation to Sartre, is a 
contentious issue, however, it is not for a thesis on Robbe-Grillet to address it. Many important areas of 
debate between Merleau-Ponty and Sartre are discussed in Jon Stewart ed., The Debate between Sartre and 
Aferleau-Ponty (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1998). 
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account of embodied consciousness. A consideration of the embodiment of 
consciousness, together with the undermining of cultural myths, are what will drive the 
argument forward in this thesis. Thus, chapter two will be devoted to the notion of the 
phenomenological reduction, as Merleau-Ponty conceived of it. The phenomenological 
reduction was the cornerstone of phenomenology, so it is of importance to discuss the 
ways in which the reduction may elucidate Robbe-Grillet's formal strategies of 
subversion. Because the notion oemaking strange by undermining convention is also a 
starting point for Robbe-Grillet's work, considering his aims and the reduction together 
are an important foundation for the rest of the discussion. Through a close study of 
various works by Robbe-Grillet, this chapter will explore the way in which the lifting of 
cultural certainties suggested by Robbe-Grillet can be understood to effect a kind of 
phenomenological reduction for the protagonists of his films and novels. This analysis 
goes beyond earlier analyses of the reduction by Bernal and Carrabino, as it analyses 
different texts with regards to the reduction (Carrabino's discussion of the epocN 
focused only upon La Jalousie). Also, this study considers the effects of the reduction 
discussed by Merleau-Ponty (the question of a loss of personal identity) but not by Bernal 
I 
and Carrabino, who place their emphasis on the njantisation of the reduction, the 
nothingness at the centre of consciousness. Understanding Robbe-Grillet's formal 
strategies as effecting a fictional or cinematic form of reduction helps elucidate some of 
the difficulties encountered by the reader of his novels or the viewer of his films in terms 
of their perceived strangeness or incomprehensibility. 
The first main conclusion of the phenomenological reduction was, for Merleau- 
Ponty, that consciousness was always incarnate, that it was a body-subject, and this is to 
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be the topic of the third chapter. The consequences of this conclusion for Robbe-Grillet's 
choice of narrative perspective in h'is novels is examined, and is compared to the camera 
work used in his films. The influence of the shared aims of Robbe-Grillet as romancier 
and as cinjaste are considered in this respect. An analysis of Robbe-Grillet's rendering 
of perceptual experience is also offered in this chapter, revealing the importance of 
another consequence of the reduction. That consciousness is always embodied is 
highlighted by the role of sensory perception in apprehending the world. 
in subsequent chapters, further consequences of human existence as bodily beings 
will be examined. The experience of time, discussed in chapter four, once more allows 
for an examination of Robbe-Grillet's narrative strategies; it constitutes another attempt 
to subvert readers' or viewers' expectations. In doing so, Robbe-Grillet renders time in a 
I 
way that makes it seem strange, but that also corresponds to Merleau-Ponty's explanation 
of time as perspectival. Thus, a consideration of time as depicted in Robbe-Grillet's 
works is an integral part of understanding his work as narrating embodied consciousness 
and as subverting cultural expectations. Since, for Merleau-Ponty, time is not linear, but 
emanates from the here and now of the body-subject, all time is experienced from the 
perspective of the present. The discussion of this topic will thus demonstrate that a 
complex, even bewildering, aspect of Robbe-Grillet's rendering of human experience in 
film and fiction becomes explicable when considered in the light of Merleau-Ponty's 
account of time. They share the notion that the past and future are part of our present 
experience. A case for understanding Robbe-Grillet's cinema in terms of 
phenomenological time has been made by Gilles Deleuze, and his updating of 
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phenomenology is incorporated into the new application of phenomenology to Robbe- 
Grillet's cinema for which this thesis argues. 
In addition to the topic of time, Merleau-Ponty offers a theory of the body as a 
sexual being, a subject that is most pertinent to Robbe-Grillet, since an emphasis on 
sexuality is notable in many, if not most, of his works. Chapter Five deals with sexuality, 
and is of particular importance in this thesis, since it will be the first time that any attempt 
I 
has been made to account for the proliferation of scenes depicting human sexuality in 
Robbe-Grillet's works in terms of phenomenological philosophy. Again, as with the 
discussion of time in Robbe-Grillet, developments made in phenomenology since 
Merleau-Ponty's death will be used to explore this topic and to evaluate Robbe-Grillet's 
success in depicting what has proven to be one of the most controversial issues of his 
career. 
Finally, this study will consider the question of human relationships, of human 
knowledge of others, in a discussion of Merleau-Pontyan intersubjectivity. The 
discussion in the last chapter necessitates a move away from Merleau-Ponty's 
Phenomenologie de la perception in favour of a reading of his Le Visible et Pinvisible, 
where he re-worked his initial view of intersubjective relations. Reading Le Visible et 
Pinvisible allows for the sophistication and progress made in his later thought to be 
brought to bear on the problematic human relationships presented by Robbe-Grillet in his 
novels and films. The sophistication of Merleau-Ponty's arguments here also 
encompasses a consideration of self-knowledge and self-reflexivity. Again, this analysis 
constitutes an advance on previous phenomenological studies of Robbe-Grillet's works, 
since they did not incorporate'a reading of Merleau-Ponty's later thought. Language as a 
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means of intersubjective communication is analysed in this chapter, again outlining the 
I 
extent to which Robbe-Grillet's formal strategies of making strange and subverting 
expectations are relevant. 
The study now turns to set its examination of the works of Robbe-Grillet in the 
context of the theoretical standpoint that underpins it, by examining the development of - 




The phenomenological movement has its earliest roots in the work of Franz 
Brentano, whose 'descriptive. psychology' was a springboard for Edmund Husserl's 
phenomenology proper. The notion of intentionality, posited by Brentano, was to 
become the cornerstone of the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl and those who 
took his work forward, such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The 
following discussion will briefly trace the contributions of these, the major figures in 
phenomenology, charting the progress they made from Brentano's basic notion of 
intentionality through to the complex account of bodily existence offered by Merleau- 
Ponty. Whilst the scope of the present discussion precludes the possibility of a detailed 
examination of the various standpoints of all of the philosophers in the phenomenological 
movement, a summary of some important aspects of the work of the major figures will 
serve to provide a context for Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. This in turn will be the basis 
of the later discussion of Robbe-Grillet's work. Much of the existing phenomenological 
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criticism of film and fiction can generally be characterised as either that based upon the 
philosophy of Husserl, or that based upon the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, and the 
present examination of their thought will illuminate the adaptation of it as critical 
methodology by those who have produced phenomenological commentaries on Robbe- 
Grillet. This discussion of phenomenology will serve to situate both previous critical 
approaches to Robbe-Grillet and the position of this thesis in relation to them. In order to 
set them in a wider context, this brief introduction to phenomenology will concentrate 
upon the beginnings of the 'movement in Austria and Germany with Brentano and 
Husserl, and then consider the impact of phenomenology in France, in the work of Sartre 
and Merleau-Ponty. The examination of Merleau-Ponty's work, which will outline his 
critique of previous phenomenological philosophers, will also demonstrate the extent to 
which Merleau-Ponty was able to take up the ideas of his phenomenological predecessors 
and develop them. This discussion will consider Merleau-Ponty's contribution in terms 
of his attempt to characterise human experience in phenomenological terms, and his side- 
stepping of the age-old philosophical problem of Cartesian dualism, that is, the problem 
of accounting for the interaction between a physical body and a non-physical mind. This 
is an especially important part of his contribution, since he outlines his own work against 
that of Husserl and Sartre with regards to the question of the mind-body problem. It is 
Merleau-Ponty's attempt to account for human experience in terms of a bodily 
consciousness rather than dividing consciousness from bodily existence that makes his 
phenomenology an apt means of examining the rendering of embodied existence in the 
film and fiction of Robbe-Grillet. 
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Merleau-Ponty's own phenomenology will be outlined in detail, concentrating 
upon those elements which are most pertinent to an appraisal of Robbe-Grillet's work in 
phenomenological terms. Here, the discussion will largely be based upon Merleau- 
Ponty's lengthy work Pbinominologie de la perception, 67 and focus on: the 
phenomenological reduction, a means of suspending the usual conditions of perception in 
I 
order to allow for a return to basic sensory experience; the body-subject, the basis of our 
experience of the world around us; the body as a sexual being, a further consequence of 
being a body-subject; time, our awareness of temporality, again founded upon our bodily 
situation; and lastly, intersubjectivity, the awareness we have of other people as having a 
bodily consci6usness like our own. 
Finally, this examination of the thought of Merleau-Ponty will end with a look at 
his reflections on topics such as film, literature and art. Close parallels will be drawn 
here between the aims of the artist/writer/film-maker as outlined by Merleau-Ponty and 
those mentioned by Robbe-Grillet in regard to his own work, both in interview and in his 
theoretical writing, such as in Pour Un Nouveau Roman. Clearly, these will be of great 
I 
relevance in the consideration of the artistic output of Robbe-Grillet. These, then, are the 
elements which are to be the basis of the following analysis of Robbe-Grillet's film and 
fiction, and which will help elucidate some of the more perplexing aspects of his work. 
67 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, AgnomMologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945). 
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Husserl and the Influence of Brentano on phenomenology 
Brentano's project in Psycholbýyfroni an Empirical Slandpoin ý8 was an attempt 
to describe mental acts and mental states. It was a descriptive psychology, the emphasis 
being on its descriptive, as opposed to explanatory, nature. The matter to be described 
here was one's own mental states, chosen by Brentano because he wanted to base his 
philosophy on non-inductive foundations, his aim being that these would yield claims 
which were indefeasible. His argument ran thus: one makes no inductive judgements 
concerning one's basic perceptual experience, so there can be no error of judgement, 
hence Brentano's claim of indefeasibility. Brentano, then, would make no claims about 
the physical phenomena which are the objects of mental acts, since these are not within 
I 
the remit of psychology. Rather, he would concern himself solely with mental 
phenomena. Phenomena, for Brentano, were anything that was given directly in 
experience, be they perceptions or emotions or feelings of any kind. He could claim 
indefeasiblity when describing such phenomena because their appearance coincides with 
their reality. That is, the way phenomena appear is just the way they are. One might be 
mistaken about the object of a mental phenomenon, e. g., one might see a chair as being 
blue when in fact it is green, due to a trick of the light, but the mental phenomenon of the 
blue chair is just what it is. If the phenomenon is of a blue chair, then it is simply a 
phenomenon of a blue chair, rather than a proof of the blue chair's existence. Brentano 
would not wish to make any truth claims about it beyond what is given in perception as a 
phenomenon. He mentions in this regard the experiment conducted by John Locke. 69 
Locke immersed one hand in a bowl of hot water and the other in a bowl of cold water at 
" Franz Brentano, Psychologfrom an Empirical Standpoint ed. L. L. McAlister, trans. by A. C. 
Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and L. L. McAlister (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973). 
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the same time. He then placed both hands into the same bowl of tepid water. He had a 
sensation of warmth in one hand and of coldness in the other, although both hands were 
feeling water of the same temperature. What we may conclude from this, claims 
Brentano, is that: 
We have no right, therefore, to believe that the objects of so-called 
external perception really exist as they appear to us. Indeed, they 
demonstrably do not exist outside of us. In contrast to that which really 
and truly exists, they are mere phenomena. 70 
That is, it makes no sense to say that there was anything erroneous about the phenomena 
undergone by Locke in themselves. Whilst it may be true that he could have based some 
judgement upon these phenomena which bore no resemblance to reality, the untruth of 
any such assertion is not connected to the phenomena as experienced; they just are as 
they are. 
Importantly, the main contribution to the phenomenological movement made by 
Brentano stems from his initial interest in the objects of consciousness, namely, mental 
phenomena. Brentano claimed that, all mental acts had to be about something, they had to 
have an object. This basic structure characterises all consciousness, and Brentano, taking 
up a term used by scholastic philosophers from the middle ages, called it intentionality. 
The notion of intentionality is essential to the thought of Husserl, Sartre and Merleau- 
Ponty, and will be of great importance when arguing for a phenomenological 
understanding of the work of Robbe-Grillet. That is, for Brentano, and for all subsequent 
phenomenological philosophers, consciousness depends upon there being some 
phenomenon to be conscious of This phenomenon would not necessarily have to 
69 Brentano, p. 8. 
70 Jbid, p. 9. 
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I 
correspond to any object 'out there' in the physical world, such as the blue chair or the 
bowls of water mentioned above. The phenomenon in question might just as easily be an 
emotion, say, a feeling of anger, or an imagined or dreamed phenomenon, say, a dream 
about feeling angry or an imagined blue chair. Just so long as it is an object of 
consciousness, so long as it is the object of which one is aware, upon which one is 
focused, then it is an intentional object. Furthermore, consciousness needs objects in 
order to be conscious. There cannot be consciousness of nothing. 
However, it is precisely in attempting to account for consciousness via the 
explanation of intentionality that Brentano runs into difficulty. He claims that all mental 
acts have an intentional object within them. As Brentano puts it, intentional objects 
inexist or have intentional inexistence as parts of mental phenomena (i. e., they exist in 
phenomena, they are part of them): 
Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the 
Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, 
and what we might call ( ... ) reference to a content, direction towards an 
object' (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing) or 
immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as 
an object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In 
presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed 
or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired, and so on. 71 
The problem here lies in accounting for consciousness. An act could register an 
intentional object, given this account, but then how does consciousness arise from this 
process? In order to avoid this pioblem, Brentano introduces the notion of having an 
inner awareness of a mental act. Since the intentional object of an act may come from 
within the perceiver, say, in the form of pleasure at hearing a sound, there is an inner 
71 Aid, p. 88. 
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perception. In this process, Brentano thinks that it is possible to maintain that an act 
refers to itself- 
( 
... 
) the pleasure which I feel is not actually pleasure in the sound, but 
pleasure in the hearing. In fact you could say, not incorrectly, that in a 
certain sense it even refers to itself the feeling and the object are 
"fused into one". 72 
This process involves having a primary awareness of an intentional object, and then this 
act itself becomes the object of a secondary awareness, so that there is effectively an 
awareness of being aware. Again, the question arises as to whether this awareness can be 
equated with consciousness, or whether a process of simply one thing's registering 
another would explain equally well the process outlined. Furthermore, if, as Brentano 
claimed earlier, intentional objects exist within acts, or are part of acts, then it is 
impossible to say that they are- identical to acts. Brentano is saying that act and object are 
"fused into one"; but if they are identical, then the object is no longer part of the act. 
Brentano is contradicting a claim he made earlier - to say that the act is identical to its 
object is to contradict the claim thaf the object is part of the act. 
Husserl adopted Brentano's study of phenomena and his use of the notion of 
intentionality, however he approached the question of intentionality differently from 
Brentano, and in so doing, avoided some of the problems encountered above. For 
example, Husserl did not hold the same view as Brentano in relation to intentional objects 
and mental acts. For Husserl, an intentional object was external to a mental act; an act 
was intentional if it was directed to an object which was not contained within that act. 
An act has intentionality by means of its structure, which he calls a noesis. The noesis is 
that aspect of the act which directs it towards its intentional object (the noema). The 
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noesis picks out the noema from the mass of perceptual data given in consciousness. 
These sensory, or hyletic data are the most basic form of experience, and the function of 
the noesis is to structure certain of these data into an intentional object. As will be 
elucidated later in this discussion, Merleau-Ponty, in his account of perception, 
completely disagreed with Husserl in this respect. David Bell comments that, for 
Husserl, hyletic data 
( ... ) are merely undergone or registered: the mind, 
in other words, is 
purely passive in the reception of such material. ( ... 
) Hyletic data, as 
such, are just had, and are neither intentional experiences nor the 
intentional objects of experiences. ( ... 
) They are exclusively sensory, that 
is they are without intellectual or conceptual articulation of any sort. And 
for Husserl this means Ihat they are intrinsically meaningless or 
senseleSS. 73 
Husserl's account here gives an explanation of the conditions necessary for an act to be 
directed towards an intentional object, however, his explanation does not go so far as to 
explain exactly how acts and intentional objects manage to relate to each other. That is, it 
looks problematic to claim that one can make meaning out of something that is 
intrinsically meaningless, as if one were imposing a meaning where none exists. Husserl 
does not account for just how the noesis decides upon which hyletic data to pick out to 
form an object, nor does he explain how meaning might be conferred upon hyletic data. 
Husserl, then, is essentially an idealist. Sensory experience impinges upon the mind, 
which then has to synthesise this itiformation into some kind of meaningful perception. 
He faces the same problem as all idealists, that of accounting for the fact that whilst 
experience is understandable to us, it is based upon a senseless mass of sensory data. 
72 Brentano, p. 90. 
73 David BeIL Husserl (London and New York: Routledge, 1990,199 1), p. 173. 
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In his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl, taking inspiration from Descartes, set out 
to establish apodictic or indubitable evidence upon which to base his philosophy. He 
claimed to be taking a scientific approach to philosophy, by basing his work strictly upon 
this indubitable evidence: 
I Evidence is, in an extremely broad sense, an "experiencing" of something 
that is, and is thus; it is precisely a mental seeing of something itself ( ... 
) 
It is plain that 1, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving 
toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on 
accepting any judgement as scientific that I have not derived from 
evidence, from "experiencee' in which the affairs and affair-complexes in 
question are present to me as "they themselves". 74 
Here, the influence of Brentano is obvious. Husserl, like Brentano, will use only that 
which is given in experience as a basis for his phenomenology. The way in which 
Husserl achieved this return to experience was to have a great deal of influence on the 
phenomenological philosophers to come after him, and it is to this that we shall now turn 
our attention. 
The important innovation irf Husserl's philosophy, which paved the way for later 
philosophers in the phenomenological movement, was his use of the reduction. It is 
essential for this study to consider it, since it informs Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology 
and his conception of it will be pertinent to an understanding of Robbe-Grillet's formal 
strategies of making strange or subverting literary convention. The aim of the reduction 
was to parenthesise, or to 'overthrow', as Husserl puts it, assumptions commonly 
accepted in our usual attitude to the existence of the world around us. Husserl called this 
the natural attitude. It includes the assumptions we make about the existence of things in 
74 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations trans. by Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht Boston, London: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 199 1,0 published The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), pp. 12- 
13, original emphasis. I 
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science, in culture and so on. The natural attitude is basically a realist view of the world, 
that is, a view in which objects exist independently of our experience of them. For 
Husserl, their existence could not simply be assumed, since after performing the 
reduction, casting aside the natural attitude, all that remained were the phenomena 
themselves, as encountered in perception. As for Brentano, phenomena are simply 
phenomena, and no claims about their existence can be made beyond the evidence of our 
experience of them, and Husserl explains that, having performed the reduction: 
As radically meditating philosophers, we now have neither a science that 
we accept nor a world that exists for us. ( ... ) Along with other Egos, 
naturally, I lose all the formations pertaining to sociality and culture. In 
short, not just corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life- 
world is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon of being, instead of 
something that is. 75 
So, Husserl's phenomenological epoch6, or reduction, referred to by Husserl76 as a 
process of "inhibiting", "putting out of play", or "parenthesi sing" the "Objective world" 
allows him access to the universe of phenomena. Also, (and this will be a point of 
disagreement with later phenomenological philosophers, as we shall presently discuss), it 
leads to his apprehension of himself as an Ego: 
The epoch6 can also be said to be the radical and universal method by 
which I apprehend myself purely: as Ego, and with my own pure 
conscious life, in and by which the entire Objective world exists for me 
and is precisely as it is for me. 77 
So, for Husserl, the reduction yields perceptual phenomena and himself as the ego 
undergoing those phenomena. A major problem for Husserl here is that he must come 
down firmly on the side of idealism in order to maintain this philosophical position. That 
'5 Husserl, pp. 19-19. 76 Ibid, p. 20. 
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is, given that one has performed the epoch6, yielding the transcendental ego and its 
phenomena, the natural attitude has been transcended, and existential enquiries about the 
"real" world have to be suspended. That is, Husserl cannot know about the world out 
there on this account - all he can know are the contents of the sensory data, or the 
I 
phenomena he perceives in perception. He wants to argue later in Cartesian Meditations 
towards intersubjectivity, but this will be difficult, given that he appears to have argued 
himself into an idealist and solipsistic corner. 
One difficulty with the transcendental reduction as put forward by Husserl, a 
difficulty that he recognised and tried to argue around, was that it yields little of 
philosophical significance. That is, having performed the reduction, one is able to 
identify an ego and its objects of consciousness. However, this raises the question of 
whether these discoveries may be put to any useful purpose. It would appear to be of 
little interest to identify or describe one's own subjective and contingent objects of 
consciousness, one's own experience, especially since Husserl aimed at attaining 
indubitable knowledge. He therefore requires some method of moving from the 
particular to the general, some procedure that allows him to indicate what it is in one's 
own experience that is common to all human experience. That is, he needs next to 
describe the essence of human experience. Husserl's next move, then, is the eidetic 
reduction, an additional stage of reduction that will allow him to identify essences. For 
Husserl, this amounts to a process of imaginatively varying what an experience could 
possibly be, and once one comes across any variant that is impossible to imagine, then 
77 Husserl, p. 21. 
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that variant is excluded. So although one could, for example, imagine seeing physical 
objects, one would not be able to imagine seeing a sound . 
78 As Husserl puts it: 
We, so to speak, shift the actual perception into the realm of non- 
actualities, the realm of the as-if, which supplies us with "pure" 
possibilities, pure of everything that restricts to this fact or to any fact 
whatever. ( ... ) Perception, the universal type thus acquired, floats up in the air, so to speak - in the atmosphere of pure phantasiableness. Thus 
removed from all factualness, it has become the pure "eidos" perception, 
whose "ideal" extension is made up of all ideally possible perceptions, as 
purely phantasiable processes. 79 
In spite of Husserl's somewhat peculiar terminology, his meaning is clear. The universal 
or essential possibilities so imagined are what he calls the eidos. Husserl claims that the 
eidos is a 
beheld or beholdable universal, one that is pure, "unconditioned" - that is 
to say: according to its own intuitional sense, a universal not conditioned 
by any fact. 80 
In other words, the eidos is not so much concerned with intentional objects as 
experienced, but reveals what an ideal or "pure" perception (pure because stripped of all 
conceivable contingent factors. ) of them would be. Any particular instance of an object of 
perception, is therefore, for Husserl, merely one example of an eidetic object, of a "pure 
possibility". Once more, the eidetic reduction is a part of Husserl's philosophy over 
which Merleau-Ponty would take him to task, as will soon be explained. 
The final part of Husserl's phenomenology of importance for understanding the 
basis of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is the question of intersubjectivity. Husserl makes 
his case in strictly phenomenological terms for the perception of other human beings. 
'8 T1-ds example has been suggested by Michael Hammond, Jane Howarth and Russell Keat, in 
Understanding Phenomenology (oxford UK and Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1991,1992), see p. 76. 
79 Husscrl, p. 70. 
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There has traditionally been a problem in philosophy of wanting to claim that there are 
other human beings, with bodies inhabited by minds, but arguing towards this position is 
made difficult by the fact that one only has access to one's own mind. This, however, is 
not necessarily to be seen as problematic. Indeed, it is a condition of the existence of 
other minds that they should not be accessible by oneself, otherwise they could not truly 
be claimed to be other minds, as Husserl points out: 
These two primordial spheres, mine which is for me as ego the original 
sphere, and his which is for me an appresented sphere - are they not 
separated by an abyss I cannot actually cross, since crossing it would 
mean, after all, that I acquired an original (rather than an appresenting) 
experience of someone else? " 
So, it is quite logical, as Husserl indicates, that I cannot cross the abyss which separates 
me from another, since otherwise there would only be one mind, my own. Husserl's use 
of the term "appresent", however, requires some explanation, since it is by appresentation 
that he claims one can experience others. He argues that we are able to perceive others as 
conscious beings via a form of sensory awareness, other people are "appresented" to us, 
rather than inferred by us: 
If we stick to our de facto experience, our experience of someone else as it 
comes to pass at any time, we find that actually the sensuously seen body 
is experienced forthwith as the body of someone else and not as merely an 
indicafion of someone else. 82 
What Husserl means by this is that a person's body is presented to us in perception, and 
in this perception, the fact that he or she is a conscious person is "appresented". What 
Husserl seems to be at pains to emphasise here is that this process is not to be understood 
80 Husserl, p. 71. 
81 Ihid, p. 12 1. 
82 Jhg. p. 12 1. 
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as a process of inference or analogy from one's own body and one's experiences of it. It 
is not the case that other people's bodies are perceived, and that one then infers the 
existence of their minds on the basis that their bodies resemble one's own. Rather, other 
people are experienced as other people, as having a mind, just like one's own, and this is 
just given in experience, it is appresented. In this way, Husserl avoids having to make an 
argument based upon inference or analogy in order to move from one's own mind to 
other minds, and he manages to account for other minds in a phenomenological manner, 
that is, by describing only what is given in experience. 
I 
One criticism which could be levelled at Husserl after the performance of the 
reduction is that it would appear that little has been gained by performing it. 
Performance of the reduction leads only to a change in attitude: the natural attitude 
towards the existential status of the objects of perception has been suspended and our 
experiences remain for us as phenomena, but with the caveat that we no longer assume 
anything about their existence. Husserlian phenomenology, then, may describe what is 
given, but it can do no more than that. In philosophical terms, this may well be 
problematic for Husserl, the reduction yields a description of one's own perceptions 
which will be of strictly limited value to anyone else. Husserl's idealism, which amounts 
here to solipsism, does little to further philosophical understanding, his rigorously 
scientific method only allows him to "describe his own intuitione', 83 and furthermore, 
( 
... 
) given a pure intuition of the kind Husserl believes himself to have 
isolated, all one could do with it would be to describe it. But there seems 
to be no philosophical problem to which such a descr 
solution, no philosophical use to which it could be put. 8Vion 
could be the 
83 Bell, p. 197. 84 Jbid, p. 197. 
60 
It will be the contention of this thesis, however, that the phenomenological 
reduction, and the aims and methods of phenomenology - more specifically Merleau- 
Pontyan phenomenology - in accounting for human perception, are a useful means of 
approach when analysing Robbe-Grillet's literature and film. The bracketing of cultural 
assumptions and the consequent return to phenomena can be seen as a radical break with 
the past in literary and filmic terms. Therefore, although Husserlian phenomenology 
could be laid open to criticism on a philosophical level, its revision by Merleau-Ponty 
makes its wider application to film and literature far from redundant. 
Phenomenology in France: Sartre 
Sartre's approach to phenomenology differed in many ways from that of Husserl. 
It was, however, influential in the formation of Merleau-Ponty's ideas, particularly in 
relation to the Merleau-Pontyan notion of the body-subject. One of the most important 
I 
developments in Sartre's philosophy was the differentiation he established between 
consciousness and the objects of consciousness. Sartre wanted to reject Husserl's 
account of the reduction, in which the ego was given as a residuum of the process of the 
reduction. In La Transcendance de Pego, Sartre sets out his argument against Husserl, 
and demonstrated the problems inherent in Husserl's transcendental reduction. 
The main aspect of the transcendental reduction (as conceived of by Husserl) to 
which Sartre objects is the notion that it reveals an ego. For Husserl, it should be 
remembered, the reduction revealed the ego and its acts of consciousness. Sartre 
distinguishes two forms of consciousness, reflective and unreflective, and begins his 
argument against Husserl by claiming that, in conscience irrýflechie, the notion of an ego 
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is superfluous. That is, when one is not thinking about, or reflecting on, the fact that one 
is conscious (i. e. in unreflective consciousness), there is no 1, no ego, of which one is 
aware. One is only aware of the object of consciousness. It is as if, Sartre says, in 
unreflexive consciousness, instead of objects having qualities of heat, smell, shape, etc, 
they have qualities of repulsiveness, attractiveness, charm, usefulness, etc, and it is as if 
85 
these latter qualities were what made us act or behave in the way we do. It is only in 
reflective consciousness that one is aware of the ego, as well as the object of 
consciousness perceived as the thing desired, or hated, etc: 
I 
Dans le cas de la r6flexion, et dans ce cas seulement, je puis penser "Je 
hais Pierre" 'Tai pitid de Paul, etc. ". ( ... 
) La r6flexion "empoisonne" le 
d6sir. Sur le plan irr6fl6chi, je porte secours A Pierre parce que Pierre est 
"devant-&re-secouru". Mais si mon dtat se transforme soudain en dtat 
r6fl6chi, me voilA en train de me regarder agir au sens o6 l'on dit de 
quelqu'un qu'il s'6coute parler. Ce n'est plus Pierre qui m'attire, c'est ma 
conscience secourable qui ra'apparalit comme devant 6tre perp6tu6e. 
Wme. si je pense seulement que je dois poursuivre mon action parce que 
46cela est bien", le bien qualifie ma conduite, ma piti6, etc. 86 
However, it still looks as though there is an "I" present in reflexive consciousness, given 
the account of it Sartre outlines here. But this "I" is still not graspable, not clearly 
apparent, even in reflexive consciousness: 
il West que trop certain que le Je du Je pense West Fobjet d'une 6vidence 
ni apodictique ni ad6quate. Elle West pas apodictique puisque en disant Je 
nous affirmons bien plus que nous ne savons. Elle n'est pas ad6quate car 
le Je se pr6sente comme une r6alit6 opaque dont il faudrait d6velopper le 
contenu. Certes, il se manifeste comme la source de la conscience, mais 
cela m8me devrait nous faire r6fl6chir: en effet, de ce fait il apparalit voil6, 
mal distinct A travers la conscience, comme un caillou au fond de Peau. 87 
'5 Joan-Patü Sartre, La Transcendance de Vego (Paris: Libmirie philosophique J. Vrin, 1965), pp. 41-42. 
86 Ibid, p. 42. 
87 Ibid, p. 35. 
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Thus, although Sartre thinks that it is possible to discover objects of consciousness and a 
hazily present "Je", no transcendental ego, such as that posited by Husserl, emerges, as is 
neatly surnmarised by Hammond, Howarth and Keat: 
I 
First, the Sartrean ego is transcendent as opposed to transcendental: that 
is to say, it is part of the world, not 'beyond' the world; second, it is 
transcendent as opposed to ininianent: that is, it is not wholly 'in' the 
phenomena, it can have hidden facets, a past, a future, a character, about 
any of which one can be ignorant or mistaken. 88 
For Sartre, it. is in perceiving the object of consciousness that consciousness is to be 
discovered. That is, even in reflexive consciousness, consciousness itself is not the object 
of consciousness, because it is already given in the act of being conscious of something: 
Une conscience n'a nullement besoin d'une conscience r6fl6chissante pour 
8tre consciente d'elle-m8me. Simplement elle ne se pose pas A elle-meme 
commme son objet. " 
Thus, the important point made by Sartre about consciousness is that it is contained in the 
act of consciousness itself, rather than in a conscious subject. In this respect, Merleau- 
Ponty was in agreement with Sartre, for him too, Husserl's reduction arrived at the wrong 
conclusion, consciousness and its acts could not be separated. 
Sartre further elaborates his ontology in LEtre et le njant. 90 In this work, he 
distinguishes between two modes of being, the first, Petre-pour-soi, is, for Sartre, a 
nothingness, as opposed to the second mode of being, Petre-en-soi, a plenitude. Sartre 
asserted that consciousness consisted of nothingness, it was a hole at the centre of being: 
( 
... 
) le Pour-soi apparalt comme une menue n6antisation qui prend son 
origine au sein de I'Etre; et il suffit de cette n6antisation pour qu'un 
bouleversement total arrive A I'En-soi. Ce bouleversement, c'est le 
8' Hammond, Howarth and Keg p. 102. 
89 Sartre, La Transcendance de Pego, p. 29. 
90 Jean-Paul Sartre, LEtre et le n&nt (Paris: Gallimard, 1943). 
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monde. Le Pour-soi n'a d'autre r6alit6 que d'Etre la ndantisation de 
I'Etre. 91 
In terms of intentionality, consciousness was always aimed towards something outside 
itself, by definition, since there was nothing within it. Consciousness was aimed at 
Petre-en-soi, being-in-itself B eing-in-it self was, by contrast, pure being, its existence 
being described by Sartre as superfluous, "de trop"'92 and this kind of being constituted 
the objects of consciousness. This being-in-itself, the matter of which the world is made, 
existed simply as a contingent fact, for Sartre. Furthermore, he claimed that these two 
modes of being were "scind6s en deux r6gions incommunicables". 93 Given this 
incommunicability, then, how was consciousness to operate? 
Consciousness, for Sartre, "is somehow in direct contact with being and is nothing 
.,, 
94 ords no further explanation than other than this grasp of being Sartre's account aff 
this. He does, however, in LEtre et le Want, re-emphasise his point that self- 
consciousness is already present in consciousness. A condition of consciousness having 
knowledge of its object is that'it is also consciousness of itself. 
( ... ) si ma conscience n'6tait pas conscience d'6tre conscience de table, 
elle serait donc conscience de cette table sans avoir conscience de 1'6tre 
ou, si l'on veut, une conscience qui s'ignorerait soi-m8me, une conscience 
inconsciente - ce qui est abs, urde. 9' 
So, for Sartre, self-consciousness is given in the act of consciousness, that is, one is 
aware of oneself as a conscious being in any conscious act, and this awareness is just 
there without one's needing to think about it: 
91 Sartre, LElre et le nMnt, pp. 711-712. 
92 Ibid, p. 34. 
93 Ibid, p. 3 1. 
94 Dennot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (Lodon and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 360. 
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Ainsi n'y a-t-il aucune esp6ce de primat de la rdflexion avec la conscience 
r6fl6chie: ce n'est pas celle-lA qui r6v6le celle-ci i elle-meme. Tout au 
contraire, c'est la conscience non-rdflexive qui rend la rdflexion possible: 
96 il ya un cogito pr6r6flexif qui est la condition du cogito cart6sien.. 
I 
However, Sartre explains that it is wrong to equate consciousness with being conscious of 
itself as an act, rather, "la conscience existe par Soi. 07 Critics of Sartre have judged this 
explanation to be somewhat inadequate as an account of consciousness. Dermot Moran 
complains, for example, that: 
Sartre has a peculiar and entirely unexplained view of a self-creating 
consciousness emerging at the heart of a brute being. ( ... ) This whole act in fact contradicts Sartre's equally strongly held view that consciousness is 
not its own foundation. There is not much point in trawling through 
Sartre's works for a more nuanced resolution of this contradiction. All 
one will succeed in doing is multiplying the assertions - one will not 
discover an argument. 98 
In spite of the weaknesses in Sartre's account of consciousness, however, Moran" does 
see some value in the insights Sartre provides of a phenomenological account of bodily 
existence. The for-itself in Sartre's philosophy is a bodily consciousness, it has a 
situation in a body, and it is through this body that it expresses itself Sartre's discussion 
on the body is also bound up with his account of the perception of others. For Sartre, 
one's own body is not only the point of view I actually have, it is also an object upon 
which other points of view, (ones I could not possibly have), can bring their attention to 
bear. One becomes aware of'the existence of others through one's experience of being 
perceived by others, claims Sartre. In a situation of, for example, feeling oneself blush or 
95 Sartre, LEtre et le n6ant, p. 18. 
96 Ibid., p. 20. 
97 Ibid., p. 22. 
98 Moran, P. 387. 
99 Ibid., p. 389. 
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sweat, one is acutely aware of one's body not as it is for oneself, but as it is for another. 
Sartre explains that 
( ... ) 
je ne saurais 8tre embarrassd par mon corps tel que je Pexiste. Cest 
mon corps r6el qu'il est pour I'autre qui devrait m'embarrasser. 100 
The reason for this feeling of embarrassment or profound discomfort is due to the fact 
that the Other sees us as we are, which we are ourselves unable to do, since it is 
impossible to view oneself from outside one's own body, unless in a mirror or a 
I 
photograph, etc. More importantly for Sartre, this process is one of analogy, in which I 
realise that the other sees me as I see them, that is, as an object: 
C'est A ce niveau que se fait Passimilation analogique du corps d'autrui et 
de mon corps. 11 est n6cessaire en effet - pour que je puisse penser que 
"mon corps est pour autrui comme le corps d'autrui est pour moi" - que 
j'aie rencontr6 autrui dans sa subjectivitd objectivante, puis comme objet; 
il faut, pour que je juge le corps d'autrui comme objet semblable A mon 
corps, qu'il m'ait 6t6 donn6 comme objet et que mon corps ra'ait d6voil6 
de son c6t6 une dimension-objet. "' 
Merleau-Ponty would fundamentally differ from the view expressed by Sartre here in his 
own account of the perception of others. No such analogical argument for the existence 
of other minds was permissible, for Merleau-Ponty. 
Phenomenology in France: Merleau-Ponty 
In common with his phenomenological forebears, Merleau-Ponty took up the aim 
of describing phenomena, of elucidating an intentional relationship between 
consciousness and the objects of consciousness, of thinking through the 
phenomenological reduction, and of describing bodily existence in the world. It was, 
100 Sartre, L Etre et le n6ant, p. 421. . 
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however, Merleau-Ponty's arguments concerning bodily existence that set him apart from 
the previous phenomenological philosophers. 
Merleau-Ponty's account of the reduction, unlike Husserl's, asserted that a 
complete reduction was never possible. In this respect his account of the reduction is 
similar to Sartre's. Whereas for Husserl, what remained after having performed the 
reduction was an ego and the objects of consciousness, for Merleau-Ponty, this could not 
be the case, since the ego and its objects were inseparable. Since consciousness was 
always consciousness of something, that is, consciousness could not exist in a vacuum, or 
without an object, it made no sense to speak of a transcendental ego as Husserl had. 
Merleau-Ponty explains, in relation to the reduction that: 
C'est parce que nous sommes de part en part rapport au monde que la 
seule mani6re de nous en apercevoir est de suspendre ce mouvement, de 
lui refuser notre complicit6, ( ... 
) ou encore de le mettre hors jeu. Non 
qu'on renonce aux certitudes du sens commun et de Fattitude naturelle, - 
elles sont au contraire le th&me constant de la philosophie, - mais parce 
que, justement comme pr6suppos6s de pens6e, elles "vont de soi", passent 
inaperques, et que, pour les r6veiller et pour les faire apparaitre, nous 
avons A nous en absentir un instant. ( ... 
) Le plus grand enseignement de 
la r6duction est l'impossibilit6 d'une r6duction compl6te. ( ... 
) Si nous 
6tions 1'esprit absolu, la r6duction ne serait pas probldmatique. Mais 
puisque au contraire nous sommes au monde, puisque m8me nos 
r6flexfons prennent place dans le flux temporel qu'elles cherchent A 
capter, ( ... 
) il n'y a pas de pens6e qui embrasse toute notre pensee. 102 
Just as the ego is not separable from the objects of consciousness in the process of 
reduction for Merleau-Ponty, so the Husserlian notion of experiencing hyletic data fails 
to correspond to our lived experience. As was discussed previously, the idea that hyletic 
data are formed into objects of consciousness for the noetic act is fraught with problems, 
since it is illogical to claim that a meaningful perception may be created out of 
101 Sartre, LEtre et le nýant, pp. 421-422. 
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meaningless data. Furthermore, for Merleau-Ponty, this just does not correspond to 
experience. Ayletic data simply are not what we experience. We do not, for example, 
experience redness as a sensation in isolation, as Husserl's account of hyletic data might 
suggest. As Merleau-Ponty points out, redness is not a sensation, but rather a property of 
an object. Borrowing an example from Sartre, he remarks that, 
( 
... 
) ce rouge ne serait A la lettre pas le m8me s'il n'6tait pas le "rouge 
laineux7 d'un tapis. 103 
This is a more convincing argument than that of Husserl - sensations are not experienced 
in isolation and then gathered together to form some coherent object; the redness and the 
woolliness of the carpet cannot, in this case, be separated. Neither can the ego, or 
consciousness, be separated from the object of consciousness: 
Nous sommes pris dans le monde et nous Warrivons pas A nous en 
d6tacher pour passer A la conscience du monde. Si nous le faisions, nous 
verrions que la qualitd West jamais 6prouv6e imm6diatement et que toute 
conscience est conscience de quelque chose. 104 
So, for Merleau-Ponty, the result of the reduction is that we find ourselves grounded in 
the world around us; far from being transcendental egos, we are bound up in our 
environment. That part of the teduction that aims to yield, or help us describe, 
experience as it is undergone, still remains; there is still a process of bracketing as 
described by Husserl: 
Le r6el est A d6crire, et non pas A construire ou A constituer. Cela veut dire 
que je ne peux pas assimiler la perception aux synth6ses qui sont de 
l'ordre du jugement, des actes ou de la pr6dication. ( ... 
) Chercher 
Fessence du monde, ce West pas chercher ce qu'il est en idde, une fois que 
102 Merleau-Ponty, PhMom6nologie de la perception, pp. viii-ix. 
103 Ihid., p. 10. 
104 lbid, p. 11. 
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nous I'avons rdduit en thýme de discours, c'est chercher ce qu'il est en 
fait, pour nous avant toute th6matisation 105 
The reduction is the process of suspending our usual mode of perceiving the world, of 
putting to one side our pre-conceptions of it, and our theories about it. It is in this respect 
that Merleau-Ponty has carried on in the spirit of Husserl, although his conclusions after 
performing the reduction were, clearly, radically different. There is an implicit criticism 
of Husserl's eidetic reduction in what Merleau-Ponty says here. That is, he rejects the 
idea of trying to describe essences, which was the aim of Husserl's eidetic reduction. 
The world as it is perceived has nothing to do with essences, as Husserl conceived of 
them, claims Merleau-Ponty. What interests him is, rather, the world as it is given in 
perception, before we thernatise it or subject it to any form of analysis. 
The body-subject 
Let us turn now to look at what Merleau-Ponty thinks is going on in perception. 
His account of perception offers a solution to an age-old problem in philosophy, namely, 
the mind-body problem. That is, philosophers have found it difficult to account for the 
fact that a physical body and a non-physical mind can interact with each other. Similarly, 
it is difficult to account for the way in which the physical world is perceived via a 
physical body by a non-physical mind. Traditionally in philosophy, there have been two 
ways of accounting for the relationship between consciousness and the world perceived 
by consciousness. The first of these, Materialism, holds that the objects of perception 
I 
exist independently of human consciousness, and that the world impresses itself upon our 
minds in perception. The problem here is that of making the jump from the physical to 
105 Merleau-Ponty, Phýnomýnologie de laperception, p. iv, p. x 
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the non-physical - from the world to the mind. Also, for Merleau-Ponty, this account 
makes the human consciousness too passive - it has no role in the perception of objects. 
In other words, the world does not rely upon the human consciousness for its existence. 
Opposed to this view is Idealism, an account of perception in which the only things 
available to the human mind are the objects of consciousness. The world relies for its 
existence upon a consciousness to perceive it. An idealist cannot prove the existence of 
anything beyond what is present td the mind; without human consciousness, the outside 
world cannot exist. Husserl, in performing the transcendental reduction, fell into this trap 
- he could only account for the existence of perceptual data, rather than for that of the 
world "out there". Clearly, our intuition is always to assume the existence of such a 
world, and it is therefore counter-intuitive to deny its existence. Idealism, for Merleau- 
Ponty, gives the perceiving subject too much power - one could say that it has an almost 
God-like creativity. He claims of empiricism (Materialism) and intellectualism 
(Idealism) that 'Tun et I'autre sont incapables d'exprimer la mani6re particuli6re dont la 
conscience perceptive constitue son objet. " 106 That is, both of these accounts fail to 
correspond to our normal experience of perception. We neither create something from 
nothing, nor do we undergo a process of the world simply representing itself to us: 
The central insight to be gained from ( ... 
) phenomenological studies is 
that knowledge is not something which is pre-given in the world - it is not 
embedded in the world waiting to be located. Nor is knowledge 
embedded inside some essential inner self revealed through introspection. 
Instead, knowledge is viewed as emerging from our ongoing interpreted 
action in the world. 107 
106 Merleau-Ponty, Phgnomgnologie'de laperception, p. 34. 
'O'Dennis J. Sumara, PrivateReadings in Public, (New York: Lang, 1996), p. 102. 
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Merleau-Ponty's account of perception is a kind of third way; neither Realist nor Idealist. 
His account is based on the notion bf the body-subject (le corpspropre), and it is on this 
basis that the whole of his philosophy is developed. 
In perception, claims Merleau-Ponty, rather than the world being impressed upon 
the human consciousness from without, or the world being created by the conscious 
subject, the world is given to the subject, but in an indeterminate and ambiguous way. If 
we consider the visual field, for example, there are many elements within it to which the 
perceiver may pay attention, but only one area will be noticed by the perceiver at a given 
time. The perceiver may choose which element within the indeterminately given field to 
pay attention to, which element to make determinate. Merleau-Ponty likens this process 
to a gestalt shift, wherein the subject can never bring their attention to bear 
simultaneously on both the figure and the ground; either one or the other is the object of 
perception at any one time: 
Quand la Gestalt-theorie [sic] nous dit qu'une figure sur un fond est la 
donn6e sensible la plus simple que nous puissions obtenir, ( ... 
) c'est la 
d6finition m6me du ph6nom&ne perceptif, ce sens sans quoi un phenom6ne 
ne peut 8tre dit perception. Le "quelque chose' perceptif est toujours au 
milieu d'autre chose, il fait toujours partie d'un "champ". Une plage 
vraiment homog6ne, Woffrant rien 6 percevoir ne peut 6tre donn6e a 
ancune perception. La structure de la perception effective peut seule nous 
enseigner ce que c'est que percevoir. La pure impression West donc pas 
seulement introuvable, mais imperceptible et donc impensable comme 
moment de la perception. 108 
Gestalt psychology first made the discovery of this figure/ground structure in perception, 
and for Merleau-Ponty, this perceptýon of a figure against a ground is what consciousness 
consists of Either the figure seen against the background can be the object of perception, 
or the background itself can become the object of perception, it can become the thing 
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upon which attention is focused. The focus of attention can switch between the two. 
This process of shifting perception is known as a Gestalt shift. The important result of 
this discovery for Merleau-Ponty is that the perceiving subject is able to pick out a figure 
from a background - either one or the other becomes the object of consciousness. But 
only one is the object of consciousness, only one is foregrounded at any one time. This is 
the most basic form of perception, and its structure is common to all human perception. 
In perceptual experience, therefore, we are presented with something which is already 
structured, already meaningful in some way, but its structure remains ambiguous until we 
bring our attention to bear upon it. This is absolutely fundamental to Merleau-Ponty's 
account of how consciousness arises: 
Le miracle de la conscience est de faire apparalitre par Pattention des 
ph6nom6nes qui r6tablissent l'unitd de l'objet dans une dimension 
nouvelle au moment oý ils la brisent. Ainsi I'attention West ni une 
association d'images, ni le retour A soi d'une pensde ddjA maitresse de ses 
objets, mais la constitution active d'un objet nouveau qui explicite et 
th6matise ce qui n'6tait offert jusque IA qu'a titre d'horizon ind6termin6. 
( ... ) Ce passage de l'ind6termind au d6termin6, cette reprise A chaque instant de sa propre histoire dans l'unit6 d'un sens nouveau, c'est la 
pens6e m6me. 109 
So, rather than Husserl's noetic/noematic distinction, or Sartre's P&re-en- 
soill'etre-pour-soi account of the act of consciousness and the conscious subject, 
Merleau-Ponty bases his account of consciousness firmly on the experience of 
perception. Hyletic data are not organised into meaningful objects by the noesis, as in 
Husserl. Rather, a figure arises from a field, the indeterminate becomes determinate, and 
the evidence for this structuring of perception is readily available when we consider 
examples such as a figure seen against a background. in accounting for perception and 
'0' Merleau-Ponty, Ph6nom6nologie de laperception, p. 10. 
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consciousness in this way, Merleau-Ponty has avoided the problems of Materialism and 
I 
Idealism, as the conscious subject is neither all-powerful in creating its environment, nor 
is it at the mercy of the impressions made upon it by the world "out there". Instead, the 
world is ambiguous, indeterminate, and consciousness arises when the body, in making it 
determinate and meaningful, perceives it. 
Another aspect of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology that is of importance in 
considering his account of perception is the notion of sedimentation. This is a process 
whereby previous experiences are 'sedimented' so that the knowledge gained from them 
can be applied to new situations: 
11 ya un "monde des pensd&', c'est-A-dire une s6dimentation de nos 
op6rations mentales, qui nous permet de compter sur nos concepts et sur 
nos jugements acquis comme sur des choses qui sont IA et se donnent 
globalement, sans que nous ayons besoin A chaque moment d'en refaire la 
synth6se. 110 
The sedimented knowledge of which Merleau-Ponty speaks is not an inert mass, it is put 
to use constantly in perception, making us privilege certain aspects of the perceptual field 
before us. We constantly feed off the sedimented knowledge we have amassed, and we 
constantly add to it in perception; it is an active process of acquisition and application. 
This means that past experiences can influence the experiences we choose to concentrate 
upon in the present. 
The account of perception outlined by Merleau-Ponty is dependent upon bodily 
consciousness. That is, the fact that perception has a structure is also due to the situation 
I 
of the consciousness within a body. Here, the influence of Sartre can be detected in 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. The situation of the body-subject obviously determines the 
109 Merleau-Ponty, PhinomMologie de la perception, p. 39. 
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range of possibilities within the perceptual field (e. g. one cannot see what is behind one's 
back). Consciousness, then, always perceives from a given perspective. Also, human 
consciousness of the world is always intentional, that is, directed towards the object of 
consciousness. Thus for Merleau-Ponty, the direction of intentional experience is always 
from the perceiver towards the world, so that consciousness cannot be directed towards 
itself 
En d'autres termes, j'observe les objets extdrieurs avec mon corps, je les 
manie, je les inspecte, jen fais le tour, mais quant A mon corps je ne 
l'observe pas lui-m6me: il faudrait, pour pouvoir le faire, disposer d'un 
second corps qui lui-m8me ne serait pas observable. ( ... 
) Ce qui 
1'empeche d'6tre jamais un objet, c'est qu'iI est ce par quoi il ya des 
objets. 11 West ni tangible ni visible dans la mesure oa il est ce qui voit et 
ce qui touche. "1 
Just as one can never jump on one's own shadow, one's own consciousness is never 
available as an intentional object. Equally, consciousness is always of something, it 
cannot exist in a void. It is always directed towards something outside of itself, and, due 
to its bodily incarnation, it has a certain perspective on the world, a situation in space and 
in time. 
Time 
The consequences of Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of perception and the body- 
subject can be found in his accounts of sexuality, intersubjectivity (the existence of other 
people) and time. Merleau-Ponty's notion of temporality stems, once again, from his 
account of bodily existence. According to Merleau-Ponty, time is not something external 
which consciousness records, rather, it arises from my present consciousness. The past 
110 Merleau-Ponty, PhMomMologie de la perception, p. 15 1. 
74 
and the future are merely a part of my experience in the present, and can only be 
experienced in the present. Furthermore, time can not be a succession of separate 
moments, for Merleau-Ponty, since this would require that consciousness intend each 
separate moment from outside of that moment, which would lead to an infinite 
regression: 
si la conscience du temps 6tait faite d'dtats de conscience qui se 
succ&dent, il faudrait une nouvelle conscience pour avoir conscience de 
cette succession et ainsi de suite. 112 
As was discussed earlier, in relation to the body subject, consciousness cannot stand 
outside of itself or be an object for itself, so an atomistic account of temporality is 
illogical, for Merleau-Ponty. 
I 
Merleau-Ponty dismisses the notion that time can be described as flowing like a 
river. Although the metaphor of a river that flows is often used to make sense of the idea 
of time passing, Merleau-Ponty claims that it is quite wrong to conceive of it in this way. 
The problem with time thus explained is that it omits to mention, yet presupposes, the 
very thing upon which Merleau-Ponty's account insists, viz. a situated observer. There 
has to be someone standing on the riverbank, watching the flow of the river, so to speak, 
otherwise no direction of flow, no "to" or "from", is possible. Moreover, this metaphor 
for time would have the body-subject observing the passage of time passively, whereas 
Merleau-Ponty wants to claim that in fact the body-subject has a role to play in the 
process. Time is something that isborn of one's relationship with the world, it is part of 
one's being in the world; time is reaching out and interacting with the world, it is not 
something that one undergoes, but is something that one lives: 
111 Merleau-Ponty, PhenomMologie de la perception, pp. 107-108. 
75 
Le temps West donc pas un processus r6el, une succession effective que je 
me bornerais A enregistrer. 11 nalt de mon rapport avec les choses. ( ... 
) Un 
pass6 et un pr6sentjaillissent quandje m6tends vers eux. 1 13 
Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty's notion of time is not dependent upon any process of re- 
constituting time from remembered or projected memories/fantasies. One's experience 
of the past, for example, is not an intellectualised process whereby one tries to put a date 
to a certain experience by means of deduction. Such a process of reasoning bears no 
resemblance to our relationship with the past, claims Merleau-Ponty. Instead, our 
experience of the present reaches out towards the future and the past; we are always in 
touch with the past and the future: 
Mon pr6sent se &passe vers un avenir et vers un pass6 prochains et les 
touche Iä oü ils sont, dans le passý, dans l'avenir eux-m8mes. Si nous 
Wavions le pass6 que sous la forme de souvenirs expres, nous serions 
tent6s ä chaque instant de Nvoquer pour en v8rifier l'existence. 114 
Merleau-Ponty's account of time also takes issue to some extent with Bergson's 
explanation of time inMatkre etMimoire. 11-5 Whilst Merleau-Ponty is prepared to admit 
that Bergson is right to conceive, of time as a continuum, he claims that Bergson's 
account amounts to a denial of time, in that it does not distinguish between past, present 
and future: 
Bergson avait tort d'expliquer l'unit6 du temps par sa continuit6, car cela 
revient A confondre pass6, pr6sent et avenir, sous pr6texte que Pon va de 
l'un A I'autre par transitions insensibles, et enfin A nier le temps. Mais il 
avait raison de s'attacher A la continuit6 du temps comme A un ph6nom6ne 
essentiel. ( ... 
) chaque pr6sent r6affirme la pr6sence de tout le pass6 qu'il 
chasse et anticipe celle de tout I'A-venir, et ( ... 
) par d6finition, le present 
112 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la Perception, p. 483. 
113 Ibid., pp. 471,48 1. 
114 Ibid., p. 479. 
115 Henri Bergson, Afati&e et memoire (Paris: Alcan, 1908). 
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So, for Merleau-Ponty, although time cannot be explained in terms of its continuity, since 
this would mean no distinction between past, present and future, time is nevertheless 
experienced as a continuity. Two contiguous moments in time are not indistinguishable, 
therefore, time is not a continuum, but they blend into each other, one instant is the 
anticipation of the next. Merleau-Ponty sees time as a result of the introduction of a 
human consciousness into the world, and it is for this reason that past and future are 
experienced from the perspective of the present. The human subject necessarily 
perceives from the present, since time is nothing more than the result of the subject's 
I existence in the world. Similarly, in Robbe-Grillet's novels and films, the past and future 
exist via the present; time is experienced in the present because this present is the 
perspective of the perceiving consciousness. Merleau-Ponty explains that time is human 
existence in the world: 
Le pass6 West donc pas passd, ni le futur futur. 11 Wexiste que lorsqu'un 
subjectivit6 vient briser la pl6nitude de I'Etre-en-soi, y dessiner une 
perspective, y introduire le non-Etre. Un pass6 et un avenir jaillissent 
quand je m'dtends vers eux. ( ... 
) Le passage du pr6sent A un autre 
pr6sent, je ne le pense pas, je n'en suis pas le spectateur, je 1'effectue, je 
suis d6jd au prdsent qui va venir ( ... ) je suis moi-m8me le temps, qui "derneure" et ne "s'6coule" ni ne "change". 117 
Human beings do not exist "in" time, a human perspective on the world cannot be 
measured by any "objective" or external yardstick; the situation of a person in the world 
is determined by his/her existence as a body. Space and time are relative to the situation 
of the body, for Merleau-Ponty, rather than the body's position being measured in time 
116 Merleau-Ponty, PhMomMologie de la perception, p. 48 1. 
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and space. This bodily anchorage in the world ensures for Merleau-Ponty the unification 
of his philosophical accounts of perception, space, time, and sexuality, since they all flow 
from this corporeality; all our experience results from our bodily existence. 
The body as a sexual being 
Merleau-Ponty's explanation of the body as a sexual being is based upon his 
account of perception. In the same way as, in perception, phenomena are given in an 
indeterminate manner and then made determinate when they are focused upon, the body 
in its sexual being sometimes perceives the phenomena around it in an ambiguous way. 
The world is -given ambiguously, and it is the fact that we have bodies, sexual bodies, 
which allows us to decide which element of the perceptual field will be intended in 
perception. 
11 ya(... ) des formes confuses, des relations privil6gi6es, nullement 
"inconscientee' et dont nous savons tr6s bien qu'elles sont louches, 
qu'elles ont rapport A la sexualit6, sans qu'elles 1'6voquent express6ment. 
( 
... 
) La sexualit6, sans &re Fobjet d'un acte de conscience expr&s, peut 
motiver les formes privil6gi6es de mon exp6rience. (L') existence est la 
reprise et 1'explication d'un6 situation sexuelle, et ( ... 
) ainsi elle a toujours 
au moins un double sens. 11 ya osmose entre la sexualit6 et 1'existence, 
c'est-A-dire que si 1'existence diffuse dans la sexualit6, r6ciproquement la 
sexualit6 diffuse dans 1'existence, de sorte qu'il est impossible d'assigner, 
pour une d6cision ou une action donn6e, la part de la motivation sexuelle 
et celle des autres motivations, impossible de caract6riser une d6cision ou. 
un acte comme "sexuel" ou "non sexuel". 118 
So, for Merleau-Ponty, perception is inextricably bound up with sexuality. Our 
perspective on reality is reliant upon the fact that we inhabit a body. The fact that we are 
sexual beings means that certain aspects of the perceptual field will be picked out in 
117 Merleau-Ponty, Ph6nomMologie de la perception, p. 481-482. 
118 Ibid, pp. 196-197. 
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perception, although it will not necessarily be immediately obvious to the perceiver that 
the attention paid to these aspects is sexually motivated. 
Merleau-Ponty's account of sexuality also has implications for relationships 
between human beings, and for the perception of others in general, not only in a sexual 
context. He talks about the relation of power between two people in a sexual situation, 
and the way in which we can use our bodies to gain power over another. Merleau-Ponty 
claims that we rarely show off our bodies to another person, but if we do, it is either in 
fear, or else in the attempt to fascinate another: 
11 lui semble que le regard 6tranger qui parcourt son corps le d6robe A lui- 
m6me ou qu'au. contraire 1'exposition de son corps va lui livrer autrui sans 
d6fense, et c'est alors autrui qui sera r6duit A 1'esclavage ( ... ) cette 
mzCitrise est une impasse, puisque, au moment ofj ma valeur est reconnue 
par le d6sir d'autrui, autrui West plus la personne par qui je souhaitais 
d'6tre reconnu, c'est un etre fascin6, sans libert6, et qui A ce titre ne 
compte plus pour moi. ( ... ) Ce qu'on cherche A poss6der, ce West donc 
pas un corps, mais un corps anim6 par une conscience ( ... )119 
For Merleau-Ponty, the realisation that if others can be objects for me, then I can also 
exist as an object for others and therefore become enslaved myself is a disturbing one, as 
my own freedom is thus called into question. In this respect, he is in agreement with 
Sartre9s account of human relationships. However, since Merleau-Ponty thinks that other 
people are given in perception as conscious beings, rather than as objects, the value in 
any relationship is not in the mastery or enslavement of another, but in interacting with 
another free, conscious being. 
I" Merleau-Ponty, PhMomMologie de la Perception, pp. 194-195. 
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Intersubjectivity 
The existence of other minds has often been considered difficult to prove in 
philosophy. Clearly, we have no access to the minds of others, and this is indeed a 
condition of their status as other minds, as Husserl pointed out. However, both for 
Merleau-Ponty and for Husserl, this does not preclude our ability to perceive other people 
as being bodies inhabited by consciousness like ourselves. Whereas for Sartre, Merleau- 
Ponty claimed, the process of perceiving other people was one of analogy with one's own 
situation, no such analogy was necessary for Merleau-Ponty. Following Husserl's notion 
of the apperception of others, Merleau-Ponty claimed that other people were given in 
perception as other people. He did not see the need to account for this as a process of 
seeing someone else and then concluding from their behaviour, speech or movement that 
a consciousness was at work within their body, as did Sartre: 
II n'y a rien IA comme un "raisonnement par analogie". ( ... 
) Le 
raisonnement par analogie pr6suppose ce qu'il devait expliquer. L'autre 
conscience ne peut 6tre d6duite que si les expressions 6motionnelles 
d'autrui et les miennes sont compar6es et identifi6es et si des corr6lations 
pr6cises sont reconnues entre ma mirnique et mes "faits psychiques". Or, 
la perception d'autrui pr6c&de et rend possible de telles constatations, elles 
Wen sont pas constitutives. 120 
To argue by analogy, then, is to admit circularity into one's argument, which is not 
acceptable. Also, the perception of others is required before any such process of 
analogical reaýoning can take place. 
Merleau-Ponty illustrates his argument with an example from his own 
observations. One can notice, even in a baby of fifteen months, that the baby perceives 
the other as another person like himself If, argues Merleau-Ponty, I playfully take the 
120 Merleau-Ponty, MnomMologie de la Perception, p. 404. 
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child's finger between my teeth and pretend to bite it, then he copies the way I open my 
mouth. A baby of this age is not yet capable of arguing by analogy, claims Merleau- 
Ponty, he has never seen his own reflection, so he cannot know by comparison that I have 
a face just as he does. In any case, this comparison would not help, since my features do 
not very close ly resemble his, I have teeth which do not look like his own. Nevertheless, 
there is an intersubjective significance in biting, for the baby. That is, the way the baby 
feels his teeth and jaw from his own, internal perspective is as a means of biting, and he 
perceives my jaw and teeth, from the outside, as capable of performing the same task. 
Although an analogy of the kind described by Sartre may be used to re-confirm what is 
already given in the perception of, others, it cannot replace or become prior to what is 
given in perception, i. e. that other consciousnesses exist, in just the same way as I do. 
Merleau-Ponty modified his position on intersubjectivity later in his career, and 
this was largely in response to what he perceived to be the dualistic tendencies of 
previous phenomenological philosophy. Merleau-Ponty thought that the notion of 
selffiood for his philosophical predecessors came at the price of the subject's severance 
from the world which is the object of human consciousness. A Cartesian mind/body split 
reared its head in the works of Husserl and Sartre, in the form of Husserl's distinction 
between the world and the transcendental ego, and Sartre's etre-pour-soilelre-en-soi 
division. 121 A schism between the self and the world, for Merleau-Ponty, would lead to 
difficulty in arguing convincingly for the existence of other minds, of other 
consciousnesses - how can the move from knowledge of one's own mind to knowledge 
of others be justified? Indeed, Husserl's idealism is dangerously close to a solipsistic 
"' There is debate about Merleau-Ponty's argument in tWs regard-, see Jon Steivart ed., The Debate 
Between Sartre andAferleau-Ponty (Evanston, Illinois: North, ", cstem University Press, 1998). 
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account of consciousness, and his attempt to side-step this via his notion of the 
&apperception' of other human beings, whilst arguably a faithful phenomenological 
rendering of his own experience, is less than convincingly argued. Whilst the solipsist 
comer is clearly an undesirable place from which to argue, in terms of making a 
convincing case for the existence of others, it is, in addition, a contradictory position. 
The very act of engaging in an argument that one can only be sure of one's own existence 
and perceptions, and that there can never be any absolute proof of the veracity of these, is 
an act that assumes the existence of an interlocutor. 
Sartre's account of being is no less difficult a starting point for arguing towards 
the existence of others; the division between the en-soi and the pour-soi remains 
dualistic. That is, the mind/body problem is unresolved by the way in which Sartre 
carves up Being. Merleau-Ponty considers this in the following remark: 
Certes, entre les deux "c6t6s" de notre corps, le corps comme sensible et le 
corps comme sentant, - ce que nous avons appeI6 autrefois corps objectif 
et corps ph6nom6nal - on peut r6pondre qu'il y a, plut6t qu'un 6cart, 
Pabime qui s6pare I'En Soi Ou Pour Soi. 122 
Thus, Merleau-Ponty, without naming Sartre, seems to be criticising the latter's stance, 
referring to him implicitly by borrowing his terminology. Any suggestion that the body 
belongs simply to the realm of the En Soj is not sufficient to account for the sense of 
touch, for example, it makes the hands seem too mechanistic: 
Oui ou non, avons-nous un corps, c'est-i-dire non pas un objet de pensde 
permanent, mais und chair qui souffre quand elle est bless6e, des mains 
qui touchent? On le sait: des mains ne suffisent pas pour toucher, mais 
d6cider pour cette seule raison que nos mains ne touchent pas, et les 
renvoyer au monde des objets ou des instruments, ce serait, acceptant la 
122 Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et Pinvisible p. 180. 
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bifurcation du sujet et de l'objet, renoncer par avance A comprendre le 
sensible et nous priver de ses lumi6res. 123 
What Merleau-Ponty wishes to explore and describe, then, is the inherence of the subject 
within the physical body, and any suggestion of two separate modes of being, the En Soj 
and the Pour Soi, he claims, precludes the possibility of such an exploration. 
The alternative suggested by Merleau-Ponty is an inherence of the consciousness 
in the world that allows for the consciousness to be part of that world and therefore to 
have access to the world and to other human beings due to the fact that everything is 
made of the same stuff, of the same flesh: 
( 
... 
) notre corps est un 6tre A deux feuillets, d'un c6t6 chose parmi les 
choses et, par ailleurs, celui qui les voit et les touche; nous disons, parce 
que c'est 6vident, qu'il r6unit en lui ces deux propri6t6s, et sa double 
appartenance A l'ordre de I' "objet" et A l'ordre du "sujet" nous d6voile 
entre les deux ordres des relations tr6s inattendues. ( ... 
) Car, si le corps 
est chose parmi les choses, c'est en un sens plus fort et plus profond 
qu'elles: c'est, disions-nous, qu'iI en est, et ceci veut dire qu'iI se detache 
sur elles et, dans cette mesure, se d6tache d'elles. S'iI touche et voit, 
ce n'est pas qu'il ait les visibles devant lui comme objets: ils sont autour 
de lui, ils entrent tnýme dans son enceinte, ils sont en lui, ils tapissent du 
dehors et du dedans ses regards et ses mains. 124 
Thus, there are no longer two realms of being, but one, that which Merleau-Ponty calls la 
chair. The flesh of the world is the means by which the body has a purchase on it; it can 
communicate with and perceive the flesh of the world because they are of the same kind: 
I 
"Je suis fait de la m6me chair que le monde, c'est dire aussi qu'autrui et moi sommes de 
la m6me chair. "125 Thus, claims Merleau-Ponty, we should no longer say that the body is 
123 Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et linvisible p. 180. 
124 Jbid, p. 180-18 1. 
125 Zielinski, Agata, Lecture de Merleau-Ponty et Levinas., Le corps, le monde, I'autre (Paris: Presses 
Univcrsitaires de France, 2002), p. 188. 
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made up of two components, with the sensible 126 or perceivable aspect being the same as 
the world. Rather, the body is not either a thing that is seen or a thing that sees, but it is 




) ne sont rien d'autre que cette r6f6rence d'un visible, d'un tangible- 
6talon A tous ceux dont il porte la ressemblance, et dont il recueille le 
t6moignage, par une magie qui est la vision, le toucher rnýrnes. 
It is his contention that the human body and the world and other human bodies are all 
made up of phair that will then allow Merleau-Ponty to account for the existence of 
others. This strategy seems to present a means of avoiding any argument from analogy or 
Husserlian 'apperception'. 
Merleau-Ponty implicitly criticises Husserl in PhMom&iologie de la perception. 
He argues that evidence of other people is possible precisely because I am not transparent 
to myself (i. e. I cannot perceive myself as a pure Ego or as elre-pour-soi), and because 
my subjectivity brings its body along with it; it is always an incarnate subjectivity: 
Nous disions tout A I'heure: en tant qu'autrui r6side dans le monde, qu'il y 
est visible et qu'il fait partie de mon champ, il West jamais un Ego au sens 
oa je le suis pour moi-m8me. Pour le penser comme un v6ritable Je, je 
devrais me penser comme simple objet pour lui, ce qui m'est interdit par le 
savoir que j'ai de moi-m8me. Mais si le corps d'autrui West pas un objet 
pour moi, ni le mien pour lui, s'ils sont des comportements, la position 
d'autrýi ne me rdduit pas A la condition d'objet dans son champ, ma 
perception d'autrui ne le r6duit pas A la condition d'objet dans mon 
champ. 127 
By way of this critique, *then, Merleau-Ponty modified his understanding of 
intersubjectivity. What Merleau-Ponty did take from Sartre, however was the idea that 
126 Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et Pinvisible, p. 18 1. 
127 Merleau-Ponty, PUnomenologie de la perception, p. 405. 
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being perceived by others was a part of knowing oneself and was the basis of interaction 
with others. 
Beyond philosophy: Merleau-Ponty and phenomenology in art, fiction and cinema 
The application of Merleau-Ponty's interest in perception, the phenomenological 
reduction, and in the body? -subject as the locus of perception went beyond the 
philosophical. His writings also cover the consequences of his phenomenology for 
painting, literature and cinema. He sees art and phenomenology as having a common 
purpose, as is illustrated by the following remark in PhMonienologie de la Perception: 
La vraie philosophie est de rapprendre A voir le monde, et en ce sens une 
histoire racont6e peut signifier le monde avec autant de "profondeur" 
qu'un trait6 de philosophie. ( ... 
) [La phdnom6nologie] est laborieuse 
comme Foeuvre de Balzac, celle de Proust, celle de Val6ry ou celle de 
Uzanne, - par le m8me genre d'attention et d'6tonnement, par la m6me 
exigence de conscience, par la m6me volont6 de saisir le sens du monde 
ou de 
' 
Phistoire A 1'6tat naissant. Elle se confond sous ce rapport avec 
1'effort de la pens6e moderne. 128 
The novelist seeks to render experience just as it is experienced as in the process of 
phenomenological reduction. Robbe-Grillet's works perform the literary and cinematic 
equivalent of the phenomenological reduction in rejecting the cultural baggage of 
previous literary and cinematic conventions and metaphoric devices, and returning to the 
exploration of objects, of things themselves. In this sense, the artist, whether novelist or 
painter, is working to the same end. Merleau-Ponty, in describing Uzanne's project, 
seems effectively to be describing the phenomenological reduction: 
Nous vivons dans un milieu d'objets construits par les hommes, entre des 
ustensiles, dans des maisons, des rues, des villes et la plupart du temps 
nous ne les voyons qu'A travers les actions humaines dont ils peuvent 6tre 
128 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la Perception, p. xvi. 
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les points d'application. Nous nous habituons A penser que tout cela existe 
n6cessairement et est in6branlable. La peinture de Uzanne met en 
suspens ces habitudes et r6v6le le fond de nature inhumaine sur lequel 
I'homme s'installe. ( ... 
) C'est un monde sans familiarit6, oii l'on West 
pas bien, qui interdit toute effusion humaine. Si l'on va voir d'autres 
peintres en quittant les tableaux de Uzanne, une d6tente se produit ( ... 
)129 
I 
The feeling of &paysement described here might just as well apply to that experienced 
by the reader of a Robbe-Grillet novel or the viewer of one of his films. The difficulty 
experienced in reading or viewing them is due in no small part to the fact that Robbe- 
Grillet refuses metaphor and literary convention in favour of a return to the perceptual, to 
descriptions of objects unimbued with a pre-established meaning. 
Merleau-Ponty also took an interest in cinema, and it is the subject of an essay 
entitled 'Le cin6ma et la nouvelle psychologie'. 130 The overlap with his theory of the 
perception of others is evident in his discussion. Just as Merleau-Ponty describes our 
relations of other people, who are experienced directly as other conscious beings in 
PhMomMologie de la Perception, he applies the same approach to his contemplation of 
cinema: 
VoilA pourquoi Vexpression de Phomme peut etre au cindma si 
saisissante: le cindma ne nous donne pas, comme le roman I'a fait 
longtemps, les pensdes de I'homme, il nous donne sa conduite ou son 
compqrtement, il nous offre directement cette mani6re sp6ciale d'Etre au 
monde, de traiter les choses et les autres, qui est pour nous visible dans les 
gestes, le regard, la mimique, et qui d6finit avec 6vidence chaque 
personne que nous connaissons. ( ... 
) La philosophie contemporaine ne 
consiste pas A enchaiiner des concepts, mais A d6crire le m6lange de la 
conscience avec le monde, son engagement dans un corps, sa coexistence 
avec les autres, et ( ... 
) ce sujet-IA est cin6matographique par excellence. 131 
129 Mcrleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens (Pariv Les Editions Nagcl, 1948) p. 28. 
130 In ibid., pp. 85-106. 
131 Ibid, pp. 104-105. 
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It is clear here that Merleau-Ponty's remarks on cinema hark back to the central point of 
his phenomenology of perception, that is, the embodied nature of consciousness. Cinema 
can directly convey someone's behaviour and so render the bodily consciousness of 
others to us in a way which allows us to grasp it directly, without the need to have that 
person's thoughts told to us. 
Bearing in mind the phenomenological possibilities that Merleau-Ponty saw for 
rendering human experience in art, the following chapter examines how the basis of 




The Phenomenological Reduction: 
making strange 
The development of phenomenology outlined so far has highlighted the fact that 
the phenomenological reduction was, for Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, of primary 
importance in the process of carrying out any phenomenological description. It allowed 
for a return to phenomena themselves, to the contents of our experience as undergone in 
perception. This meant also that cultural assumptions about experience were to be 
suspended. These assumptions were composed of presuppositions in relation to the 
sciences, arts, etc. This "natural attitude", as it was labelled by phenomenological 
philosophers, included that which could be termed our cultural baggage, that is, all the 
prejudices, presuppositions and attitudes instilled in human consciousness over years of 
existence, the assumptions we make to enable us to make sense of the world around us. 
As mentioned previously, the results of the reduction were different for Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty, and it was against flusserl that Merleau-Ponty set out his ideas about the 
reduction. Whereas for Husserl, the reduction revealed a transcendental ego which 
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assembled hyletic sensory data into meaningful perceptions, for Merleau-Ponty, it 
revealed a body-subject which was already firmly grounded in its environment, in the 
world around it, and for whom perception already had an ambiguous structure. For both 
philosophers, however, the main thrust of their phenomenological project was the return 
to phenomena themselves, and to the description of these phenomena. The aim of the 
reduction then, was to suspend for a moment one's adherence to the natural attitude in 
order to become aware that one usually adheres unthinkingly to it. 
La meilleure formule de la r6duction est sans doute celle qu'en donnait 
Eugen Fink, I'assistant de Husserl, quand it parlait d'un "6tonnement" 
devant le monde. La r6flexion ne se retire pas du monde vers Funit6 de la 
conscience comme fondement du monde, elle prend recut pour voir jaillir 
les transcendances, elle distend les fits intentionnels qui nous relient au 
monde pour les faire paralitre, elle seule est conscience du monde parce 
qu'elle le r6v6le comme 6trange et paradoxal. 132 
It is the strangeness of the perceived world after the performance of the reduction that is 
to be under discussion here. More specifically, in the context of Robbe-Grillet's novels 
and films, the possibility of -understanding disturbed or traumatised mental states as 
performing a role similar to that of the reduction will be explored. That is, as Merleau- 
Ponty indicates, when one is in a state of anguish, obsession or trauma, the intentional 
links between subject and world ate loosened, the world can appear different from the 
way it usually does, experiences are undergone as fragmented perceptions rather than as 
meaningful events. The phenomenological reduction, then, can explain Robbe-Grillet's 
seemingly obsessive description of the minutia! of sensory data which occurs due to a 
suspension of normality, in terms of the circumstances or situations experienced by 
fictional or filmic characters. A Robbe-Grilletian protagonist may, for example, find 
132 Merleau-Ponty, PhenomMologie. de la perception, p. viii. 
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him- or herself in an unknown place, cut off from the cultural norms he or she is used to. 
Alternatively, he or she may be undergoing some kind of crisis which means that his or 
her usual mental processes are not functioning correctly. This frequently leads the 
Robbe-Grilletian protagonist to pay more attention to small perceptual details, rather than 
to analyse the situation from a larger perspective and thus put a name to his or her 
situation. The aim of this analysis is to discuss these issues in detail, and also to 
endeavour to demonstrate that the notion of the reduction, as well as being pertinent to a 
discussion of the novels of Robbe-Grillet, can yield similar insights when applied to his 
films. This is one level on which the reduction can be seen to operate in the works of 
Robbe-Grillet, i. e. on the level of the experiences of his novelistic and filmic characters. 
In a sense, it also operates on the level of the reader or viewer's approach to reading or 
viewing a Robbe-Grillet novel or film. That is, pre-established habits of reading novels 
I 
or viewing films have to be revised when confronted with the Robbe-Grilletian novel or 
film. So, the effect of strangeness experienced by the character within one of his works is 
not limited to the depiction of that character's experience of the world. It is also 
experienced by the audience of that work, upon encountering the work's non-adherence 
to traditions of chronological plot, omniscient narrative perspective, characterisation and 
so on. (These issues will be explored in more depth, and in a more relevant context in 
later chapters. ) This suspension of cultural nonns, this bracketing of habitual ways of 
perceiving the world in order to lay bare raw experience, whilst being originally intended 
as a philosophical procedure by phenomenological philosophers, can be adopted as a 
means of explaining Robbe-Grillet's break with the novelistic devices of the past. That 
is, due to his rejection of the conventions of the nineteenth century realist novel, the 
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Robbe-Grilletian novel requires its reader to suspend reading strategies which might 
previously have been applicable, and this constitutes a form of suspending cultural 
attitudes. Traditional narrative devices and conventions are flouted, readerly expectations 
are overturned, and the reader finds that habitual strategies for making sense of the novel 
are ineffective. It has already been noted that, although Robbe-Grillet's novels have 
already been subject to some analyses in phenomenological terms, and although some 
film theory exists in relation to, phenomenology, 133 no critic has yet attempted a 
phenomenological analysis of Robbe-Grillet's films. The present discussion vAll 
therefore explore the ways in which phenomenology, and in particular the notion of the 
phenomenological reduction, may be applied to his films, as well as to his novels. 
Robbe-Grillet's formal strategies of describing objects without pre-established 
meaning, as outlined in Pour Uti Nouveau Roman, suggest a position analogous to 
Merleau-Ponty's stated aims when he outlines his conception of the phenomenological 
reduction. This call for a return to unprocessed, pre-reflective states of perception, as 
they are experienced without the prejudices we usually bring to bear on them, is 
remarkably similar to the aim of nouveaux romanciers in their eschewal of literary 
conventions in favour of descriptiofis of basic human perceptual experience. In Pour Un 
Nouveau Roman, Robbe-Grillet argues for a return to objects themselves: 
A chaque instant, des franges de culture (psychologie, morale, 
mdtaphysique, etc. ) viennent s'ajouter aux choses, leur donnant un aspect 
moins 6tranger, plus compr6hensible, plus rassurant ( ... )A la place de cet 
univers des "significations" (psychologiques, sociales, fonctionelles), il 
faudrait donc essayer de construire un monde plus solide, plus immddiat. 
Que ce soit d'abord -par leur pr6sence que les objets et les gestes 
s'imposent, et que cette pr6sence continue ensuite A dominer, par-dessus 
toute th6orie explicative qui tenterait de les enfermer dans un quelconque 
syst6me de r6f6rence, sentimental, sociolologique, freudien, m6taphysique 
"' See: Casebier and Sobchack. 
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ou autre. Dans les constructions futures, gestes et objets seront hi avant 
d'6tre quelque chose. 134 
Traditionally, literature works like a grid, claims Robbe-Grillet, it renders experience 
comprehensible, filtering it into squares which may be readily assimilated. However, that 
is not what the world is really like. For him, it is neither significant nor absurd, it has no 
meaning beyond the bare fact of its existence. Robbe-Grillet speaks of the shock of this 
reality, and with good reason; it is not difficult to imagine that the reader who is used to 
conventional literature might find himself or herself perplexed when confronted for the 
first time with a nouveau roman. His discussion also mentions the effect film may have 
in making the viewer see reality anew, and in particular he compares those films which 
have been adapted from novels to the texts upon which they are based. The aim of these 
kind of films, Robbe-Grillet remarks, is simply to translate a story into images. However, 
the effect on the viewer of such a film is often greater than on the reader of the original 
novel: 
Mais il arrive A tout moment que le r6cit film6 nous tire hors de notre 
confort int6rieur, vers ce monde offert, avec une violence qu'on cherchait 
en vain dans le texte 6crit correspondant, roman ou sc6nario. 135 
Robbe-Grillet's explanation for this is that in the original novel upon which the film was 
based, objects, gestures, etc., had a significance. For example, an empty chair was a sign 
of an absent person. In the film, the chair may now be seen for itself, as it really is; if any 
symbolic significance remains, it is only in a superfluous manner: 
Et voici maintenant qu'on voil la chaise ( ... ) ce qui nous atteint, ( ... ) ce 
qui apparait comme essentiel et irr6ductible A de vagues notions mentales, 
ce sont les gestes eux-m8mes, les objets, les d6placements et les contours, 
134 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, pp. 20-2 1, p. 23. 
135 Ibid., p. 22. 
92 
auxquels Fimage a restitu6 d'un seul coup ( ... 
) leur Haliti. ( 
... 
) L'aspect 
un peu inhabituel de ce monde reproduit nous r6v6le, en m6me temps, le 
caract6re inhabiluel du monde qui nous entoure: inhabituel, lui aussi, dans 
la mesure oit il refuse de se plier A nos habitudes d'appr6hension et A notre 
ordre. 136 
The endeavours of Robbe-Grillet and Merleau-Ponty to describe reality are comparable, 
then, in so far as they both espouse a suspension of culturally loaded ways of perceiving 
the world, and a return to the objects of experience, to raw perception. Neither seeks to 
explain, nor to give an account of the world in conventional terms, but to present the most 
basic level of our relationship with the world around us, a relationship bom of our 
corporeal existence. 
The defamiliarising effect of the process of reduction, it could be argued, might 
also be explained in terms of a Formalist analysis. Formalism is an approach to literature 
and cinema that analyses art forms according to their difference from the norm, and the 
extent to which this difference creates a strange or unfamiliar effect. 137 In a Formalist 
analysis, therefore, a break with past literary or cinematic forms might employ certain 
new techniques which would create a sense of unfamiliarity or strangeness for the reader 
or viewer. For the Formalists, a work of art can be considered more or less artistic 
according to the extent to which it employs defamiliarising techniques. This view of 
literature or film would certainly account for some of the strange aspects of Robbe- 
Grillet's work, and would therefore allow an analysis in which his works would be seen 
as literary or artistic. However, in terms of analysing Robbe-Grillet's body of work, this 
would be a relatively simplistic method of literary or cinematic analysis. it is 
136 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, pp. 22-*23. 
137 See Victor Chklovski, Sur La TUorie de la prose, traduit du russe par Guy Verret (Lausanne: L'Age 
D'honune, 1973). 
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immediately apparent to the reader of a Robbe-Grillet novel or the viewer of one of his 
I 
films, that the work they are engaged with does indeed display defamiliarising artistic 
techniques and tendencies. Indeed, even now, some years since their initial appearance, 
these works still retain their defamiliarising power. The benefit of a phenomenological 
analysis over a Formalist one in this regard, then, is in its wider applicability to many 
areas of Robbe-Grillet's work. Whilst it is true that there are a great many examples of 
defamiliarisation in Robbe-Grillet's artistic output, to explain them simply as literary or 
cinematic devices whose inclusion only serves the purpose of confirming a work's artistic 
status, would be to fail to account for many of the complexities of Robbe-Grillet's works. 
The benefit of phenomenology over formalism with regards to the notion of making 
strange is that it can account for the strangeness encountered in Robbe-Grillet's works in 
terms of such diverse areas as the emphasis on sensory perception and on body-centred 
experience, and the bizarre, confusing treatment of time, but from a cohesive, body- 
centred perspective. Moreover, the many strange-seeming aspects of Robbe-Grillet's 
works can be accounted for in phenomenological terms from within a cohesive 
theoretical framework, that is, one that returns constantly to the foundations of 
phenomenology, the process of the reduction and the conclusion it produces, i. e. that 
human existence cannot be accounted for in terms of a dualistic mind and body, but that 
consciousness is the body, the phenomenological body-subject. 
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The reduction in Le Voyeur: unconventional descriptions and the return to 
phenomena 
Existing phenomenological commentaries on Robbe-Grillet have, of course, paid 
attention to the way in which his novels can be understood to effect a phenomenological 
reduction. However, the analyses of Bernal and Carrabino have placed a slightly 
different emphasis on the reduction than that proposed here. 138 Bernal concentrates 
heavily on the notion of the Wantisation, the nothingness that is at the heart of 
consciousness. Although her reading of Robbe-Grillet is enlightening and persuasive, 
she omits to mention the suspension of the habitual physical and cultural environments of 
Robbe-Grillet. 's protagonists, and the extent to which this also effects a bracketing such 
as is outlined in the phenomenological reduction. Neither does she consider the 
dissolution of self-identity that Merleau-Ponty claims occurs when illness, stress or 
trauma interfere with the normal processes of perception, and which he thinks forces the 
subject to focus on the phenomena in his or her immediate environment. The 
protagonists of Robbe-Grillet's works frequently find themselves in situations which lead 
I 
them into a crisis or trauma. In these situations, their habitual conditions of being are 
suspended, they are cut off from their familiar surroundings, some aspect of their 
everyday life is thrown into turmoil, which means that they can no longer make sense of 
what is happening to them, the reality confronting them has lost its comforting, familiar 
veneer. This 'suspension of the usual means of making sense of reality is reminiscent of 
Sartre's La Nausie, in which Roquentin, when he experiences the chestnut tree root at the 
level of phenomena, experiences this sensation of strangeness that, for Sartre, is nausea. 
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In Robbe-Grillet's works, this kind of experience is also narrated, and Le Voyeur is a rich 
source of examples. In Le Voyeur, Mathias is suffering from some kind of sexual 
obsession concerning a young girl he remembers from his past. This leads him to attend 
to perceptual details which, under normal circumstances, would go unnoticed. These 
details cannot be re-assembled by Mathias into a meaningful account of what is 
happening to him. He is confused, nothing makes sense, because his usual apparatus for 
processing the experiences he undergoes into something meaningful have been put out of 
play by the obsession from which he suffers. 
His lack of awareness of the obsessive nature of his thoughts is in evidence 
throughout the novel. The difference in preoccupations between Mathias and everyone 
I 
else on the island is apparent from the first page. Whilst the other passengers on the boat 
are trying to see what or who is waiting for them on the quay, Mathias is absorbed in 
other contemplations: 
Ug&rement A 1'6cart, en arri&re du champ que venait de d6crire la fum6e, 
un voyageur restait 6tranger A cette attente. La sir&ne ne I'avait pas plus 
arrach6 A son absence que ses voisins A leur passion. Debout comme eux, 
corps et membres rigides, il gardait les yeux au Sol. 139 
Mathias is in fact looking at a length of rope, which transports him back to memories of 
his childhood collection of pieces of string. This bizarre behaviour, which would make 
little sense to any onlooker, is quite justified in Mathias' mind. He sees nothing strange 
in taking an interest in rope or string, passing it off as a perfectly normal interest for a 
young boy, and furthermore, he sees nothing odd about his continuing interest in lengths 
138 Carrabino's account of the reduction concentrates upon La Jalousie, and consequently this text is not 
mentioned here. What is proposed instead is a reading of a range of Robbe-Grillet's novels and films, from 
across his career, to demonstrate the applicability of the approach to a divcrse selection of works. 
139 Alain Robbe-Grillet, Le Voyeur, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1955) p. 9. 
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of string or rope long into adulthood. However, Mathias next turns to look at a small 
child, a little girl, who has been observing him. Her pose is described in detail, 140 and 
this pose (leaning against a pillar or post, hands behind the back, as if tied together, legs 
slightly parted, head leaning back on the pillar), is to be repeated, albeit with slight 
modifications each time, in descripýions of various young females throughout the body of 
the text. There is no explicit link made here in the descriptions of the young girl and the 
rope, although their contiguity in the text suggest an association of some kind. The fact 
that the link is not spelled out at any stage points to Mathias' inability to label his 
thoughts. This in turn, makes it difficult for the reader to realise what is happening, as it 
is, after all, Mathias' perspective that is being presented to the reader. His obsessive state 
of mind hinders recognition of the thoughts that he is having as being sexual or sadistic 
and so the bare component elements of his perception are presented, without being 
labelled as constitutive of sadistic sexual fantasies. This hindrance of recognition can be 
accounted for if we consider the conditions of the phenomenological reduction. The 
reduction involves a suspension of the usual conditions of perception, allowing for a 
return to pre-reflective sensory experience. This experience will not be significant or 
meaningful, since it has been divested of all cultural signification. Mathias' obsession 
here acts in the same way, preventing any 'normal' assessment of his thoughts, 
precluding the possibility of his realising that what is going on in his mind is a sexual 
fantasy. This is never articulated by Mathias, and consequently, never articulated for the 
reader either. 
In Robbe-Grillet's fiction, the protagonist's perception of the world is rendered in 
such a way as to create a feeling of dipaysement or defamiliarisation in the reader. 
140 Le Voyeur, p. 22. 
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Conventional reading strategies are useless. This is because the Robbe-Grilletian 
protagonist's experiences are never thernatised in the course of the narrative. That is, the 
reader has to perceive the fictitious world along with the protagonist, he or she only ever 
has as much information as the protagonist has. This in itself would not necessarily 
confuse the reader, were it not for the fact that the Robbe-Grilletian protagonist tends to 
be confused, obsessed, or somehow unable to make sense of the world around them. 
Since the information narrated is largely perceptual, the reader lives through the text with 
the protagonist, experiences the same phenomena as he (it usually is a "he" in Robbe- 
Grillet) does. No privileged perspective is presented, no ultimate explanation is ever 
provided, of the constantly shiftling and sometimes contradictory experiences and 
thoughts portrayed. The Robbe-Grilletian text is literally the description of experience, 
rather than the telling or explaining of a tale, and it is in this respect that it can be 
understood as a phenomenological project; as a reduction from the thernatised world of 
meaning to the pre-reflective world of phenomena. Objects as images are communicated 
to us as readers in Robbe-Grillet's art, rather than objects as ideas (or metaphors), as Ben 
Stoltzfus points out: 
The meaning of his novels passes through a minimal distortion of 
conceptual apprehension. ( ... ) The process of language as thought the 
author's) has always interfered with the direct apprehension of things. 14ý 
This lifting of the distortion of conceptual apprehension is perhaps best exemplified by 
the episode in the third part of the novel, when Mathias revisits the cliff top following the 
disappearance of Jacqueline. By this stage, the clues as to a possible link between 
Mathias' own movements and the adolescent's disappearance are mounting up, yet 
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Mathias never manages to formulate the possibility of his own guilt into a specific 
thought. Instead, his attempt to re-trace his steps and to remove any potentially 
incriminating evidence (such as the sweet wrappers or the half-smoked cigarette butts) 
are accounted for by Mathias in ways which do not suggest any involvement on his part. 
I 
They are brushed off as coincidences, or their presence is postulated as being due to the 
activity of some other person. 
This is what makes a Robbe-Grillet novel so difficult for the reader, as well as the 
novel's protagonist, to make sense of The clues are there, but little sense can be made of 
them, since the evidence is conflicting, and many different possible versions of events are 
considered by Mathias. This translates, for the reader, into a mass of descriptions that 
defy one's expectations, when compared with the more traditional realist novel. The lack 
of explanation as to the events that are occurring means that the reader is a step removed 
from having the story told to her, as would be the case in, for example the Balzacian 
novel. (Balzac is an apt examplq here, because Robbe-Grillet, in Pour Un Nouveau 
Roman, sets his novelistic enterprise against that of Balzac. ) Stoltzfus claims that with 
the increasing emotional involvement of a Robbe-Grillet character in his environment, 
descriptions become ever more traditional. 142 For Stoltzfus, Robbe-Grillet's language 
becomes emotionally charged to the extent that an equivalent of the anthropomorphic 
adjective is used: the objective correlative. An objective correlative is an object that 
comes to be associated with, for example, an emotion felt by a character in a novel, but is 
not a metaphor, a metaphor being a pre-established symbol for that emotion. Whilst it 
could be claimed that some descriptions of objects in Robbe-Grillet might be replaced by 
141 Ben Stoltzftis, Alain Robbe-Grillet and the French New Novel, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1964) p. 110.1 
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an anthropomorphic expression in more traditional, realist literature, Stlozfus' claim that 
such a structure is a direct equivalent is questionable. Objects in Robbe-Grillet's fiction 
and films grow to be associated with, for example, the state of mind of the protagonist, 
but this process is established via the repeated contiguity of the object and the state of 
mind. Their association is never made explicit, and furthermore their contiguity often 
appears to be arbitrary, so that it is not possible to claim that x is definitively a metaphor 
for y. More importantly, Robbe-Grillet's use of such objective correlatives is not 
dependent upon pre-establi shed, generally accepted metaphor - precisely the kind of 
cultural baggage the phenomenological reduction aims to put out of play. (An example 
of this is the millipede in La Jalousie, which, via its repeated presence in situations 
suggestive of a sexual relationship between two of the characters, could be understood as 
a sexual metaphor. 143 Again, however, such an interpretation must ultimately be resisted 
due to the lack of ultimate proof of such a relationship. ) Such objective correlatives do 
not allow two ideas to be understood as directly equivalent because of the complexity of 
Robbe-Grillet's texts, and also because they do not rely upon any commonly accepted 
cultural significance. It is precisely this kind of commonly accepted cultural significance 
which makes realist novels easily "readable" and gives them their veneer of what Andr6 
Gardies calls the "vraisemblable". 144 As he points out, this is merely a construct, "un 
concept purement culturel", 145 yet 
ýur reliance on such cultural concepts is only revealed 
to us via a process such as the phenomenological reduction. Robbe-Grillet, in his artistic 
practice, refuses a traditionally constructed "vraisemblable". 
142 StoltzfUs'Ala 
' 
in Robbe-Grillet and the French New Novel, p. 116. 
143 Alain Robbe-Grillet, La Jalousie (Paris: Les Editions de Mnuit, 1957), see, for example pp. 62,166. 
144 Andrd Gardies, Alain Robbe-Grillet (Cindnia d'aujourd'hui 70) (Paris: Editions Seghers, 1972), p. 20. 
145 Gardies, p. 15. 
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Loss of personal identity 
In terms of suspending habitual modes of being in the world, Le Voyeur effects a 
phenomenological reduction on another level. In a very straightforward and factual 
sense, Mathias is cut off from the usual conditions of his existence by the fact of being on 
an island. His daily routine has been disrupted by the necessity of an early departure, 
dictated by the ferry timetable. This has a physical effect on him, making him visibly 
weary. His Weariness accounts to some extent for his general physical feeling of unease, 
such as the headaches from which he frequently suffers. These physical effects on 
Mathias of the disruption to his routine suggest that Robbe-Grillet, like Merleau-Ponty, 
definitely conceives of human existence as being incarnate, and situated in the world. It 
is in this respect that Heath's contention that Robbe-Grillet views man as separate from 
the world can be questioned. 146 It will be remembered that Heath can argue that this is 
I 
the case with regard to Robbe-Grillet's theory, his novels and films suggest otherwise. 
Consciousness, for Merleau-Ponty, cannot be separated from physical reality, and this has 
consequences for the way in which the world is perceived, as is the case in Le Voyeur. 
Mathias' weariness apparently affects the islanders' ability to recognise him, as 
for example when he sees Mme Marek: 
Celle-ci ne le reconnut pas tout de suite. S'iI ne lui avait pas adress6 le 
premier la parole, elle serait meme pass6e sans le regarder, tant elle 
pensait peu le rencontrer IA. Pour s'excuser de son inattention, elle 
pr6tendit que le visage de Mathias avait chang6 depuis la derni6re fbis 
qu'ils s'dtaient vus, en ville, et qu'il paraissait aujourd'hui trýs fatigud - ce 
qui dtait normal puisqu'il avait da se lever de bien meilleure heure que de 
couturne, pour prendre le bateau, sans s'etre couch6 plus t6t pour cela. 
D'ailleurs il dormait trop peu depuis plusieurs jours. 147 
146 Heath, The Nouveau Roman: A Study in the Practice of Writing, see chapter 3. 
147 Le Voyeur, p. 10 1. 
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Mathias' general fatigue and the disruption to his routine is used here, in Mathias' mind, 
to excuse Mme Marek's inability to recognise him, despite her having seen him only two 
hours earlier. However, although there has indeed been a suspension of normal 
circumstances, of daily routine, for Mathias, this could be only part of the reason for the 
strain which is manifested in his face. The meeting with Mme Marek appears towards 
the beginning of section two of the novel, just after the blank space which Mathias begins 
to realise he cannot account for. There is an unstated suggestion here that something has 
just happened which may have added to the appearance of stress on Mathias' face. If 
Mathias was indeed on top of the cliff at the time of Jacqueline's disappearance, then 
perhaps some greater trauma has added to the strain he is under. 
The inability of the islanders to recognise Mathias, coupled with their reaction to 
him, adds to the impression that he does not fit in, or is somehow different from them, 
and thus he is somewhat removed from what is normal for the people there. Although he 
claims that he was born and brought up on the island, he has not visited it for several 
years, and his claim to be a native is contradicted in some measure by the fact that 
nobody there seems to know him. Most people who see him look at him strangely, 
indicating that Mathias is somewhAt different or unusual, an outsider. This happens in 
the opening pages, when Mathias first sees a little girl on the ferry. She stares at him 
because he is different from all the other passengers, his behaviour is odd. Mathias 
seems not to have an awareness of how to behave in a normal manner. He does not react 
in the same way as other people. The garage-owner who hires him a bicycle, for 
instance, remarks that he finds a woman who passes by to be attractive. Mathias is quite 
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unaware of why he should make this remark, and does not share the view that she is 
particularly attractive. 
The one islander who doeg know him, claiming to be an old acquaintance, is 
unknown to Mathias. When he invites Mathias to dine at his house, Mathias feels he 
cannot refuse, particularly since he is asked in the presence of the waitress in the caf6. 
Her witnessing of Mathias being recognised by an islander lends credence to Mathias' 
claim of being from the island. Mathias only learns this man's name, Jean Robin, when 
he sees it scrawled on the door of his house. Jean addresses him as "Matt", a name 
Mathias has never been called before. So there is some doubt as to Mathias' identity 
even from someone who claims to know him. 
All of these examples point to Mathias' difference from those around him, and 
attest to an unstable sense of his own identity. He does not seem to exist for the people 
I 
he meets, they do not seem able to relate to him. This can be attributed to his disturbed 
state of mind, his bizarre behaviour before the blank in the centre of the text caused by 
his obsessive fantasising, and his behaviour thereafter caused by his attempts to establish 
whatever took place during the time that he cannot remember. His state of mind effects a 
process of phenomenological reduction. It prevents Mathias from being able to process 
elements of his environment into anything meaningful. Furthermore, it leads to a 
dissolution of his own identity, a sense of dislocation. Although Bemal identifies some 
of these aspects in Le Voyeur as indicative of Mathias' distance from the other islanders, 
she does not make a specific link with the phenomenological reduction. 148 Whilst 
Bernal's study of Robbe-Grillet is a phenomenological one, Mathias' loss of identity is 
simply posited by Bernal, rather than rigorously analysed and elucidated in 
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phenomenological terms. As Jean Duffy has demonstrated in relation to Claude Simon, a 
Merleau-Pontyan analysis of the nouveau roman can lend insights into this dissolution of 
personal identity. 149 Her Merleau-Pontyan analysis of Simon's work can be successfully 
adopted and applied to the work of Robbe-Grillet, in the case of a loss of identity such as 
that suffered by Mathias. Duffy highlights Merleau-Ponty's contention that the 
intentional relation normally in operation between the perceiving subject and the world 
breaks down in traumatic or stressful circumstances. Merleau-Ponty remarks on the link 
between living at the level of experience and a feeling of depersonalisation: 
Toute sensation comporte un germe de r8ve ou de d6personnalisation 
comme nous 1'6prouvons par cette sorte de stupeur oa elle nous met quand 
nous vivons vraiment A son niveau. 150 
Just as the phenomenological reduction suspends the normal relation of consciousness to 
its objects, so that the pre-reflective contents of experience are laid bare, so, in the case of 
Le Voyeur, Mathias' normal relation to the world around him has been suspended by the 
obsessive state of mind he is in, and by the panic that sets in during the second and third 
parts of the novel. This leads to an inability on his part to grasp what is occurring to him, 
to make sense of his experiences, and it also leads to an increasing sense of loss of 
identity. 
An even more striking example of Mathias' loss of grip on his own identity comes 
towards the end of the novel, as he finds himself once more in the caf6, amidst islanders 
discussing Jacqueline's disappearance. As Mathias returns to the caf6, his headache is 
less severe, although it is still affecting his thought processes; his head is filled with "une 
148 Bernal, see part 2, chapter 2. 
149 Jean Duffy, 'Claude Simon, Merleau-Ponty and Perccption', in French Studies, 46,1 (1992) 33-52. 
"' Merlcau-Ponty, PhMonzenologie-de laperception, p. 249. 
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sorte de bourdonnement cotonneux". 151 This, combined with the general tumult of the 
people in the caf6, affects his ability to make out what is happening around him: 
11 y avait beaucoup de gens, de fum6e, de bruit. L'dclairage 6lectrique, 
faux et bleuatre, 6tait allum6 au plafond. Des lambeaux de conversations, 
quasi incompr6hensibles, se d6tachaient par instant du brouhaha g6n6ral; 
un geste, un visage, un rictus, 6mergeait quelques secondes, ici et IA, A 
travers les miroitements du brouillard. 152 
Here again, Mathias' tiredness is a factor in his inability to comprehend events. The 
mental strain caused by his headache and his tiredness means that his perceptions occur 
on the level of basic phenomena, of snippets of sensory experience, rather than easily 
understandable events or conversations. For Merleau-Ponty, experiencing events on this 
very basic level leads to a sense of depersonalisation, a feeling of losing one's grip on 
one's identity. This is increasingly the case in this scene in the caf6. Mathias has so far 
I 
been variously named throughout the novel as either "Mathias" or "le voyageue,. At this 
point in the novel, however, the two names seem to belong to two different people: 
Mathias termina son absinthe. Ne sentant plus la petite mallette entre ses 
pieds, il abaissa le regard vers le sol. La valise avait disparu. 11 enfonga la 
main dans la poche de sa canadienne, pour frotter ses doigts macul6s de 
cambouis contre la cordelette roul6e, tout en relevant les yeux sur le 
voyageur. La patronne crut qu'il cherchait de la monnaie et lui cria le 
montant de la consommation; mais c'6tait le verre d'absinthe, dont il 
s'appr6tait A r6gler le prix. 11 se tourna donc vers la grosse femme, ou vers 
la femme, ou vers la fille, ou vers la jeune serveuse, puis reposa la valise 
afin de saisir la mallette tandis que le marin et le p6cheur s'immisgaient, se 
faufilaient, s'interposaient entre le voyageur et Mathias... 
Mathias se passa la main sur le front. 11 faisait presque nuit. 11 
6tait assis, sur une chaise, au milieu de la rue - au milieu de la route - 
devant le caf6 de Roches Noires. 
"Alors, Qa va mieux? demanda prýs de lui un homme. 153 
151 Le Voyeur, p. 220. 
152 jbid, p. 220. 
153 jbid, p. 222. 
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The remarkable feature of this passage is the manner in which the third person narration, 
expressing Mathias' own thoughts, refers to Mathias both as "Mathias" and le 
voyageur", in a way which suggests that they are two separate people. This is also true of 
the other characters described, and even of inanimate objects. It is indicative of the 
extremely distressed state Mathias is in. The fisherman, named on the previous page 
simply as "un p8cheuf" now becomes simultaneously "le marin et le p8cheur"; the 
briefcase Mathias has been carrying his watches in is variously "la petite mallette" and 
"la valise". This could perhaps be explained as an attempt on the part of Robbe-Grillet to 
render the effect of drink on Mathias -a kind of double vision. But this alone would not 
be sufficient to explain other examples, where Mathias' intentional object is something 
conceptual or abstract, rather than a sensory perception of a concrete object, for example, 
there is a distinction between "la ýonsommation" and "le verre d'absinthe". These are 
not two things which are seen, rendered in blurred or double vision; rather they are the 
same item, but described as if separated, as if really two different notions, in Mathias' 
mind. As mentioned previously, this fragmentation occurs with regard to people as well 
as objects, and here the caf6 waitress takes on a number of names associated with 
scattered memories from Mathias' past, names which have been introduced previously in 
the course of the novel. Again, this suggests an inability on Mathias' part to work out 
what is happening, or to label successfully events and phenomena in his environment. It 
suggests also that Mathias does not distinguish between females - their poses as 
described throughout the novel are 
I 
all slight variations on a theme, the first example of 
which was the little girl on the boat. As these variations are all lined to Mathias' sexual 
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fantasies, it would appear that women are perceived mostly in terms of their sexuality by 
Mathias. The, one exception to this is the woman admired by the garage-owner, who, 
since she is not attractive to Mathias, receives little attention in the text. 
Finally, and most significantly, Mathias perceives himself as two people. Whilst 
the fragmentation of "le marin" and "le p6cheur" could be attributed to Mathias having 
consumed a glass of absinthe or to his headache, the fact that these two figures weave in 
between Mathias' two selves attest to a breakdown in his self-identity. Mathias' state of 
mind, by this stage, is extremely disturbed. Evidence of this troubled mind is given in the 
passage in its reference to the string which Mathias touches, ostensibly in an attempt to 
wipe the oil from his hands. However, by now the attentive reader will have noticed the 
association of Mathias touching the string and his sexual obsession, so that Mathias' 
excuse of wiping his hands is only further evidence that he is either unaware of his own 
mental state, or trying to deny it to himself 
The phenomenological reduction in Robbe-Grillet's cinema 
As with Le Voyeur and other novels, Robbe-Grillet's films are constituted of a 
series of perplexing sensory data. ý10wever, in the case of his films, the data concerned 
are images and sounds, directly perceived by the viewer, as opposed to words on a page 
describing such experiences. There is, therefore, a focus upon sensory data in the present 
of the unfolding story, but also, frequently, a re-living of the past. Just as elements of 
remembered experience come to mind for Mathias in Le Voyeur during his failed 
attempts to construct his perceptions into something meaningful, so for A in LAnWe 
derWre d Marienbad, the past constantly interferes with the present. For A, little sense 
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can be made of the repetitious mass of experiences she lives and re-lives, with each 
perception appearing to be slightly different each time she experiences it. Equally, in 
L'Immortelle, N's attempt to make sense of the events he has recently undergone 
involves living and re-living sensory experience. In these films, just as in Le Voyeur, it is 
possible to identify a process of reduction at work. That is, once more, the protagonists 
of these films find themselves in a state of trauma, confusion or desperation, which leads 
to an inability to make sense of their situations. On a structural level, this means that the 
films are difficult to follow for the viewer, as they do not conform to conventional 
cinematic structures or plot developments. As in Le Voyeur, the viewer of Robbe- 
Grillet's films has no privileged perspective, so that if the protagonist struggles to work 
out what is happening around him/her, so does the viewer. The viewer only ever has as 
much information as the protagonist. 
The phenomenological reduction in LAnnee derntere a Marienbad 
Many elements in L'AnWe dernijre ii Marienbad constitute a process of 
reduction, in that they represent a suspension of normal circumstances. The intrigue of 
the film lies partly in the fact that the viewer never finds out quite why any of the 
characters are in the chdteau in which the film is set. They may be on holiday, since they 
are only ever seen pursuing leisure activities (playing card games, walking around the 
castle grounds, watching a play, dancing, drinking, etc. ), however there is no ultimate 
proof of this. There is also the possibility that A and M are there for reasons of A's 
health, as M reminds her: "ll faut ýous reposer. N'oubliez pas que nous sommes IA pour 
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qa. " 154 This indicates that there is some kind of problem, and that there is currently a 
suspension of their normal routine or circumstances. A and M appear at first to be 
married, although they address one another as "vous", which could suggest a more formal 
relationship (if she is unwell, he may be her physician). The nature of their relationship 
is also questioned by X: "Qui est-il? Votre mari peut-etre. "155 There is never any 
suggestion that A and M's relationship is loving or warm, indeed the reverse is the case. 
They behave stiffly and indifferently towards each other. This could be the source of A's 
discontent and anguish. Equally, Xs persistent attempts to persuade her that they met 
and had an affair the year before could be the reason for her anxiety. In any event, A 
does seem to be distracted, unwell, confused. She is incapable of functioning normally, 
due to the influence of some stressful or disturbing situation, and this results in a 
confusing mass of experiences being presented to the viewer, who, as mentioned before, 
has access only to the same information as the characters in the film. 
Just as the troubled Mathias hears snatches of conversation which do not add up 
to anything coherent in Le Voyeur, so in L Annie deridire 6 Marienbad, indistinct 
conversations are overheard, tantalising the listener, who almost manages to hear what is 
being said, without ever fully undeýstanding anything. Equally, only glimpses of people 
are seen, and this effect is underlined in the music which accompanies the images. 
La cam6ra ( ... 
) se met alors A suivre les deux hommes, par une 
modification aussi naturelle que possible de son mouvement. 
Les deux hommes parlent A voix basse. On ne distingue pas ce qu'ils 
disent. La cam6ra les accompagne d'un peu loin, et peut-6tre de fagon 
assez vague. D'autres personnages traversent des fonds, qA et IA; et des 
fragments de corps apparaissent par instants en gros plan. 
On entend des bouts de phrases, venus on ne sait d'o6: 
... Vraiment, cela semble incroyable... 
154 Alain Robbe-Grillet L Annýe derni&eiiAfarienbad, p. 150 (emphasis added). 
155 Jbid, p. 123. 
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... Nous nous sommes rencontr6s, dejä, autrefois... 
... Je ne me rappelle pas 
bien. ý? a devait 8tre en vingt-huit ... en 
vingt-huit ou vingt-neuf .., En meine temps la musique reparä^it, insensiblement; ce West plus celle, 
romantique, du dibut: elle est faite au contraire de notes 6 arses ou de 
breves s6ries, elle est incertatine, hache et comme inquiýte. 15p 
Robbe-Grillet is perhaps suggesting, by the "natural" movement of the camera, that there 
is some persop who is watching this scene, through whose eyes and ears the viewer has 
access to these events. If A is trying to make sense of what happened last year, and 
indeed of what is happening now, then perhaps these are her perceptions, presented to the 
viewer as seen by her. This is certainly the view taken by Vivian Sobchack in her 
Merleau-Pontyan analysis of cinema. Her contention is that the film is as much an 
intentional object for the viewer as the events depicted in it are for the characters in the 
film. Sobchack's account of film-as-intentional-object, then, is concurrent with a 
Merleau-Pontyan account of phenomenological reduction. The viewer shares in the 
filmic characters' experiences, and is incapable, just as A is, of forming a coherent story 
from the mass of phenomena presented. The "story" here is not told, but lived, for both A 
and the viewer. Due to the state of crisis in which A finds herself, there is a suspension 
of the normal conditions of her existence, so that the objects of consciousness are 
foregrounded, perceived just as they are experienced, without any thematisation or 
explanation. A's distressed or confused state of mind is highlighted in the cin&roman of 
L 'AnWe denWre 6 Marienbad. 
11 faut que A ait toujours I'air absent, [sic] d6toum6e m8me du groupe oa 
elle figure, regardant aillýurs, souriant vaguement quelquefois mais 
toujours belle de visage et gracieuse de pose. 157 
156 L Annee derniýreti Marienhad, pp. 36-37. 
157 Aid, p. 80. 
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La photo montre de face un groupe d'auditeurs, dont A (... ); il ya en outre, 
dans le champ, un certain nombre de si6ges vides (de part et d'autre de A, 
en particulier). Ce plan est tr6s sombre; seuls les visages 6mergent de 
l'obscurit6: tourn6s vers la sc&ne, ils sont 6clair6s par celle-ci. Visages 
immobiles et attentifs. Mais celui de A est tr&s diff6rent des autres, 
comme absorb6 par autre chose: les yeux baiss6s, par exemple, ou fix6s 
au delA. 15' 
Although in watching the film the viewer can see that A is set apart from the other 
characters and is therefore somehow different from them, a more explicit indication of 
Robbe-Grillet's intent in setting her apart from the others is given in the cing-roman. 
(This is also true of his other cin&ronians, compared to his films - the authorial intent is 
sometimes clarified through a reading of the text. ) Just as Mathias' difference from those 
around him is. signalled in Le Vojeur by his odd behaviour, so A's unease is signalled by 
her distance from the other characters around her. It is true that the other characters in 
L'Atwýe dendire 6 Mariei, ibad behave in an equally odd manner. They frequently 
appear to be frozen, mannequin-like in their lack of facial expression and bodily 
movement. This is indicative of the fact that, for A, the only characters who matter are 
herself, M and X. A herself is rarely animated; she often appears sleepy or confused, 
I 
particularly when X tries to persuade her of their affair the year before. This is further 
evidence of some emotional crisis; A appears to be too emotionally fragile to bring 
herself to even contemplate, let alone acknowledge, the relationship X claims they once 
had. The upshot of all of this is the "strangeness" experienced by the viewer when 
watching the film, a reflection of the strange, confusing nature of A's perceptions. This 
strangeness and stupor are indicated by Merleau-Ponty in mentioning the effect of living 
at the level of phenomena. In the same way as Mathias loses his grip on his own 
158 LA nWe dernWe 6 Marienbad, p. 113. 
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personality and sense of identity in Le Voyeur, so A in Marienbad becomes less able to 
act on her own impulses, to make her own decisions. As she falls under M's spell, she is 
less capable of making sense of what really did happen to her, and her sense of her own 
individuality is dissolved. 
The Phenomenological reduction in LImmortelle 
Evidence of a process analogous to that of the phenomenological reduction is also 
to be found in LImmortelle, a film in which certain elements vary considerably from the 
'norm'. Non-linearity of plot, an unclear distinction between "real" and "imaginary" 
events, an absence of psychological depth with regard to characterisation, and a lack of a 
final solution to the mystery all ýerve to alert the viewer that the strategies usually 
employed to understand a film will not necessarily be of use in this case. The viewer is 
required to put aside her assumptions in understanding this film; they are to be bracketed 
out, placed in parentheses. The viewer's access to the film, rather than being explained 
or told to her through the conventions of a naturalist or psychological film, is presented 
through a bodily, human perspective, that of the central character, N. N's real name is 
Andr6 Varais, although Robbe-Grillet suggests in his introduction to the cin6-roman that 
N stands for 'narrator': 
Un narrateur qui ne "raconte" rien, mais par les yeux de qui tout est vu, 
par les oreilles de qui tout est entendu, ou par Fesprit de qui tout est 
imagin6. Et c'est IA ce qui lui donne, lorsqu'il est prdsent sur Ncran, cet 
aspect A la fbis vide et gauche, qui West 6videmment pas celui d'un 
"h6ros" de cin6ma 159 .I 
159 Alain Robbe-Grillet, LImmortelle (Paris: Les Editions de Nlinuit, 1955), p. 9. 
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In other words, the film is composed of N's understanding of events, of his experiences 
and imaginings. Here, Robbe-Grillet's narrator takes on a position akin to that of the 
perceiving consciousness suggested by Merleau-Ponty after the reduction. That is, the 
narrator is a bodily consciousness; he exists in a certain point in space, and it is through 
this point, through his body, that everything is experienced. This is further evidence of 
the similarity between the reduction as outlined by Merleau-Ponty and Robbe-Grillet's 
artistic practice. The position of the protagonist of Robbe-Grillet's film could not, for 
example, be likened to the ego of Husserlian phenomenology, which is separate from the 
objects of consciousness; N is bound up in the world in which he lives; his direct contact 
with it is through his body. In the above remark, Robbe-Grillet highlights N's awkward 
manner - not that of the traditional hero. Here there is evidence of a suspension of the 
usual conventions of cinema -a hero would typically be in control of his situation, he 
ought to be able to resolve the mystery by the end of the film. Rather than achieving 
such a final resolution, N remains perplexed; by the end of the film he is still left with a 
mass of shifting memories of events, which he never manages to assemble into a 
plausible account of L's mysterious'behaviour. 
N is divorced from his usual conditions; he finds himself newly arrived in a 
foreign country where he knows nobody, and does not understand the language or the 
customs of the local people. The cultural norms of his own country no longer apply to 
his current situation. They are, in phenomenological terms, bracketed, put out of play. 
Hence, perhaps, N's need to constantly return to his experiences, to replay them in his 
mind in an effort to make sense of them. His experiences as presented in the film are 
frequently disjointed, unconnected, devoid of obvious significance, indicating his 
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confusion and the inapplicability of, his usual strategies of understanding to his new life in 
Turkey. In the absence of any cultural knowledge of events around him, he is obliged to 
return to perceptions as given directly in experience, unimbued with any cultural 
significance. Indeed, L warns him that such cultural understanding he may think he has 
is merely illusory: 
L: Vous n'6tes pas d'ici? 
N: Je viens d'arriver. Vous 8tes frangaise? 
L: Non. Pourquoi? ( ... 
) Vous 6tes 6tranger ... 
Vous vous 6tes perdu ( ... 
) 
Vous venez d'arriver dans une Turquie de 16gende ... Les mosqu6es, 
les 
chAteaux forts, les jardins secrets, les harems ... N: Comme dans les livres! 
L: Tout 9a, ce sont vos imaginations Regardez ... une mosqu6e 
comme dans vos r6ves ... Elle est en train 
de s'6crouler... 160 
N has just arrived in Turkey, and already he is lost, both literally and figuratively. The 
cultural insights N has, as a foreigner, such as those gleaned from books, are likely to be 
highly stereotypical, over-simplified assumptions about Turkish culture. L, with her 
greater experience of the country and its culture and language (a fact she mysteriously 
denies, claiming only to speak "du turc pour touristes" 161), sees through the fagade of this 
over-stylised image. N's expectations about Turkey are undermined by L's remarks; the 
Turkey of books and legends bears little resemblance to the real Turkey in which N now 
finds himself Here again, N's over-simplified cultural assumptions will have to be 
suspended if he is truly to experience the world around him. 
Again, just as Mathias in Le Voyeur and A in LAnWe dendire 6 Marienbad are 
different from those around them, cut off from a normal relation with the world by some 
trauma which affects them, so N in LImmortelle is marked out both by his foreignness 
160 LImmortelle, pp. 30-32,164-165. 
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and by the trauma he too undergoes. His obsessive search for L takes him over and he 
appears, rather like A, to live in a dream world, constantly re-living the past and making 
hypotheses about what may have become of L. 
The phenomenological reduction in La Reprise and Cest Gra(liva qui vous appelle 
Robbe-Grillet's return to the novel and cin6-novel in the twenty-first century 
mark a continuation of some familiar concerns. Both La Reprise and Cest Gradiva qui 
vous appelle are reminiscent of previous texts in terms of the themes that reappear, and, 
as with the other texts and films discussed in this chapter, contain features that can be 
understood aý effecting a kind of phenomenological reduction. In the case of Robbe- 
Grillet's Gradiva this is unsurprising, as it is comparable in many ways to an earlier film 
and cini-roman, LInintortelle. Cest Gradiva qui vous appelle contains many references 
to LImmortelle, including the fact that the female characters in both share one of their 
names, Lefla (although both have sosies and other names too). It is with the mysterious 
L/Lale/Leila/Gradiva that the male protagonists of both L Vniniortelle and Cest Gradiva 
qui vous appelle have fallen in love. The similarities between Robbe-Grillet's earlier 
film and Wilhelm Jensen's story, Gradiva 162 have been outlined in an insightful essay by 
Phillipe Sollers. 163 What is remarkable about the similarities between Jensen's Gradiva 
and LImmortelle is, as Sollers explains, that when writing the cin&roman for 
L'Immortelle, "'Robb e-Grillet ne connaissait pas Gradivd'. 164 However, she is a recurrent 
161 LImmortelle, p. 99. 
162 See Jensen's story and Freud's reading of it in: Wilhelm Jensen and Sigmund Freud, Gradiva and 
Delusion and Dream in Jensen's Gradiva, trans. by Helen M. Do%Nmey (Los Angeles: Sun and Moon, 
1993). (Gradiva originally published 1903. ) 
163 Phillipe Sollers, Te Rdve en plein jour', in La Nouvelle Revue FranVaise, 125 (1 mai 1963) 904-911. 
" Sollers, P. 906. 
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figure in his works, also appearifig in briefly in Topologie d'une cW fantdnie and 
Souvenirs du triangle dor. 165 In terms of the phenomenological reduction, then, the 
protagonist of Robbe-Grillet's Gradiva, John Locke, is subject to the same disorienting 
surroundings as is N in LImmortelle. Although not suggesting a phenomenological 
reading of LImmortelle or Jensen's Gradiva, Sollers' list of the principal features of 
L'Immortelle apply equally well to Robbe-Grillet's Gradiva, and these are features that 
ensure that the protagonist's. usual means of understanding his environment are no longer 
there: 
Un homme rencontrerait une femme ( ... 
) 6nigmatique participant A une 
organisation suspecte qui aurait sur elle des droits absolus ( ... 
) il perdrait 
sa trace, la chercherait, se heurterait sans cesse A une conspiration de 
silence et d'incompr6hension, i des complicit6s multiples - multipli6es 166 par son langage et sa situation d'6tranger, etc... 
John Locke is in Marrakech, so that, like N, he is cut off from his usual cultural 
surroundings, he can make himself understood only to those locals who speak French, 
and their wall of resistance to his enquiries makes it impossible for him to work out who 
this mysterious woman is, a woman who he has only ever glimpsed briefly, yet with 
whom he seems to be in love. Nevertheless, the locals to whom he does speak seem to 
misinterpret his meaning, and'to be keen to lure him into an underworld of prostitution, 
as happens, for example, when John enters an antique shop looking for Leila/Gradiva, 
who had disappeared amongst the crowd outside the shop. All the while, John tries to 
find out whether the young womaý has entered the shop, and all the while, the antiques 
seller tries to turn the topic of conversation to tempting John into buying "des bracelets 
165 See Morrissette, Intertextual assemblage in Robbe-Grilletfrom Topology to the Golden Triangle, pp. 53- 
55, for a discussion of these intertextual references. 
" Sollers, 'Le R8ve en plein jour', p. 905. 
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d'esclaves, des bijoux indiscrets... " Or, still more suggestively, he offers: J'ai 
d'excellentes adresses, pour le plaisir. (Ces trois mots dits A voix tr6s bas)". 167 Like N in 
L'Immortelle, John is not a traditional hero, he is powerless to resolve his problems, he 
has no control over his circumstances and the people he encounters are more of a 
hindrance than a help in unravelling the mystery of Lella/Gradiva. 
The plot as well as the setting of Robbe-Grillet's Gradiva are labyrinthine; as 
Robbe-Grillet explains in the preface, the story takes place in "le d6dale impr6visible des 
ruelles et impasses de I'ancienne m6dina". 168 The physical environment of the city thus 
itself reflects the story; it is a foreign environment, one whose intricacies can never be 
fully understood. It defies understanding and expectation, it removes the protagonist 
from the certainties of his habitual existence. Thus, the conventions to which he is 
accustomed are no longer of any use, they are bracketed, put out of play, and so John 
cannot understand his situation via recourse to his usual points of cultural reference. 
Similarly, in La Reprise, the central character, Henri Robin/HR/Ascher/etc. (who, 
because he is a secret agent, has a ijumber of alter-egos) is sent to an unfamiliar city, this 
time post-war Berlin, on a mission about which he knows nothing. Rather like Mathias 
in Le Voyeur, his physical discomfort due to lack of sleep and a headache, act upon him 
in such a way that he is unable to make sense of his surroundings: 
Le pr6tendu Henri Robin s'est rdveiII6 de tr6s bonne heure. 11 a mis un 
certain temps A comprendre oCt il se trouve, depuis quand, et ce qu'il fait 
IA. 11 a mal dormi, tout habiII6, sur son matelas d'infortune, dans cette 
pi&ce de dimensions bourgeoises (mais pr6sentement sans lit et glac6e). 169 
167 Alain Robbe-Grillet, Cest Gradiva qui vous appelle (Paris: Les Editions de Mnuit, 2002), p. 25. 
168 jbid, p. 7. 
16' Alain Robbe-Grillet, La Reprise (Paris: Les Editions de NEnuit, 2001), p. 45. 
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Thus, his physical surroundings are, as for the other protagonists, unfamiliar, as well as 
being uncomfortable, and this physical discomfort affects his ability to make sense of his 
situation. This is strongly suggestive of the phenomenological body-subject of which 
Merleau-Ponty speaks. The fact that the consciousness is embodied means that physical 
hardship impacts on the power of thought; the physical and the mental are inextricably 
connected, because human existence is incarnate consciousness. 
Conclusion 
The phenomenological reduction, a procedure which demands the suspension of 
culturally ingrained habits of percqption and favours instead a return to phenomena as 
experienced, can explain many aspects of the work of Robbe-Grillet. Firstly, it can 
account for the effect of defamiliarisation experienced by viewers and readers of his 
work. This is more than simply a process of defamiliarisation on the part of Robbe- 
Grillet for the sake of rendering his works unusual and therefore more avant-garde or 
artistic than the norm. Although there is a desire on the part of Robbe-Grillet to break 
with past literary and cinematic forms, the resultant body of work is more than just a 
strange-seeming art form. That is, the viewer or reader of a Robbe-Grilletian work is 
offered no wider viewpoint than that of the characters in a given work, and is therefore 
obliged to live through the film or novel from the perspective of those characters. 
Because these characters are frequ6ntly in a traurnatised, distressed or obsessive state of 
mind, they perceive events around them on a basic, unprocessed level, as a mass of 
disjointed experiences, and fail to see their situation from a wider perspective. For the 
reader or viewer, the effect is a defamiliarising one, since their past reading habits may 
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have made them more accustomed to being presented with a view of events in which 
those events form part of an overall perspective. Thus, the reader or viewer is detached 
from their habitual conditions of reading or viewing, and sometimes finds it difficult to 
work out what is occurring, just as the character is rendered incapable of processing what 
is happening to them due to some stressful situation. One result of this in Robbe-Grillet's 
work is the character's sense of loss of their personal identity, often in the form of a 
feeling of difference from others around him or her. The Robbe-Grilletian protagonist 
may be cut off from their usual cultural reference points due to being in a foreign place, 
and therefore their attempts to understand the behaviour of others are undermined by the 
suspension of the familiar and comforting elements of their usual conditions of existence. 
Their inability to interact normally with others becomes apparent in the Robbe-Grilletian 
characters' behaviour towards others; this is due to a lack of mutual cultural reference 
points, but in addition, their bizarre behaviour may be due to a trauma, making them 
appear to others to be detached, withdrawn, or somehow odd. The Robbe-Grilletian 
character may experience a dissolýtion of their sense of self, due to their experiencing 
events at the level of pre-reflective phenomena. When perception occurs at this level, 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that the individual exists almost in a dreamy stupor. This would 
explain why Robbe-Grillet indicates that the characters in his films should appear 
detached from the others, in a noticeably dream-like state. The same is true of his novels, 
as is the case for Mathias in Le Voyeur: his difference from other people is indicated in 
their reactions to him, and his sense of depersonalisation becomes apparent in his loss of 





The lesson of the phenomenological reduction is, for Merleau-Ponty, that a 
complete reduction (a reduction to the Husserlian transcendental ego) is not possible. 
Instead, Merleau-Ponty insists that the corps-propre, the body-subject, is the centre of 
consciousness and perception. Robbe-Grillet's fictional and filmic universe is similarly 
centred upon bodily existence, indeed his theoretical position on the subject is borne out 
by his artistic practice. That'is, his films and novels are presented or narrated from a 
human perspective in space and time. The discussion in this chapter will focus upon the 
spatial, bodily perspective from which Robbe-Grillet's films and novels are shot or 
narrated, while an analysis of the temporal implications of perception from a bodily 
perspective will be the subject of the next chapter. The two main consequences of 
representing a bodily situation in the world, both for Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology 
and for Robbe-Grillet's fiction or film are, firstly, a sense of bodily perspective or 
viewpoint and secondly, an insistence upon sensory, bodily perception. This discussion 
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will examine the benefit to be gained from a reading of Robbe-Grillet's fiction and a 
viewing of his films that is grounded in Merleau-Ponty's account of the body-subject. It 
will detail the way in which the notion of the body-subject elucidates Robbe-Grillet's 
film and fiction in terms of its narrative perspective and focus upon perception. 
Bodily situation 
Robbe-Grillet's insistence upon depicting the world from a human perspective is 
well documented. This is in part a reaction to the God-like narrative perspective of 
nineteenth-century realist literature, against which he argues in Pour Un Nouveau 
Roman: 
Qui d6crit le monde dans les romans de Balzac? Quel est ce narrateur 
omniscient, omnipr6sent, qui se place partout en m8me temps, qui voit en 
m6me temps 1'endroit et 1'envers des choses, qui suit en m6me temps les 
mouvements du visage et ceux de la conscience, qui connalt A la fbis le 
pr6sent, le pass6, et I'avenir de toute aventure? Ca ne peut 6tre qu'un 
Dieu. 
C'est Dieu seul qui peut pr6tendre 6tre objectif Tandis que dans nos 
livres, au contraire, c'est uh homme qui voit, qui sent, qui imagine, un 
homme situ6 dans Fespace et le temps, conditionnd par ses passions, un 
homme comme vous et moi. Et le livre ne rapporte rien d'autre que son 
exp6rience, limit6e, incertaine. C'est un homme d'ici, un homme de 
maintenant, qui est son propre narrateur, enfin. 170 
Having a situation in space and time, in the here and now, is of great importance in terms 
of the perspective from which Robbe-Grillet's novels are narrated. The narration is 
always from an embodied perspective, so that the reader never has access to any 
objective, overall viewpoint such as that described above. The perspective presented is 
that of one of the characters, rather than being from an omniscient narrator. 
170 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, p. 149. 
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A stylistic consideration of the opening sentences of many of Robbe-Grillet's 
novels illustrates his attempt to situate his works, from the very outset, within a given 
perspective of space and time, often in the here and now. One example of this is the fact 
that some of his novels begin in the present tense, creating an immediacy which draws 
the reader into the text by making the narrative time frame the present and by forcing the 
reader to adopt the same perspective as that of the protagonist. Thus, the reader 
witnesses events along with the protagonist. Robbe-Grillet's first novel, Un Ngicide, 
begins with just such a technique. The narrator, although not identified as a narrating Je 
until the second page of the text, nevertheless situates himself for the reader within a time 
frame and a situation at the very start of the novel: 
Une fois de plus, c'est, au bord de la mer, ä la tomb6e de jour, une etendue 
de sable fin coup6e de rochers et de trous, qu'il faut traverser, avec l'eau 
parfois jusqu'ä la taille. La mer monte, par vagues soudaines venant en 
m8me temps de plusieurs cötýs et se m81ant en dangereux remous. 171 
The narration is taking place in the present tense, from the now of the narrating body- 
subject. The emphasis upon the body as a perspective is indicated in the fact that the 
water is "jusqu'A la taille", and that it is "venant en m8me temps de plusieurs c6t6e', that 
is, from all sides around the narrator's body. So, even without the mention of aje in this 
opening passage, Robbe-Grillet's narrator has a bodily perspective in relation to his 
surroundings. Similarly, the opening lines of Dans Le Labyrinthe place the narrator in a 
here and now, although this time there is an explicitje right from the start: "Je suis seul 
ici, maintenant, bien A Fabri. " 172 As for Projet pour une Hvolution d New York, a 
narratingje appears half way through the first page with: "Je suis en train de fermer la 
171 Alain Robbe-Grillet, Un Rggicide (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1978), p. 11. 
172 Alain Robbc-Grillet, Dans Le Labyrinthe (Paris: Les Editons de Minuit, 1959), p. 9. 
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porte derri6re Moi...,,. 
173 This is followed on the second page with a description of the 
outside of the door, thus situating the narration in a bodily perspective, with the door, the 
body's object of consciousness, described relative to the body. This initial description 
appears to be a re-living, in the present (indicated by "en train de"), of a past experience, 
and so can be seen as another instance of a bodily here and now. Such instances of 
memory relived in the present will be discussed more fully in the following chapter, 
however. Once again, there is a narratingje at the beginning of the first chapter of Djinn 
(although the prologue is written from a third person perspective, the writer of the 
prologue claiming to have found the manuscript of Djitni): 
Farrive exactement A Fheure fix6e: il est six heures et dernie. Il fait 
presque nuit dejA. Le hangar West pas ferm6. Fentre en poussant la porte, 
qui n'a plus de serrur . e. 174 
So here there is yet another narrator who places himself in a temporal here and now, 
giving the position of objects and time in relation to himself 
So, with respect to situating human experience from a human, rather than a God- 
like perspective, Robbe-Grillet's novelistic practice is in harmony with his theoretical 
writing. Appart from rejecting a God-like perspective because it is outdated, then, it 
appears that Robbe-Grillet grounds his accounts of human existence in the experience 
that human existence offers up. That events should be narrated from this embodied 
perspective is understandable, since that is how human beings experience life, a view 
which is certainly consistent with a phenomenological account of human experience. 
173 Alain Robbe-Grillet, Projetpour une r&olution 6 Alew York (Paris: Les Editions de NEnuit, 1970), 
P. 11. 174 Alain Robbe-Grillet, Djinn (Paris: Les tditions de Minuit, 198 1), p. 11. 
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Merleau-Ponty argues that human existence is grounded in corporeal being, and that as a 
result of this bodily being, all experience emanates from the here and now. 
11 ne faut donc pas dire que notre corps est dans Pespace ni d'ailleurs qu'il 
est dai. IS le temps. Il hahile 1'espace et le temps. 175 
That is, a human perspective on the world cannot be measured by any "objective" or 
external yardstick, the situation of a person in the world is determined by his/her 
existence as a body. Space and time are relative to the situation of the body, for Merleau- 
Ponty, rather than the body's position being measured in time and space. Indeed, once 
Merleau-Ponty has established that the body is our anchorage in the world, that all our 
experience results from our bodily existence, his accounts of space, time, sexuality and 
intersubjectivity all flow from this corporeality. For Merleau-Ponty, then, experience is 
always structured in this way; it always has the body at its centre. The question here, 
given that Robbe-Grillet appears to take a theoretical standpoint similar to that of 
Merleau-Ponty, is one of how he translates a theoretical insistence upon body-centred 
existence into film and fiction. 
Merleau-Ponty's view -of what a novel can achieve in terms of translating human 
experience into art is apt here when considering the placement and perspective of human 
beings in Robbe-Grillet's novels: 
Le romancier n'a pas pour'rOle d'exposer des Wes ou m8me d'analyser 
des caract&res, mais de pr6senter un 6v6nement interhumain, de le faire 
mfirir et 6clater sans commentaire id6ologique, A tel point que tout 
changement dans Fordre du r6cit ou dans le choix des perspectives 
modifierait le sens romanesque de I'dv6nement. Un roman, un po6me, un 
tableau, un morceau de musique sont des individus, c'est-A-dire des 6tres 
o6 l'on ne peut distinguer 1'expression de 1'exprim6, dont le sens West 
accessible que par un contact direct et qui rayonnent leur signification sans 
quitter leur place spatiale et temporelle. C'est en ce sens que notre vie est 
175 Merleau-Ponty, PhMomgnologie de la perception, p. 162. 
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comparable A I'muvre Wart. 11 est un nocud de significations vivantes et 
non pas la loi d'un certain nombre de termes covariants. 176 
This account of a novelist's aims certainly fits with Robbe-Grillet's novelistic theory and 
practice on at least two counts. Rqbbe-Grillet has insisted on the fact that his writing is 
non-committed, and also he never provides his reader with an analysis of the personalities 
of his characters; rather, he simply describes events and allows the reader to draw his or 
her own conclusions. La Jalousie is a case in point; as Merleau-Ponty mentions in 
respect of the choice of perspective, La Jalousie simply would not be the same novel if 
the narrative perspective were altered. Likewise, the ambiguity upon which the novel 
rests (the possible objective/subjective readings of the novel) would be destroyed if there 
was textual confirmation that narrator was indeed A... 's husband. 
A possible objection to aligning Robbe-Grillet's theory with that of Merleau- 
Ponty might be raised at this point. Whilst Robbe-Grillet argues that only a God can see 
"Fendroit et Fenvers des choses", 177 for Merleau-Ponty, many possible perspectives are 
given in human perception. That is, when I observe an object, even though I can only see 
one side of it, I know nevertheless how it will look from the other side, or from above or 
from below: 
Voir, c'est entrer dans un univers d'Etres qui se motarent, et ils ne se 
montreraient pas s'ils ne pouvaient We cach6s les uns derri6re les autres 
ou derri6re moi. En d'autres termes: regarder un objet, c'est venir 
Fhabiter et de IA saisir toutes choses selon la face qu'elles tournent vers 
lui. Mais, dans la mesure oý je les vois elles aussi, elles restent des 
derneures ouvertes A mon regard, et, situ6 virtuellement en elles, j'apergois 
ddjA sous diff6rents angles Fobjet central de ma vision actuelle. Ainsi 
chaque objet est le miroir de tous les autres. Quand je regarde la lampe 
pos6e sur ma table, je lui attribue non seulement les qualit6s visibles de ma 
place, mais encore, celles que la chemin6e, que les murs, que la table 
176 Merleau-Ponty, PhinomMologie de la Perception, pp. 175-177. 
177 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, p. 149. 
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peuvent "voir", le dos de ma lampe West rien d'autre que ]a face qu'elle 
"montre" A la chemin6e. 178 
Although it may at first seem that this notion of having knowledge of an object's various 
perspectives runs counter to what Robbe-Grillet claims about human beings not having 
access to any God-like perspective, the two positions are not contradictory. Merleau- 
Ponty's argument still relies upon the body being situated, having a limited perspective. 
His point is, rather, that in experience, objects are perceived from a given perspective, but 
that part of the condition for having a perspective is that certain sides of any given object 
will be hidden. That perception sh6uld have this structure does not exclude knowledge of 
what may lie on the hidden side of the object, in fact, perception entails an attribution of 
(unperceived) qualities to an object, based upon those which are directly perceived. This 
projection of qualities is not so much a procedure of the imagination as simply an 
inherent part of perception, for Merleau-Ponty. 
Let us now turn to examine the importance of perspective in Robbe-Grillet's films 
and novels. Robbe-Grillet-s work, in terms of narrative perspective, can broadly be 
categorised into two groups; those works in which a single character's perspective is 
presented, and those in which the characters take turns at presenting their experiences, 
where the description of events slips (sometimes almost imperceptibly) from one 
character's control to another's. These two categories will be discussed in turn, 
beginning with a consideration of the single protagonist's point of view, as presented in 
La Jalousie and LImmortelle. 
"' Merleau-Ponty, MnomMologie de la perception, p. 82. 
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Literary narrative perspective 
La Jalousie is, of all Robbe-Grillet's novels, the one which adheres consistently to 
presenting experience of the world from a single embodied perspective. The discussion 
of the novel here places its focus'slightly differently from previous phenomenological 
commentaries on Robbe-Grillet's works, in that it looks at the question of why there is a 
"missing je" in La Jalousie, and how this can be accounted for in phenomenological 
terms. Although a protagonist is never named or explicitly mentioned, it is possible to 
read the novel as though it was littered with clues as to his/her presence. The implied, yet 
unmentioned narrator is assumed by most commentators to be the husband of A..., 
suspected by the narrator of having an affair with their neighbour, Franck. At the 
beginning of La Jalousie, the narrator's temporal perspective is immediately established: 
Maintenant Pornbre du pilier - le pilier qui soutient l'angle sud-ouest du 
toit - divise en deux parties egales Pangle correspondant de la terrasse. 
( 
... 
) seules les dalles de la terrasse sont atteintes par le soleil, qui se trouve 
eneore trop haut dans le ciel. - 179 
Thus, the reader discovers that the narration is unfolding in the present (which, one can 
ascertain, must be well after sunrise and well before sunset, given the position of the sun). 
The exact location of the narrator is less clearly defined in this passage, however. 
Although he is never explicitly mentioned, the reader nevertheless can find clues that 
point towards his being present. Perhaps the first strong hint as to his presence and 
situation is in the following passage, where the position of the armchairs on the veranda 
is described: 
Le troisi6me, qui est un si6ge pliant fait de toile tendue sur des tiges 
m6talliques, occupe - lui - une position nettement en retrait, entre le 
quatri6me et la table. Mais c'est celui-lk moins confortable, qui est 
179 Alain Robbe-Grillet, La Jalousie, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1978), p. 9. 
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derneurd vide. ( ... ) De I'autre c6te de la balustrade, vers I'amont de la 
vall6e, il ya seulement le bruit des criquets et le noir sans dtoiles de la 
nuit. "o 
Up until this point, there has been explicit evidence within the narrative only of the 
existence of A..., Franck and Christiane, Franck's wife. As Christiane is at their home 
looking after their child, then logically, only two of the four seats described here can be 
occupied by A... and Franck. Yet, the passage above indicates that three of the four 
chairs are occupied. It is at this point that the reader is tempted to conclude that the third 
occupant must be A... 's husband. The temptation to conclude that the husband is seated 
on the veranda in one of the armchairs is furthered by the way in which the narration goes 
on to describe the scene beyond the veranda, beyond the hand rail. Thus, the temporal 
and physical situation of the supposed (but never mentioned) narrator is the locus of the 
narration throgghout the novel. 
The absence of any indisputable evidence of a narrating je might well lead to 
claims that these clues are mere red herrings and that the entire novel is a chosiste work 
in which a camera-like eye merely records events and objects. Nevertheless, the 
temptation on the part of the reader to posit a jealous male heterosexual protagonist, (i. e. 
A... 's husband) is almost irresistible. The urge to posit such a narrator is, in part, a result 
of reading strategies acquired via reading rather more traditional literature, and Robbe- 
Grillet knowingly exploits this tendency on the part of his reader. Indeed, the novel's 
title is part of its own potentially double meaning. A purely chosiste reading would have 
it that thejalousie referred to was simply a venetian blind which impedes the viewing of 
objects and the occurrence of events. A psychological reading, however, would posit the 
180 La Jalousie, p. 20. 
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presence of a jealous narrator, whose emotion partly blinds him, impeding and distorting 
his view of things. A psychological explanation such as this does not necessarily, 
however, explain the lack of any mention of a narrating consciousness. 
A possible explanation for the absence of any mention of aje at the centre of the 
narrative of La Jalousie has been put forward by Szanto. His analysis of narrative 
consciousness suggests that one does not generally refer to oneself as je when thinking, 
even though the use of this pronoun does become necessary in speech: 
In a sense, the elimination of the personal pronoun in reference to oneself 
is an honest fictionalised description of the relation between a subjective 
conception and the objectivication of oneself. In speaking, one does say 
"I". In thinking, such pronouns are rare. Nor does one use a name (with 
which the external world objectifies all the qualities compounded to 
describe an individual) for oneself in personal thoughts. Since memory 
and imagination do not reach a stage of symbolisation demanding words, 
and pictures suffice (much as they suffice to describe what one sees at a 
given moment), the need of a pronoun or any label for self-reference is not 
necessary. A... 's hus6and finds need neither for this nor for labels other 
than the most simple (A ... 
) in referring to his wife, whether the letter 
suffices to bring to mind all associations of their life together is not 
important. 181 
Whilst there is truth in Szanto's assertion that, in thought, self-reference of the kind 
requiring the use of a personal pronoun is rare, there is perhaps more than just an attempt 
to reproduce thought accurately at work in La Jalousie. So, whilst an explanation such as 
this may be acceptable in terms of providing anecdotal evidence of the reflection of life 
in art, a theoretical explanation as to why this should be the case is lacking. A 
phenomenological explanation, however, may help to shed some light on this gap at the 
centre of the narrative. 
"' George H. Szanto, Narrative Consciousness (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1972). 
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Robbe-Grillet himself acknowledges this gap in the narrative, as Morrissette 
points out: 
The 'narrative' is expressed without any immediately discernible 
reference to self Robbe-Grillet has spoken of a creux, or hole ( ... ) at the centre of the narrative. It is here that the reader installs himself and, 
seeing, hearing, witnessing what the husband perceives, is obliged to 
assume the narrator's vision of things and to create without verbal cues or 
instructions his own interpretation of scenes and events'82 . 
Thus, without positing the existence of an "I", the narration nevertheless emanates 
from a point in space and time, this point being the body inhabited by the never- 
mentioned narrator. Morrissette's notion of the je-Want, which he claims is situated in 
this creux, is essentially a Sartrean one, in which consciousness is always consciousness 
of something, but, as Sartre argued in La Transcendance de Pego, never reveals a 
separate "je". 181 Morrissette remarks, in a footnote, that 
On ne saurait trouver de meilleure d6monstration de cet existentialisme du 
n6ant auquel renvoie, implicitement, la technique du "je supprim6" de La 
Jalousie, ni de meilleur soutien A la th6orie robbegrilletienne des objets- 
supports, des objectivations mentales ou des correlatifs ext6rieurs. Le fait 
que la justification de cette technique se trouve renforc6e par sa 
vraisemblance psychologique (comme en convainc La Jalousie) souligne 
1'extr6me richesse de ses procdd6s qui commencent A se r6pandre dans le 
roman contemporain (... ). 184 
What is strange about Morrissette'g support for a phenomenological approach to Robbe- 
Grillet is that his own position, that of using psychology as a means of analysis of Robbe- 
Grillet's works, should be sidelined. The phenomenological approach is "renforc6e" by 
the psychological approach, rather than the other way around. What this does suggest, 
182 Bruce Morrisette, Novel and Film (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 
p. 106. 183 This corresponds to the notion of the creux at the centrc of being referred to by Bernal. 
184 Morrissettc, Bruce, Les Romans de Robbe-Grillet, footnote 2, pp. 112-113. 
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however, is that Morrissette sees strong evidence for a phenomenological reading of the 
novel. 
The Sartrian approach on ývhich Morrissette's je-Want is based makes human 
existence somewhat dualistic, as Sartre makes a distinction between two kinds of being: 
the pour-soi and the en-soj. Merleau-Ponty's conception of the corps-propre was 
intended to be a way of reconciling the two modes of being into an incarnate subject. 
This is a fitting description of the (absent/present) narrator of La Jalousie, since the 
narrator of the novel is, after all, obsessed with bodily sensation, whereby conscious 
thoughts are not articulated, rather, the novel consists of noting sensory perceptions. So 
whilst Merleau-Ponty would be in agreement with Sartre's claim that, in perception, no 
"je" is discoverable, which certainly is the case in La Jalousie, Merleau-Ponty would 
disagree with Sartre's separating consciousness from the body by making the en- 
soilpour-soi division. Thus, given'a Merleau-Pontyan reading of the novel, the corps- 
propre is the locus of the narrative in La Jalousie, it is bodily sensation, sensory 
perception, that is referred to, rather than the consciousness or pour-soi. A Merleau- 
Pontyan explanation makes sense of the absence of the narrator, or the reason for his 
never explicitly being named. For Merleau-Ponty, the direction of intentional experience 
is always from the perceiver towards the world, so that consciousness cannot be directed 
towards itself 
le cogito comme exp6rience de mon 6tre est cogito pr&r6flexif, il ne le 
pose pas en objet devant moi; par position, et avant toute r6flexion, je me 
touche A travers ma situation, c'est A partir d'elle que je suis renvoy6 A 
moi, je m'ignore comme n6ant, je ne crois qu'aux choses. Pr6cis6ment 
parce que, dans ce que j'ai de plus propre, je ne suis rien, rien ne me 
sdparejamais de mol-meme; mals aussi rien ne me signale A moi-m8me 185 
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That is, there is nothing to be perceived in looking into one's own consciousness. This is 
why the body-subject is always turned outwards, towards the world and towards its 
intentional objects. La Jalousie, then, is a perfect example of this; the narrator's 
intentional objects are described without the narrator ever mentioning himself This is 
not to say that one cannot have consciousness of oneself, it is just that consciousness 
itself can never be the object of our perceptions. For Merleau-Ponty, self-consciousness, 
in the sense that one is conscious of the fact of one's own consciousness, is perfectly 
possible, indeed it is aff irmed to us 'in every perception: 
Toute pens6e de quelque chose est en m8me temps conscience de soi, 
faute de quoi elle ne pourrait pas avoir d'objet. A la racine de toutes nos 
exp6riences et de toutes nos r6flexions, nous trouvons donc un 6tre qui se 
reconnaft lui-m6me, imm6diatement, parce qu'il est son savoir de soi et de 
toutes choses, et qui connalit sa propre existence non pas par constatation 
et comme un fait donn6, ou par inf6rence A partir d'une We de lui-meme, 
mais par un contact direct avec elle. 186 
So., the self is given in consciousness, but not in an explicit way; it is certainly not the 
transcendental ego posited by Husserl after the reduction, but a self absorbed in its own 
perceptions, indeed in its own obsessions, as is the case in La Jalousie. 
The nearest the narrator of La Jalousie ever comes to including himself in the 
narrative is in the use of the catch-all "on". This is rarely used in the novel, but where it 
does appear, it is suggestive of the presence of the narrator, and emphasises his awareness 
of his bodily situation: 
On entend, venant par sa porte entrebaill6e, la voix de A..., puis celle du 
cuisinier noir, volubile et chantante, puis de nouveau la voix nette, 
mesuroe, qui donne des ordres pour le repas du soir. 187 
195 Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et I 'invisible, p. 83. 
186 Maleau-Ponty, Phinomenolokie de la perception, p. 426. 
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Here, it is the sense of hearing that situates the narrator on the other side of the door, and 
the use of "on" suggests a human presence of some sort. Merleau-Ponty's comments on 
the use of "on" rather than "je", which constitute part of his argument against Sartre's en- 
soi and pour-soi dualism, are enlightening with respect to the passage from La Jalousie 
above: 
Comment avons-nous pu dchapper A Faltemative du pour soi et de Fen 
soi, comment la conscience perceptive peut-elle 6tre engorg6e par son 
objet, comment pouvons-nous distinguer la conscience sensible de la 
conscience intellectuelle? C'est que ( ... 
) toute perception a lieu dans une 
atmosph6re de g6ndralit6 et se donne A nous comme anonyme. Je ne peux 
pas dire queje vois le bleu du ciel au sens ofj je dis que je comprends un 
livre ou encore queje d6cide de consacrer ma vie aux math6matiques. Ma 
perception, m8me vu de l'int6rieur, exprime une situation donn6e: je vois 
du bleu parce que je suis sensible aux couleurs - au contraire les actes 
personnels en cr6ent une: je suis math6maticien parce que j'ai d6cid6 de 
1'6tre. De sorte que, si je voulais traduire exactement 1'exp6rience 
perceptive, je devrais dire qu'on pergoit en moi et non pas que je 
pergois. 188 
Thus, in the passage from La Jalousie above, the sensation of hearing the voices coming 
from a certain direction (the other side of a door), situates the narrator's body in space. 
The passage also uses "on" to describe what the narrator hears. This is in line with the 
remarks made by Merleau-Ponty here, it is "on", rather than "je" that perceives, in basic 
perceptual experience. Merleau-Ponty argues here that a bodily account of consciousness 
is more true to our lived experience than a dualist account of consciousness, claiming that 
perception as it is experienced is anonymous, that there is no "ie", no ego, as Husserl 
would have claimed. In a point related to this, Merleau-Ponty claims that the anonymity 
of sensation is due to our body's perspectival grasp of the world; it is because the body is 
situated: 
187 La Jalousie, p. 16. 
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La sensation ne peut 6tre anonyme que parce qu'elle est partielle. Celui 
qui voit et celui qui touche West pas exactement moi-meme parce que le 
monde visible et le monde tangible ne sont pas le monde en entier. Quand 
je vois un objet, j'dprouve toujours qu'iI ya encore de 1'6tre au-delA de ce 
que je vois actuellement, non seulement de I'Etre visible, mais encore de 
I'&re tangible ou saississable par l'ouYe ( ... 
) toute sensation appartient A 
un certain champ. Dire que j'ai un champ visuel, c'est dire que par 
position j'ai acc6s et 
' 
oUverture A un syst6me d'6tres, les 6tres visibles, 
qu'ils sont A la disposition de mon regard en vertu d'une sorte de contrat 
primordial et par un don de la nature, sans aucun effort de ma part; c'est 
donc dire que la vision est pr6personnelle; et c'est dire en m6me temps 
qu'elle est toujours limit6e, qu'il y ait toujours autour de ma vision 
actuelle un horizon de choses non vues ou m6me non-visibles. La vision 
est une pens& asszýeflie 6 un certain champ. 189 
The following passage from La Jalousie, as well as the previous one, both combine these 
ideas - the anonymity of perception as revealed by the use of "on", and by the fact that 
the narrator, in the next quotation, has part of his field of perception rendered invisible by 
the situated nature of his body: 
Mais le regard qui, venant du fond de la chambre, passe par-dessus la 
balustrade, ne touche terre que beaucoup plus loin, sur le flanc oppos6 de 
la petite vallde, parmi les bananiers de la plantation. On n'apergoit pas le 
sol entre leurs panaches touffUs de larges feuilles vertes. Cependant, 
comme la mise en culture de ce secteur est assez r6cente, on y suit 
distinctement encore Fentrecroisement r6gulier des lignes de plantes. 190 
Thus, the narrator cannot see the earth between the leaves, it is screened by the leaves, 
due to his perspective, just as the narrator in the previous quotation could not see, but 
only hear, what was happening behind the door. Thus, the use of "on" indicates the 
absence of a "je" in perception, and, in revealing the limited nature of perception, 
indicates the bodily position of the perceiver. 
188 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de laperception, p. 249, original emphasis. 
189 Ibid, pp. 250-25 1, original emphasis. 
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Cinematic point of view 
The technique of situating the narration of space and time within a perceiving 
body is also apparent in Robbe-Grillet's films, and evidence of this is to be found in 
Robbe-Grillet's first foray into cinema with LImmortelle, wherein the perspective 
presented is often that of N, a human viewpoint. That is not to say, however, that events 
are revealed exclusively through the protagonist's eyes, since the camera often focuses on 
N himself There appears to be something of a contradiction at work here in Robbe- 
Grillet's theoretical position if we consider again his remarks in the introduction to 
L'Inintortelle concerning N, -the narrator, as the character from whose perspective events 
are perceived. N is, Robbe-Grillet tells us: 
Un narrateur ( ... 
) par les yeux de qui tout est vu, par les oreilles de qui 
tout est entendu, ou par 1'esprit de qui tout est imagin6.191 
Robbe-Grillet's emphasis here on a single human perspective, whilst concording 
perfectly with his novelistic practice in La Jalousie, where one person's viewpoint is 
consistently presented, is less strictly adhered to in other works. Sometimes, an almost 
imperceptible shift from third to first person perspective is employed (e. g. Le Voyeur), or 
else a perspective which shifts from one character to another (e. g. Les Goninies, La 
Maison de Rendezz-vous). LImmortelle appears to contain a mixture of techniques. 
Whilst the narrative in, for example, Le Voyeur is a third person narrative giving access 
to Mathias' subjective thought processes, LInintortelle appears to achieve a similar effect 
by giving the viewer access to N's experiences whilst including him in the shot. That is, 
he is viewed as if from another person's perspective (a kind of third person perspective), 
190 La Jalousie, p. 11. 
191 LImmortelle, p. 9. 
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and that other person is not necessarily one of the other characters, in, for example scenes 
where N is alone in his flat. Thus, the viewer sees N's face instead of what N himself 
sees; sometimes N's face and the scene around him are visible in the same shot. How is 
this third person narration to be squared with Robbe-Grillet's position as stated above 
with regard to avoiding the kind of God-like narrator found in realist novels or with 
presenting only what N experiences? 
The answer to this problem, as pointed out by Morrissette, lies in the possibility of 
separating: 
point of view in itself, as localisation of a camera objective or of an 
authorial eye, from the reason or internal justification of this same point of 
view. Does this "observer", who for Robbe-Grillet ( ... 
) need not be a 
"character" in the narrative, have the privilege of randomly positioning 
himself almost anywhere, with no excuse other than the exactitude of 
those visual perspectives? 192 
Morrissette wonders what is to prevent the observer mentioned above from becoming the 
omniscient observer of the Balzacian novel, as he would indeed have liberty of 
movement. These kind of third person perspective shots would take on a similar role in 
the film as descriptive passages do in a novel. The sliding of the perspective between 
third and first person in the novel would become the change of shot from the 
protagonist's point of view to a view of the protagonist, or vice-versa, in the film. For 
Morrissette, there is a risk here that Robbe-Grillet's theoretical position may be 
weakened. If, for Robbe-Grillet, the perspective presented to the viewer is not that of one 
of the charactqrs, how is he to justify the choice of the camera's point of view? It seems 
that Robbe-Grillet is not unaware of the need to justify the camera's point of view, indeed 
"' Morisette, Novel and Film, p. 45. 
136 
he has himself commented, in an interview, on the importance of justifying each change 
in the point of view presented by the camera: 
The cinema, whether or not there is a character to assume the point of 
view, is under the absolute obligation of always defining it - the photo has 
to be taken from a given point; the camera has to be somewhere. If there 
are changes of perspective during the course of the description, they will 
not go unnoticed; in one way or another they will have to justify 
themselves. 193 
For Robbe-Grillet, then, the camera does not need to occupy the position of a literal point 
of view shot, it does not have to situate itself literally where the eyes of the protagonist 
would be. However, his films do tend to limit themselves to only revealing that which 
the protagonist knows, and in this sense, there is no God-like perspective, such as the 
perspective Robbe-Grillet complained of in novels of Balzac. It is in this sense too that 
Robbe-Grillet's films are limited to the perspective of one body-subject; there is no 
privileged overview. Indeed, Robbe-Grillet has commented on the fact that the narratives 
of his films are incarnated by an actor: 
Fai toujours eu dans mes films un acteur principal, quelqu'un qui incarne 
en somme la parole narratrice primaire ou essentielle. 194 
Thus, Robbe-Grillet's cinema concentrates on events which are witnessed or imagined by 
one of its characters, even if the camera does not always mimic the protagonist's literal 
point of view, as was the case with an incarnate narrative perspective in La Jalousie. 
Alain Spiegel notes the similarities between novel and film in his discussion of 
the camera eye in literature. The main focus of his argument is that the novel, even 
193 Edward Branigan, Point ofview in the Cinema: A Theory ofNarration and Subjectivity in Classical 
Film (Berlin, New York, Amsterdam: Mouton Publishers, 1984), p. 45. 
194 Robbe-Grillet quoted in booklet accompan)ing box set of videos: Alain Robbe-Grillet. (Euvres 
Cin6matographiques (Paris: Minist6re des Relations Extdrieures, 1982), p. 33. 
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before the invention of cinema (as far back as Flaubert), uses narrative techniques which 
are not unlike the use of the camera. For Spiegel, the camera can be likened to the 
perspective of human vision: 
( 
... 
) the camera is a subjective medium, for it cannot show us any object 
without at the time revealing its own physical position - its angle and 
distance from the object ( ). This means that the images produced by the 
motion picture camera will only allow us to experience the object through 
a series of perspectives; that the ontology of the image itself will never 
allow for an apprehension of the object as a whole. In this sense no other 
art is less equipped to present a godlike and omniscient view of human 
experience than the camera ( ... 
)195 
Robbe-Grillet has also suggested that the novel has taken inspiration from the cinema in 
trying to decide upon the direction and duration of a description of point of view. In the 
cinema, the decision is inevitably taken for the director, to some extent, since the camera 
already has a point of view and a direction, whether or not it is meant to represent the 
point of view of one of the fi. Im's characters: 
Sur la pellicule les choses n'existent que comme phinomhes; elles ont 
obligatoirement une forme, et celle-ci se pr6sente soit d'un cöt6 soit de 
Fautre, jamais de plusieurs cöt6s en m8me temps. 196 
Given that the camera has a point pf view, the difficulty is in deciding on how the shot 
will be taken, and it is this problem which the novelist must also address: 
Sous Finfluence, ou non, de telles exigences du r6cit cin6matographique, 
le roman A son tour semble prendre conscience des rnýmes probl&mes. 
DWi est vu cet objet? Sous quel angle? A quelle distance? Avec quel 
6clairage? Le regard s'y arrete-t-il longtemps, ou passe-t-il sans insister? 
Se d6place-t-il, ou bien reste-t-il fixe? Le romancier perp6tuellement 
omniscient et omniprdsent est ainsi r6cus6. Ce West plus un Dieu qui 
195 Alan Spiegel, Fiction and the Camera Eye: Visual Consciousness in Film and the Modern Novel 
(Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1976), p. 32. 
" Alain Robbe-Grillet, 'Notes sur la localisation de les d6placernents du point de vue dans la description 
romanesque', in La Revue des lettres modernes: CWma et roman, 916ments d, -appr6ciation, 5,36-38 (Etd 
1958) 256-258 (p. 257). 
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d6crit le monde, c'est I'homme, un homme. Meme si ce West pas un 
personnage, c'est en tout cas un teii dhomme. Ce roman contemporain, 
dont on r6p6te volontiers qu'iI veut exclure I'homme de l'univers, lui 
donne donc en r6alit6 la premi6re place, celle de l'observateur. 197 
Robbe-Grillet's project as a novelist and filmmaker therefore aims for the same 
grounding in a human perspective as does Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. What is 
interesting about Robbe-Grillet's account of narrative perspective in fiction, then, is that 
the point of view of the narrative in the novel or of the camera in the cinema does not 
necessarily have to be that of one of the characters, so long as it is a human point of view. 
Indeed, it is questionable whether a cinematic equivalent of the first person 
perspective of La Jalousie would be possible. Commentaries on cinematic point of view 
indicate the failure of Lady in the Lake to depict successfully a subjective perspective on 
the screen. This was a film in whicý a camera was attached to an actor's body in order to 
show events from his perspective. Morrissette notes the problem highlighted by Lady in 
the Lake, and the way in which Robbe-Grillet's LImmorlelle avoided it: 
Some scenes use the subjective camera (with the lens where N's eyes 
would be), but in most instances the camera is alongside N. ( ... 
) It is a 
means, without resorting to the exclusive use of subjective camera (which, 
as Lady in the Lake demonstrated, cannot maintain the desired effect), of 
subjectifying the narration while retaining the third-person mode. 198 
However, the alleged success- or failure of a camera technique in one film does not in 
itself provide a justification for dismissing the possibility that it might not be used 
successfully in another film. Vivian Sobchack's discussion of point of view, in relation 
to a phenomenological approach t6 cinema, however, provides greater justification for 
197 'Notes sur la localisation de les ddplaccments du point de vue dans la description romanesque', pp. 257- 
258. 
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not attemptin. g to render internal experiences of consciousness via a film entirely 
composed of point of view shots. Sobchack's dismissal of the technique attempted in 
Lady in the Lake is justified in phenomenological terms, and distinguishes between the 
"film's body" and the human. ' lived body. The "film's body" is just not the same as a 
human body, Sobchack argues, and this is the cause of the failure of the subjective 
camera technique: 
Thus, disguised in human fýrrn in Lady in the Lake, the film's body and its 
perceptual experience is made explicit in its inauthenticity as a lived-body 
( 
... 
) Seen only objectively, both our own bodies and the film's body are 
reduced to mere physiological visibility. Their material nature, whether 
human flesh or metal and celluloid, becomes strange as it is estranged, 
abstracted, and amputated from its intentional function. In sum, the body 
we objectify is finally not a lived-body for us - whether it be the film's 
body or our own. It is not the subject of experience, but merely an object 
for experience. 199 
Because the film's body is an object for the viewer, and not a subject, it cannot convince 
the viewer that it has an intentional grasp of the world in the same way that a body- 
subject does. 
Merleau-Ponty's remarks on the cinema suggest that point of view shots are not 
always necessary to allow the view6r to identify with a character in the film: 
( 
... 
) le cin6ma ne nous donne pas ( ... 
) les pens6es de Fhomme, il nous 
donne sa conduite ou son comportement, il nous offre directement cette 
mani&re sp6ciale d'6tre au monde, de traiter les choses et les autres, qui est 
pour nous visible dans les gestes, le regard, la mimique, et qui d6finit avec 
6vidence chaque personne que nous connaissons. Si le cin6ma veut nous 
montrer une personne qui a le vertige, il ne devra pas essayer de rendre le 
paysage intdrieur du vertige ( ... 
) Nous sentirons beaucoup mieux le 
vertige en voyant de 1'ext6rieur, en contemplant ce corps d6s6quilibr6 qui 
se tord sur un rocher, ou cette marche vacillante qui tente de s'adapter A on 
"' Bruce Morrissette, Alain Robbe-Grillet (New York and London: Colombia Universtiy Press, 1965), 
p 41. ý9 Sobchack, pp. 232,248. 
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ne sait quel bouleversement de l'espace. Pour le cin6ma modeme, le 
vertige, le plaisir, la douleur, l'amour, la haine sont des conduites. 200 
This is the basis of Merleau-Ponty's account of intersubjectivity, the way in which we 
perceive others and have access to their minds. Just as our own behaviour communicates 
our internal states, so we can grasp the feelings and desires of others through their 
external manifestation in behaviour. Hence the need to show N's face, his bodily 
movement and the way in which he interacts with L and other characters - these aspects 
of his behaviour are a means for the viewer of identifying with what he is experiencing. 
So, the viewer experiences both N's perceptions as undergone by him (in literal point of 
view shots), and an understanding of what N is experiencing by watching his behaviour 
(shots in which N is seen within the frame). N's behaviour is also presented to the viewer 
I 
either from the perspective of other characters, or from the perspective of none of the 
other characters. These various perspectives are described in Merleau-Ponty's account of 
how we intend the world around us from a subjective perspective, and how we 
understand and identify with the experiences of the other people by observing them. 
Sensory perception 
As well as the bodily c, entring of experience, Merleau-Ponty discusses the process 
of perception, a central part of his philosophical project in PhMominologie de la 
perception. The return to phenomena themselves is, of course, an important result of the 
phenomenological reduction. In accordance with his aim of describing, rather than 
analysing or explaining, Merleau-Ponty sets out to describe what happens in perception. 
His detailed exposition comprises accounts of the perceptual field and how objects within 
200 Merleau-Ponty, Sens et Non-sens, p. 104. 
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it solicit one's attention so to become intentional objects, the objects of perception. He 
also discusses the tyranny of unwanted and apparently insignificant perceptions, and of 
the role of perception in relation to the imagination. All of these will be relevant in the 
analysis of Robbe-Grillet's work, which concentrates to a great extent upon painstaking 
descriptions or depiction of the perception of many phenomena. Since an obvious reason 
for the inclusion of such descriptions in Robbe-Grillet's work is not often apparent, it is 
hoped that Merleau-Ponty's call to examine the phenomenology of perception will render 
some of Robbe-Grillet's descriptive passages more understandable. 
The perceptual rield 
Perception, Merleau-Ponty claims, always has the basic structure of a figure 
perceived against a background. That is, in order to perceive anything, the subject has to 
be able to pick out an object against its surroundings. In this regard, it is worth 
underlining the influence, noted earlier, of Gestalt theory, as Merleau-Ponty 
acknowledges in PhMominologie de laperception: 
Quand la Gestalt-theorie nous dit qu'une figure sur un fond est la donn6e 
sensible la plus simple que nous puissions obtenir, ( ... 
) c'est la d6finition 
m6me du ph6nom&ne perceptif, ce sans quoi un ph6nom6ne ne peut 6tre 
dit perception. Le "quelque chose" perceptif est toujours au milieu d'autre 
chose, il fait toujours partie d'un "champ". Un plage vraiment homog&ne, 
n'offrant rien ii percevoir ne peut 6tre donn6e A aucune perception. " 
So, perception for Merleau-Ponty is a process whereby attention is brought to bear on an 
object within a perceptual field. Robbe-Grillet's prose describes a similar process, it 
presents perceptions via a character or a narrator, and these perceptions are frequently 
described as if one object is being focused upon amongst a field of objects, before the 
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attention of the perceiver moves on to the next object. This is not restricted to visual 
I 
sensation, in Robbe-Grillet's fiction; the following passage from La Maison de rendez- 
vous takes place in a dark corridor, which results in a noticeably hodily contact with the 
objects the narrator encounters. In addition, as he cannot see, there is a delay in the 
identification of each object perceived, so that each object is described in terms of tactile 
sensations before becoming recognisable, or named, as that particular object. Thus, the 
newspapers are initially "des choses entassdes" before being recognised as "journaux"; 
similarly the fish are firstly described as "un contact froid et humide", or "des corps 
allong6s, tr6s froids, un peu visqueux", until the ambiguity is resolved and the narrator 
realises that they are "[de] gros poissons": 
Comme je cherche une issue i ce d6sordre, j'atteins des r6gions qui ne 
sont plus 6clair6es du tout. Je bute sur des choses entass6es que je devine 
ensuite, au toucher, 6tre des piles de journaux 6pais, sur papier lisse, du 
format des illustrds chinois. En avangant la main A tatons, je rencontre 
alors un contact froid et humide, qui me fait retirer le bras vivement. 
Mais, dans une direction voisine, et avec 1'espoir toujours de d6couvrir un 
passage entre les piles de journaux que se multiplient, je tombe sur 
d'autres objets identiques - des corps allong6s, tr6s froids, un peu 
visqueux - dont je finis, d'apr&s Fodeur plus forte que d6gage cet endroit, 
par comprendre la nature: un grand nombre de gros poissons, sans doute 
consid6r6s comme inconsommables. 202 
This kind of description, in'which the objects are named only after being experienced, 
corresponds to Merleau-Ponty's claim that in perception, the objects of perception 
become determinate against an indeterminate or ambiguous background: "Ce passage de 
203 l'ind6termin6 au d6termin6 c'eýt la pens6e m8me. 
201 Mcrleau-Ponty, PhMomMolqgie de la perception, p. 10. 
202 Alain Robbe-Grillct, La Maison de rendez-vous (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1965), pp. 96-97. 
10' Merleau-Ponty, PhMomMolqgie de la perception, p. 3 9. 
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So, the phenomenological reduction leads to an emphasis upon things themselves, 
upon phenomena as experienced without any explanatory framework included in that 
perception. The ambiguous perceptual field, against which the body-subject picks out 
objects, making them determinate, is nevertheless constantly soliciting the attention of 
the senses. In spite of any attempt to concentrate, there are still objects around the body- 
subject that provide a distraction. Merleau-Ponty describes his own attempt to 
concentrate upon his work, whilst at the same time, his senses and his thoughts wander; 
his eye is drawn to the trees outside his room: 
Je pense au Cogito cart6sien, je veux terminer ce travail, je sens la 
freicheur du papier sous ma main, je pergois les arbres du boulevard A 
travers la fen6tre. Ma vie se pr6cipite A chaque moment clans des choses 
transcendantes, elle se passe tout enti6re au dehors. 204 
So, part of the structure of perception is that it takes place against a background, and this 
background, even in ordinary'situations, solicits the attention of the body-subject away 
from its deliberate activities. Let us return once more to La Jalousie, and consider the 
narrator's attempt to concentrate deliberately on the banana trees, by methodically 
counting them. These efforts at f8cusing upon something ordered and quantifiable are 
thwarted when the narrator's attention wanders back to the activities of A... and Franck. 
In one passage in particular, the narrator describes what is in front of him, that is, the 
window with its blind through which A... and Franck can be seen on the balcony. The 
narrator, watching A... and Franck, turns to concentrate on the stumps of some recently 
harvested banana trees, which have new shoots growing next to them: 
Juste A c6t6 de chaque disque blanc, mais dans des directions variables, a 
pouss6 le rejet de remplacemernt. Suivant la pr6cocit6 du premier r6gime, 
Merleau-Ponty, MnomMologie de la perception, p. 423. 
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ce nouveau plant a maintenant entre cinquante centim6tres et un m6tre de 
haut. 
A... vient d'apporter les verres, les deux bouteilles et le seau A glace. 
"Nous partirons de bonne heure, dit Franck. 
- C'est-A-dire? 
- Six heures, si vous voulez bien. 
- Oh! IA IA... 
- Qa vous fait peur? 
- Maiý non. " Elle rit. Puis, apr6s un silence: "Au contraire, c'est tr6s 
amusant. "205 
The white discs of each stump are counted and described meticulously, in what appears 
to be a conscious effort to concentrate upon the banana plants. That is, a casual 
observation, an eye flicking across the plants as part of a perceptual field coming into 
focus would probably not trouble t, o count the individual plants in this way. However, 
the narrator's jealous inclinations at this point mean that he is incapable of keeping his 
mind on the task of surveying the banana field. Like Merleau-Ponty unable to 
concentrate upon his work, the narrator of La Jalousie has his concentration broken by 
elements of his perceptual field. The reason that his concentration breaks in this way is 
that his attention is drawn back to contemplation of the very thing he sought to avoid - 
the relationship between A... and Franck. The suspect nature of their relationship is 
underlined in the above passage by the somewhat flirtatious conversation between them; 
they are arranging to spend time together, A... giggles at Franck's jokes, suggesting a 
closeness between them. 
205 La Jalousie, pp. 80-8 1. 
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Non-signifying objects 
Frequently, Robbe-Grillet's narratives concentrate upon objects which apparently 
have no particular signification. These objects neither serve to further the development 
of the plot, nor do they have any special meaning for the narrator or character who is 
describing them. As such, they are one of the more bewildering aspects of his work for 
readers brought up in the tradition 8f realist literature. The description of such objects in 
his fiction appears to be an attempt to render human perception in prose, and is part of 
Robbe-Grillet's move away from realist fiction. Whereas in realism, an object can have a 
meaning via the use of conventions such as metaphor, for Robbe-Grillet, objects are not 
to be understood as metaphors for emotions or to be read as having any significance other 
than the fact of their brute existence. Again, this is analogous to the process of 
phenomenological reduction, with conventional signification or explanation being 
parenthesised to allow for a return to phenomena. Such descriptions of objects devoid of 
meaning are very much the kind of descriptions called for by Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology, when he says that: 
11 s'agit de d6crire, et non pas d'expliquer ni d'analyser. Cette premi6re 
consigne que Husserl donnait A la ph6nomdnologie commengante d'Etre 
une "psychologie descriptive" ou de revenir "aux choses memes", c'est 
d'abord le d6saveu de la science. ( ... 
) Tout ce que je sais du monde, 
raýme par la science, je le sais i partir d'une vue mienne ou dune 
exp6rience du monde sans laquelle les symboles de la science ne 
voudraient rien dire. 206 
A comparison with Robbe-Grillet's theoretical writing on the Nouveau Roman reveals the 
similarity between their theoretical standpoints. Merleau-Ponty's remarks are echoed by 
Robbe-Grillet's aims for his literature: 
206 Merleau-Ponty, Phýnomýnologie de laperception, p. ii. 
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A la place de cet univers des "signifi cations" (psychologiques, sociales, 
fonctionnnelles), il faudrait donc essayer de construire un monde plus 
solide, plus imm6diat. Que ce soit d'abord par leur pHsence que les 
objets et les gestes s'imposent, et que cette pr6sence continue ensuite A 
dominer, par-dessus toute th6orie explicative qui tenterait de les enfermer 
dans un quelconque syst6me de r6f6rence, sentimental, sociologique, 
freudien, m6taphysique ou autre. 207 
So, just as Merleau-Ponty rejects science as a theoretical framework which guides our 
perceptions and helps to make them understandable, Robbe-Grillet rejects any theory that 
circumscribes experience or locks it into a system of explanations. The close description 
of the tomato on a plate in a restaurant in Les Goninies is just such a description, 
concentrating as it does on the perception of the object, giving it no other meaning than 
the fact of its presence: 
Un quartier de tomate en v6rit6 sans d6faut, d6coup6 A la machine dans un 
fruit d'une sym6trie parfaite. 
La chair rouge p6riph6rique, compacte et homog&ne, d'un beau rouge de 
chimie, est r6guli6rement 6paisse entre une bande de peau luisante et la 
loge oa sont rang6s les p6pins, jaunes, bien calibr6s, maintenus en place 




This lingering description is an apt illustration of Robbe-Grillet's desire to show things 
just as things, not as imbued. with any meaning that might make them significant or 
absurd, but quite simply there, existing. He states this as one of his aims in literature in 
Pour Un Nouveau Roman: 
Dans les constructions romanesques futures, gestes et objets seront hi 
avant d'8tre quelque chose; et ils seront encore IA apr6s, durs, inalt6rables, 
pr6sents pour toujours et comme se moquant de leur propre sens, ce sens 
qui cherche en vain A les r6duire au r6le d'ustensiles pr6caires, de tissu 
provisoire et honteux A quoi seule aurait donnd forme - et de fagon 
... Pour Un Nouveau Roman, p. 23. 
208 Les Gommes, p. 16 1. 
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ddlibdrde - la v6rit6 humaine sup6rieure qui s'y est exprim6e, pour aussit6t 
rejeter cet auxilaire g6nant dans l'oubli, dans les t6n6res. 209 
Robbe-Grillet's inclusion of a non-signifying object in Les Goninies calls to mind Jean- 
Luc Godard's long close-up of a coffee cup in Deux ou trois choses queje sais d'elle. 210 
The same resistance to any metaphorical or further meaning beyond the very presence of 
the object applies equally to Godard's image. Steven Shaviro comments along similar 
lines to Robbe-Grillet with regards to these kinds of non-signifying objects, and he 
provides citing Godard's coffee cup to illustrate his remarks. These images, in virtue of 
the fact that they appear on the screen for such a length of time, "persist beyond the act of 
211 
recognition that stabilizes and rationalizes perception". It is as if, Shaviro claims, these 
images are being presented to ask the question "What is an object? " The images no 
longer present objects inscribed in a meaningful system: 
The aberrant scale and unfamiliar lighting of these images defamiliarizes 
their objects - or, better, forces us to stop regarding them as referential 
objects. They appear in fixed shots, held for a long time: duration has 
become an independent dimension of the image, and is no longer a 
function of the time needed-for cognition and action. The pebble and the 
coffee are neither useful nor significant; they work neither as things nor as 
signs. They are nothing but images, mutely and fascinatingly soliciting 
our attention. The pebble rests, the coffee swirls, filling the screen. Our 
gaze is suspended; we are compelled merely to regard these images, in 
their strangeness, apart from our knowledge of what they represent. 212 
The defamiliarising effect to which Shaviro refers is in line with the strangeness resulting 
from the phenomenological reduction, and the dipaysement to which Robbe-Grillet has 
referred in relation to his own works. Images such as those mentioned in Godard's 
209 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, p. 23. 
210 Jean-Luc Godard, Deux Ou Trois Choses queje sais d'elle (France: Argos, 1967). 
211 Steven Shaviro, The Cinematic Body Theory out of Bounds, Volume 2 (Minneapolois and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993, Yd printing 2000), p. 29. 
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cinema, although they do occur in Robbe-Grillet's novels, are less apparent in his films. 
However, one moment at which a single shot lingers longer than is necessary for mere 
recognition in Robbe-Grillet's cinema is in the night club scene in Trans-Europ Express. 
A naked woman, bound in chains, revolves slowly on a stage for the delectation of the 
audience. The shot of the woman is in a similar vein, but it could be claimed that its 
inclusion in the film has a diegetic justification; the display of her body forms part of the 
entertainment in the club visited by the film's protagonist. It is this inclusion in the 
diegesis that distinguishes it from other non-signifying objects such as the tomato in Les 
Gommes and Godard's coffee cup. In addition, the sexual nature of the image means that 
its function is rather more complex,. a topic to be discussed in a later chapter. 
The invasion of unsolicited perceptions 
For Merleau-Ponty, the pervasive nature of apparently insignificant sensory 
perception may at times be linked to situations of danger or crisis. The body takes over 
in such situations, the subject has no wilful control over what the body will pay attention 
to 
Pendant que je suis accabI6 par un deuil et tout A ma peine, deJA mes 
regards errent devant moi, ils s'int6ressent sournoisement A quelque objet 
brillant, ils recommencent leur existence autonome. 213 
There are situations in Robbe-Grillet's fiction where such crises induce a heightened 
awareness of sensory perception in a fictional character. In Le Vq), eur, at the beginning 
of part two of the novel, Mathias notices a flattened, desiccated frog in the road. There is 
an extraordinarily detailed description of a shadow that falls across the road and of the 
212 Ibid., pp. 29 " 30. (The pebble features in Godard's Weekend). 
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frog's dried-up corpse. There is something reminiscent here of the tomato passage from 
Les Gommes; the frog is apparently a non-signifying and insignificant object, when the 
reader first encounters this description. However, it becomes apparent retrospectively, 
that it is just prior to the description of the frog that Jacqueline disappeared and was 
possibly raped and thrown over a cliff. Mathias' guilt in this matter is never absolutely 
established by the end of the novel, however it becomes evident that he is grappling with 
some kind of trauma connected with the girl's disappearance. Olga Bernal's 
phenomenological study of Robbe-Grillet suggests that the squashed frog, nothing more 
than a hollow skin, is a metaphor for the hollow in being in which the intentional 
consciousness resides. Whilst Bernal's argument is consistent with a phenomenological 
interpretation of the novel, I would contend that a phenomenological explanation that fits 
with the novel's diegesis can also be argued; that is, assuming that Mathias is the 
perpetrator of the crime, he is suffering from some kind of guilty trauma following 
Jacqueline's misfortunes. Mathias, in line with all the descriptions in this novel, does not 
state that he is traumatised; rather tlýe reader is left to work this out, given the experiences 
he undergoes. As Merleau-Ponty suggests, his body takes over in this situation; he has 
no control over the focus of his perceptions, and so stares in incomprehension at the frog. 
Perception and imagination 
There is a link in phenomenology between perception and imagination. In 
discussing perception, Merleau-Ponty claims that, in ordinary perception, one notices 
things that are not literally there, that is, one imagines things. For Merleau-Ponty, these 
things are just as much objects of perception as "real" things out there in the world. The 
213 Merleau-Ponty, Phenom6nologie de la perception, p. 100. 
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two are not to be confused, claims Merleau-Ponty, imagined objects are not mistaken for 
real ones; rather, the real objects spark off our imagination, which weaves dreams around 
those objects: 
A chaque moment mon champ perceptif est rempli de reflets, de 
craque'ments, d'impressions tactiles fugaces que je suis hors d'6tat de 
relier pr6cis6ment au contexte perqu et que cependant je place d'embl6e 
dans le monde, sans les confondre jamais avec mes r6veries. A chaque 
instant aussi je r6ve autour des choses, j'imagine des objets ou des 
personnes dont la pr6sence ici West pas incompatible avec le contexte, et 
pourtant ils ne se m6lent pas au monde, ils sont en avant du monde, sur le 
214 th6atre de Fimaginaire. 
Instances of glissements from the real into the imaginary abound in Robbe-Grillet's 
works. Whilst some of these are imaginings about the past, and so might be classified as 
memories, others are comprised of events that have not yet occurred, or that are purely 
speculative. La Jalousie provides an example of this - the description of the noise made 
by the millipede transforms into the noise made by A... 's comb: 
( 
... 
) la bestiole choit sur le carrelage, ( ... 
) les machoires s'ouvrent et se 
ferment A toute vitesse autour de la bouche, A vide, dans un tremblement 
r6flexe... 11 est possible, en approchant Foreille, de percevoir le 
gr6sillement 16ger qu'elles produisent. 
Le bruit est celui du peigne dans la longue chevelure. Les dents 
d'6caille passent et repassent du haut en bas de 1'6paisse masse noire aux 
reflets roux, dlectrisant les pointes et s' 6lectrisant elles-memes, faisant 
cr6piter les cheveux souples ( ... 
) 
Les deux longues antennes acc6l6rent leur balancement altemd. 
Dans le silence, paf instant, se laisse entendre, le gr6sillement 
caract6ristique, 6mis probablement A Faide des appendices bucaux. 215 
A single perceptual phenomenon here runs through the description of the millipede and 
of A... 's hair being combed; they are linked via the crackling noise they both make. Yet 
214 Merleau-Ponty, Phýnomýnologie de laperception, pp. iv-v. 
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both phenomena are not literally in front of the narrator, rather, the narration recounts the 
perceptions of his imagination- which has woven the two perceptions around one another. V 
The narrative continues, describing Franck killing the millipede, returning to bed, a hand 
(A... 's hand? ) grasping the sheets, and Franck going faster "dans sa hate d'arriver au 
but"2 16. The euphemistic choice'of words here is clearly deliberate, since another 
transformation takes place at this point. The fact that he is in bed seems to indicate that 
Franck is quickening his pace in the sexual act in order to reach a climax. But, by the end 
of the paragraph, these words refer to him driving a vehicle that hits a tree and bursts into 
flame. The glissements of meaning continue, as the crackling of the flames again 
becomes the same as that of the millipede and then of A... combing her hair. 217 These 
slidings of meaning are an apt rendering in fictional terms of what Merleau-Ponty 
describes, when he claims that a single perception can trigger off others in our 
imagination. It is typical of Robbe-Grillet's style that he should describe this process 
without making it explicit, and this is also consistent with the phenomenological method 
of describing, rather than analysing or explaining. The reader is carried along by the 
narrator's perceptions and imaginings, only realising retrospectively that a description 
he/she has just read applies to two different intentional objects of the narrator's 
perception. All of the perceptions in the passage described above are linked via the 
crackling sound made by the millipede, the comb and the fire, and in each one in turn is 
woven into an imagining of another. 
A somewhat similar process of the encroachment of something that is not literally 
there into the perception of something real is also apparent in Robbe-Grillet's cinema. 
21 5 La Jalousie, pp. 164-165. 
216 La Jalousie, p. 166. 
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L'Immortelle is, for example, a film in which reality and imagination are often difficult to 
disentangle. The real slides to the mythical and the imaginary throughout the film, and 
this is again similar to the imagination being sparked off by the objects of immediate 
perception as outlined by Merleau-Ponty. When N returns to the mosque after L's death 
in the car crash, he is seen in shadow. He is lit up for an instant, at the same time as the 
noise of a door opening and closing is heard. Robbe-Grillet clearly intends the viewer to 
assume that the illumination of his face is caused by light coming through as the door is 
opened and closed. As L appears, however, no such noise can be heard to justify the 
illumination of her features: 
C'est ensuite une autre silhouette qui s6claire, plus en arri6re, et sans 
justification cette fais: L assez lointaine entre des colonnes, dans la m8me 
robe que lors de leur visite A cette mosqu6e. Elle est droite comme une 
statue et regarde vers N et la cam6ra. 11 se toume lentement du cot6 de la 
jeune femme, mais elle s'6teint A son tour et le plan change. 218 
Thus, although she is not literally there (there is no sound from the door, and therefore 
not enough light coming into the dark interior to allow her to be seen), the setting of the 
mosque is enough to allow. N to imagine her presence. Unlike the passage from La 
Jalousie quoted above however, this is an imagined scene that takes place in N's 
memory, rather than being a scene that the narrator has invented for himself without 
having witnessed. 
Conclusion 
The discussion of the body subject as outlined by Merleau-Ponty has two major 
consequences which are reflected in the film and fiction of Robbe-Grillet. Firstly, the 
217 Jbid, pp. 165-167. 
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narrative perspective used by Robbe-Grillet in his novels suggests that they are narrated 
from a human point of view, if not always necessarily that of one of the characters. In a 
novel such as La Jalousie, it is possible to detect the presence of a narrator, even in the 
absence of any mention of him. The narrator's presence in spite of his apparent absence 
I 
is indicated by a phenomenological analysis of the text. Two points made by Merleau- 
Ponty in reference to perception allow this to be demonstrated; firstly, since 
consciousness is impossible to perceive, there is no direct reference in the book to any 
narrating consciousness. Secondly, every act of perception is already a recognition of 
oneself as a perceiving subject, so again, the narrator's perceptions already indicate that 
there is a human presence narrating. In Robbe-Grillet's films, and most especially in 
L'Immortelle, it is again the, perspective of the narrator that is presented. Although 
Robbe-Grillet does not film exclusively from N's point of view, the camera nevertheless 
is placed in such a way as to make the viewer identify with N and view events in relation 
to him, rather than in relation to any of the other characters in the film. 
The other major consequence of the phenomenological reduction is a return to 
phenomena themselves, described as they are perceived, devoid of any explanatory 
framework. In Robbe-Grillet's works, there are many examples of seemingly 
insignificant perceptual data, described in apparently excessive detail. Once more, when 
viewed from the perspective of a phenomenological project, their inclusion is less 
surprising. Robbe-Grillet's depiction of objects and his emphasis on sensory perception 
is understandable as an attempt to heed the call of phenomenology for a return to 
phenomena unaccompanied by any justificatory or explanatory framework. 




the strangeness of the present 
Closely linked to an examination of the body-subject, its spatial situation and 
corporeal perception, is the question of time. Indeed, these are inseparable in a 
phenomenological account of filmic and fictional narratives, since the body-subject is a 
temporal as well as a spatial being, thus, for Merleau-Ponty, "perception, being inherently 
perspectival, is of its very 'nature temporal 192 19 This is the crux of his argument in 
Phinominologie de la perception, and is an important part of this analysis of Robbe- 
Grillet's works. For Merleau-Ponty, the various modes of existence of the body-subject - 
its existence in space or time, or, asý we shall see in the following chapter, its existence as 
a sexual being - cannot be considered separately; the body-subject is a combination of all 
of these modes of being: 
Nous pouvons üs maintenant dire de la temporalit6 ce que nous avons dit 
( ... ) de la sexualit6 et 
de la spatialit6: l'existence ne peut avoir d'attribut 
219 Monika M. Langer, Aferleau-Ponty's Phenomenology ofPerception, (Handmills, Basingstokc, 
HampsWre, and London: MacMillan, 1989), p. 123. 
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ext6rieur ou contingent. Elle ne peut 8tre quoi que ce soit - spatiale, 
sexuelle, temporelle - sans I'Etre tout enti6re, sans reprendre et assumer 
ses "attributs" et faire d'eux des dimensions de son 8tre, de sorte qu'une 
analyse un peu precise de chacun d'eux concerne en r6alit6 la subjectivit6 
elle-meme. 220 
This, then, is what is at issue in using Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological philosophy to 
analyse Robbe-Grillet's films and novels - phenomenology reveals the interconnected 
nature not only of spatial situation and the objects of perception, but also of the temporal 
and cultural nature of lived experience. Our discussion here will concentrate on the 
temporality of the body-subject, and on the perception of time. 
The main thrust of the discussion here is to be an analysis of the centring of time 
on the body-subject in Robb. e-Grillet's works in terms of the way in which time is 
presented from the perspective of the present in his films and novels. For Robbe-Grillet, 
time and space are always perceived through the here and now, as he remarks in Pour U11 
Nouveau Roman, "il n'y a pas plvis d'ailleurs possible que d'autrefois. iMl It is the 
contention of this analysis that the here and now of Robbe-Grillet's film and fiction is 
that of the intentional consciousness, the phenomenological body-subject. The notion 
that embodiment leads to an apprehension of time via the present is the main point that 
Merleau-Ponty makes in relation to time, as Eric Matthews comments: 
An embodied subject necessarily perceives the world from a certain 
perspective, not only, as is obvious, in space, but also in time. The world 
that we perceive is not timeless, but present. 222 
Another important point for discussion in an analysis of temporality in Robbe-Grillet's 
work is the consequence of his depicting events from a constant here and now, the 
220 Merleau-Ponty, Ph9nominologie de la perception, p. 469. 
221 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, p. 166. 
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resultant non-realist narratives he produces. This examination will discuss the extent to 
which the non-chronology of his work effects a kind of phenomenological reduction, 
examining the sense of strangeness that results when a non-realist rendering of time is 
narrated, making events lose their veneer of familiarity. 
The past and the future in the present 
Gilles Deleuze, who has a link with phenomenological approaches to cinema via 
his interest in Bergson, a forerunner of phenomenology, deals with the issue of time in 
isolation in Robbe-Grillet's cinema. That is, he does not integrate it into a study of other 
issues, such as the body, which might also be linked with a phenomenological approach. 
This is of course because his aim in his books on cinema is not simply to study Robbe- 
Grillet, or phenomenological approaches to his work. Rather, Deleuze deals with the 
issues of movement and time, and the way in which films since the second world war 
have been structured around time, as opposed to movement, as had been the case in pre- 
war films. In his discussion of cinema in CiWma 2: LImage-temps, Deleuze argues, 
along phenomenological lines, that Robbe-Grillet's treatment of time in his films often 
amounts to a kind of past/future lived in the present. He says, of Robbe-Grillet's cinema, 
that: 
11 n'y a jamais chez lui succession de pr6sents qui passent, mais 
simultandit6 d'un pr6sent de passd, dun pr6sent de pr6sent, d'un pr6sent 
de futur, qui rendent le temps terrible, inexplicable. 223- 
This looks to be a move towards a Merleau-Pontyan conception of time on the part of 
Deleuze; the past and the future are lived in the present. If Deleuze finds that Robbe- 
222 Eric Matthews, The Philosophy ofAferleau-Ponty (Acumen: Chesham, Buckinghamshire, 2002), p. 92. 
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Grillet's presentation of time renders it 'inexplicable', then a Merleau-Ponty-based 
explanation of Robbe-Grilletian time will make it more understandable. Deleuze points 
out that there is a difference in the conception of time between Robbe-Grillet (the 
scriptwriter of Marienhad) and Resnais (who directed Marienbad). For Resnais, 
something really did happen last year in Marienbad, Deleuze explains, the film is 
supposedly based upon something that did happen, whereas for Robbe-Grillet, the affair 
did (or did not) take place only in the minds of X and A: 
[Chez Resnais] il ya toujours du r6el qui subsiste, et notarnment des 
coordonn6s spatio-temporelles qui maintiennent leur r6alit6, quitte A entrer 
en conflit avec Firnaginaire. ( ... ) Tandis que, chez Robbe-Grillet, tout se 
passe Mans la t8te" des personnages, ou mieux, dans le spectateur lui- 224 
m8me. 
Deleuze remarks that the positions adopted by Resnais and Robbe-Grillet are analogous 
to those taken by the characters in the film. That is, Deleuze sees Resnais as taking a 
similar position to X, believing that the affair really did happen, whereas, for Robbe- 
Grillet and for A, it is not possible to assert whether something really did happen or not. 
Deleuze argues that Resnais sees time as a series of nappes or layers of the past, and in 
the film, X tries to wrap these layers around A, to surround her in his version of the past. 
Deleuze thinks that for Robbe-Grillet, there is a process of shocks, of jumping from one 
version of the present to another. Thus A is constantly hesitating between two possible 
presents, she is pushed from one version to the other. In spite of this difference between 
Robbe-Grillet and Resnais, Deleuze remarks that the one thing common to both their 
positions is the lack of a centre or fixed point in time. 
223 Gilles Deleuze, LImage-Temps (Paris, Lcs Editions de Minuit, 1985), p. 133. 
224 Jbid, p. 13 6. 
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A fixed point is, however, provided if time is a result of the body-subject's 
existence in the world. Living a situation in space and time, in the here and now, is of 
great importance in terms of the perspective from which Robbe-Grillet's novels are 
narrated. As discussed, the narration is always from an embodied perspective, so that the 
reader never has access to any objective, overall viewpoint such as that of the realist 
novel. So, for Robbe-Grillet, perception must be presented as being experienced from the 
perspective of a given body, rather than narrated from an external point of view. This 
includes the narration of time, which occurs always in the body-subject's present in 
I 
Robbe-Grillet's work - the internal film plays or replays present and past events, as well 
as flights of fancy into the future. 
This is certainly also the case in LImmortelle - the film is 'narrated', Robbe- 
Grillet tells us in the introduction to the cini-roman, from the point of view of N, so that 
the viewer is presented with N's experiences in the film and the cin&ronian, events are 
narrated from his perspective, from an embodied point of view. The way in which time is 
presented in the film is extremely complex, with numerous returns to scenes already seen, 
although with modifications each time the scene is repeated. These may be trivial 
modifications, such as characters wearing different clothes, or they may be more 
significant changes, such as dialogues differing so that something said initially may be 
denied in a later version of the same scene. The reason for these modifications is that N 
is obsessively trying to work out what has happened to L, the woman with whom he has 
fallen in love, firstly after her disappearance, and then later in the film, following her 
death. Whatever the case, something in his present experience makes the narrator slip 
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into his past, he is always in contact with it, even as he lives the present, as Merleau- 
Ponty suggests. 
similar case occurs in La Jalousie, with the absent narrator's obsessive 
reworking of the millipede being crushed against the wall. The past is always on the 
horizon of the present in this novel, the narrator slips from the present into the past at a 
given sight or sound, the past is always there in the present. The sound of A... brushing 
her hair becomes the noise made by the millipede, with its association of infidelity. The 
absent narrator's jealousy may be prompting these associations, but nevertheless his past 
remains part of his present and informs his perceptions. 
Making strange: the disruption of chronoIogy 
The reduction is a feature of phenomenological philosophy of relevance to 
Robbe-Grillet's rendering of time, which previous phenomenological commentaries on 
Robbe-Grillet, including Deleuze, do not mention. This is of relevance to Robbe- 
Grillet's formal strategy of subverting literary and cinematic conventions. If it were 
simply the case that rendering time via the present experience of past and future were 
faithful to our experience of time, then all of Robbe-Grillet's works ought to appear 
completely vraisemblable for the viewer or reader. The fact that this is not the case 
points to Robbe-Grillet's deliberate undermining of the ways in which the viewer or 
reader expects time to be presented. Thus, what Robbe-Grillet's works display, once 
more, is not only a phenomenological fidelity to the way that time is experienced via a 
permanent present tense, but also an attempt to render time in unconventional and 
unexpected ways. Robbe-Grillet' places an emphasis on the immediacy of lived 
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experience in his works, and this can be plotted onto a phenomenological world view; his 
creative vision reproduces many features of the ontology of human experience explored 
by phenomenological philosophy. 
As has been discussed, the question of time in Robbe-Grillet's novels and films is 
one which is particularly perplexing. What is at issue in any discussion of time in Robbe- 
Grillet's works, is that time is presented in a non-conventional way, so as to render it 
almost impossible to decipher "real" events from imagined ones and past events from 
present or future ones. This is no simple matter of the use of fictional or filmic 
flashbacks or flashforwards, which would suggest that the viewer or reader is given the 
chance to re-construct a narrative chronology by the end of the work; with Robbe-Grillet, 
there is frequently no indication to the viewer or reader as to whether a passage is to be 
understood as, for example, a flashback. Robbe-Grillet comments on this in Pour Un 
Nouveau Roman, with reference to La Jalousie, saying that it was most certainly not the 
case that he had deliberately mixed up a pre-established chronology, but rather that he 
had constructed it in such a way that any attempt to re-establish such a chronology on the 
part of the reader would end in failure. Robbe-Grillet's rendering of time, as well as of 
space (as was discussed in the previous chapter in terms of spatial perspective), suggests 




) il Wexistait pour moi aucun ordre possible en dehors de celui du livre. 
Celui-ci n'dtait pas une narration emm8l6e d'une anecdote simple 
ext6rieure A lui, mais ici encore le d6roulement m8me dune histoire qui 
n'avait d'autre r6alit6 que celle du r6cit, d6roulement qui ne s'opdrait nulle 
part ailleurs que dans la t8te du narrateur invisible, c'est-A-dire de 
225 I'dcrivain, et du lecteur. 
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In fact, it is true to say that time is always organised around the present in Robbe- 
Grillet's films, as well as in his novels. He notes that the viewer (assuming that he or she 
is watching the film at the cinema and not on a video player) cannot re-view sections of 
the film, or linger over certain episodes, in the same way the reader of a novel can. 226 He 
or she is constrained by the will of the director, who has dictated the speed at which the 
film progresses. The presentation of any temporal dimension in film, then, whether past, 
present or future, necessarily unfolds before the viewer's eyes in the present. 
If what Robbe-Grillet's films narrate is a phenomenological present tense, one 
which presents the past or future via the present, then the lack of conventional devices 
indicating that scenes occur in the past or future is understandable. This is the case in 
Robbe-Grillet's novels just as it is in his films. He claims, in Pour Un Nouveau Roman, 
that, 
Film et roman se rencoýtrent ( ... 
) dans la construction d'instants, 
d'intervalles et de successions qui Wont plus rien A voir avec ceux des 
horloges ou du calendrier. ( ... 
) les recherches actuelles semblent ( ... 
) 
mettre en sc6ne, le plus souvent, des structures mentales privdes de 
"temps". Et c'est justement ce qui les rend au premier abord si 
d6routantes. 227 
The &routant aspect of his works, indicated here by Robbe-Grillet, is a result of the 
process of a rejection of past conventions, such as realism, and this is what he argues for 
in Pour Un Nouveau Roman; he seeks a new form of writing - the nouveau roman. 
Previous phenomenological commentaries on Robbe-Grillet's work have, however, 
omitted to indicate that his aims in rejecting a realist depiction of time can be considered 
225 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, p. 167. 
226 ibid, seep. 164. 
227 lbid, p. 164. 
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akin to the process of phenomenological reduction. 22" As the reduction underpins any 
phenomenological project, and as Robbe-Grillet's formal strategies share its bracketing 
of conventional significance, his perspectival and strange-seeming rendering of time 
mirror the body-subject revealed by the reduction - an embodied and therefore 
perspectival, temporal being. 
In the introduction to his cini-roman, L'AnWe Dendire 6 Marienbad, Robbe- 
Grillet provides an explanation for the film and cin&ronian's complex time scheme when 
he argues that this complexity is an attempt to render a kind of internal, or mental, time. 
He describes a film intirieur consisting of memories and fantasised future events, in 
between which are interspersed perceptions of what is really in front of the perceiver, so 
that: 
Le film total de notre esprit admet A la fois tour A tour et au meme titre les 
fragments r6els propos6s A Finstant par la vue et I'oulfe, et les fragments 
pass6s, ou lointains, ou futurs, ou totalement fantasmagoriques. 229 
The presentation of such an internal film meant a departure from the usual way in which 
time was depicted in cinema, for Robbe-Grillet, and in the absence of certain filmic or 
literary conventions the work becomes less easy to understand. In this respect, there are 
similarities between Robbe-Grillet ihe romancier and Robbe-Grillet the cinjaste. Just as 
in Pour Un Nouveau Roman, where Robbe-Grillet rails against conventions such as 
anthropomorphism and the use of metaphor in realist literature, in the introduction to 
L'Annje denikre d Marienbad, he rails against the use of certain well-worn cinematic 
techniques, such as a flashback signalled by a blurring of the image - once the viewer 
sees this blurring: 
228 Bernal and Carrabino's studies of Robbe-Grillct. 
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il comprend qu'il a d6sormais sous les yeux une action passee, et la 
parfaite nettet6 de la projection peut se rdtablir, pour le reste de la sc6ne, 
sans que personne soit g8n6 par une image que rien ne distingue alors de 
I'action pr6sente, une image, qui est en fait au present. 230 
So, usually in cinema, two scenes belonging to different points in time may be presented 
to the viewer in the present, they are distinguished from one another as belonging to 
different points in time only via cinematic convention. Robbe-Grillet explains that he 
and Resnais preferred to let the viewer of Marienbad work out for him/herself the twists 
and turns of the time scheme. In fact, for Robbe-Grillet, the film is most profitably 
viewed not as a series of events to be deciphered and re-ordered by the viewer in a 
chronological succession; if this is the case, he claims, the viewer will find the film 
difficult to understand, if not incomprehensible. Rather, the viewer should allow 
him/herself to be carried along as if watching his/her own mental film unfolding. This 
I 
viewer, says Robbe-Grillet: 
Se laissera porter par les extraordinaires images qu'il aura devant lui, par 
la voix des acteurs, par les bruits, par la musique, par le rythme du 
montage, par la passion des hdros ..., A ce spectateur-IA le 
film semblera le 
plus facile qu'il ait jamais vu: un film qui ne s'adresse qu'A sa sensibilit6, 
qu'd sa facultd de regarder, d'dcouter, de sentir et de se laisser 6mouvoir. 
L'histoire racont6e lui apparaltra comme la plus r6aliste, la plus vraie, 
celle qui correspond le mieux A sa vie affective quotidienne, aussit6t qu'il 
accepte de se d6barasser des Wes toutes faites, de I'analyse 
psychologique, des sch6mas plus ou moins grossiers d'interpr6tation que 
les romans ou le cin6ma ronronnants lui rabdchent jusqu'A la naus6e, et 
qui sont les pires des abstractions. 231 
truly realistic cinematic story, for Robbe-Grillet, is one which corresponds to the 
reader's senses, perceptions and emotions, one in which an emphasis is placed upon a 
... L Annie derniire 6 Marienbad, p. 15. 
230 Ibid., p. 14. 
231 Ibid, p. 17 
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bodily or sensory awareness of the film. For Merleau-Ponty, the reduction led to a 
heightened aNýareness of sensory perception, to perceptual experiences deprived of their 
usual significance; hence their apparent strangeness. We can see how the procedure of 
the phenomenological reduction helps us explain the apparent strangeness of Robbe- 
Grillet's work. 
Examples of the way in which Robbe-Grillet seeks to impede or destroy the 
possibility of establishing a traditional chronology include the fact that in many of his 
I 
works, certain information is presented, only to be denied or disproved later. Also, his 
works often have a circular kind of structure, whereby anything that has happened over 
the course of the novel or film is the subject of uncertainty by the end of it, so that the 
viewer or reader finds themselves back where they started. In his film LImmortelle, 
Robbe-Grillet uses both of these techniques for impeding a traditional chronology of 
events leading the viewer to feel that same sensation of strangeness to which Merleau- 
Ponty refers, after the phenomenological reduction is carried out. Firstly, then, the 
information N gleans in attempting to make sense of L's life after her initial 
disappearance and after her car accident seem to suggest that anything that happened 
between them could not have happened. Signs of his past life with her are systematically 
removed or denied. Thus, the viewer is left with the impression that perhaps nothing has 
happened during the course of the film. As N re-visits the places they had been to 
together, any evidence of their initial visit is erased. For example, on returning to the 
antiques shop. (shots 182 and 3 11), N sees a statue, identical to the one L had already 
bought, in the window, displayed in the same place and position. When she bought the 
statue on N's initial visit with her (shot 64), the antiques seller assured her that it was a 
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very old (and therefore, presumably, unique) object, thus making it unlikely that another 
just like it would be available for sa, le again: 
Le Marchand: Pour Madame, soixante livres seulement... Cest tr6s 
ancien... 
L (ironique): Oui, oui, naturellementl 
iS. 232 Le Marchand: C'est sar, madame, je garant 
L's ironic reply suggests that she is mistrustful of the salesman's technique, and Robbe- 
Grillet indicates that he should appear to be unnervingly obsequious in the cini-roman, 
describing him thus: "le marchand a un dr8le de sourire - gen6, ou servile, ou insinuant 
( y. 233 It is tempting therefore, to conclude that the presence of an identical statuette on 
N's return to the shop could be explained as result of the antiques seller's lies to L in 
order to maximise the sale of his "antiques". The antiques seller, nevertheless, insists 
that the second statuette's being the genuine article, as N examines it on his return to the 
shop 
N: Est-ce qu'elle ne ressemble pas beaucoup A I'autre? 
Le marchand: Quelle autre, monsieur? 
N: Celle que j'ai achet6e ici, il ya quelque temps. 
Le marchand: 11 ya quelque temps? Ici?... Peut-6tre une petite chose du 
rnýme. genre? 
N: On dirait la m6me. 
Le marchand (souriant): Comment cela pourrait-il We la m6me, puisque 
vous I'avez achet6e? 
Les mani6res du mar , chand 
Wont pas chang6: toujours c6r6monieuses, un 
peu serviles. Peut-6tre son air faux s'est-il encore accentu6.234 
Thus, the viewer is left feeling uncertain as to whether or not the man in the shop is lying 
to N, or as to whether N has made a mistake in remembering the purchase of the statue. 
Without having the statue in front of him to compare, how is he to rely on his memory, 
232 LImmortelle, p. 69. 
233 Ibid., p. 69. 
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especially since his recollections of events are called into question by so many of the 
local people he encounters? N's recollections of the past are thus undermined, his ability 
to reconstruct a chronology of events and to account for L's past and her mysterious 
disappearance and death are seriously hindered. 
However, this is not the only incident where N finds that the traces of his 
experiences with L have been brushed over. The white car in which L had the accident, 
for example, appears to have been resurrected towards the end of the film. At a garage, 
he sees a car which appears to be the same as the one owned by L: "il ya une grosse 
voiture blanche d6capotable, absolument identique i celle de L; vue de face, elle ne 
semble porter aucune trace d'accident sur la carrosserie .,, 
235 N takes an interest in buying 
it, and asks the garage-owner whether the car has been repaired at any point: 
N: L'aile, ici, elle a dt6 refaite? 
Le Vendeur: Jamais, monsieur... Neuf.. Tout neuf .. Tr6s peu rouI6 ... N: C'est vite arrriv6, un accident. 
Le Vendeur: Jamais, monsieur... Pas d'accident. Pas le plus petit ... Le 
monsieur parti pour un'long voyage. 236 
Of course, N's ability to make sense of what is happening is partly hindered by his lack 
of cultural awareness, his inability to speak Turkish, and his reliance on the poor French 
language ability of the locals. It is precisely his cultural ignorance that leads him to think 
that in Turkey, everything happens as if in an eastern mystery or adventure. It turns out 
that he cannot re-construct events along these lines, he cannot solve the mystery. It 
seems that the visible signs of the passage of time, have been to all intents and purposes 
removed. Unless, that is, the people concerned have misled N. The enigma of the film, 
234 LImmortelle, p. 13 6. 
235 Jbid, p. 189. 
236 jbid, p. 193. 
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the enigma which leads N to his death, is that it is impossible to tell what has and has not 
happened. The traditional mystery story would reveal the truth and allow for a 
chronological story to be reconstituted by the end of the film, whereas in LImmortelle, 
the truth and the order of events remain murky. 
The erasing of evidence of the past in this way is reflected in the circularity and 
doubling in the film's structure. These are yet more means by which Robbe-Grillet 
destroys any sense of chronology or of time having passed. In LImmortelle, the initial 
shot opens the film with the camera mounted on a moving vehicle so as to show a drive 
past the walls of an old Turkish castle, accompanied by Turkish music and singing. This 
establishes that the film takes place in an ancient city, full of myths and legends, where 
reality is not all that it seems. It is followed by a fade-in of L, reclining and smiling 
slightly (shot n* 2). At the end ofthe film, the penultimate shot (n" 354) is again of L, 
and Robbe-Grillet describes it in the cin&roman thus: 
Le cadrage, la position de la jeune femme et son expression sont 
exactement ceux du n' 2. Quant A la nettet6, c'est le phdnom&ne inverse 
qui se produit ici: Pimage, d'abord brillante et pr6cise, devient floue 
progressivement (... )237 
Thus the film's second and second from last shots are the same, framing the film with the 
enigmatic gaze of L. This is significant to the extent that the series of events occurring 
between these two shots is never definitively established; the "story" cannot be 
recuperated by the viewer, and thus the film has returned to the point at which it started, 
any progression or series of events is denied. There is a subtle warning to the viewer that 
this will be the case from as early as the first shot, which indicates that the story will 
unfold in the Istanbul of legend, with all its implications of uncertainty and 
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untrustworthiness. Shot 353 shows N dead after the car crash, in the same pose as L in 
shots 2 and 354. It seems that his inability to recuperate a chronology of events, mixed 
with his obsessive desire for L, has led to his death. The untrustworthiness of the legend 
and myth of Turkey is again emphasised in L's laughter, apparently from beyond the 
grave, in the final shot (n* 355). Are the two final shots of L the images and sounds that 
go through the mind of N as he breathes his last? Or is it the case that L's mocking 
laughter is a message from Robbe-brillet to the viewer that the traditional narrative, the 
mystery stories of far away lands, are not to be trusted? All that N and the viewer have to 
go on in the film are N's perceptions, his imaginings and re-workings of events. Nothing 
is certain, thus N fails to establish a traditional solution, or a chronology of events, by the 
end of the film. So, a process somewhat akin to the phenomenological reduction has 
occurred in the film - the means of working out whether events have happened, and 
moreover, why they have happened, have been suspended, bracketed. What remains for 
N and the viewer is a series of events whose occurrence is increasingly subject to doubt 
over the course of the film, and a conventional representation of the past becomes 
impossible. What this leads to in the work of Robbe-Grillet, as we shall discuss in the 
next section, is a rendering of time that focuses on a subjective experience of temporality, 
rather than a time frame that can be objectively established. 
La Belle Captive is another film in which a character finds his past is being 
erased. Walter, the protagonist, finds that Marie-Ange, the woman for whom he finds 
shelter after a car accident, is impossible to trace, following his brief involvement with 
her. The barman at the night club where they had spent the evening just before the 
accident claims to have no recollection of her. Moreover, Walter discovers from her 
237 LImmortelle, p. 209. 
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father that Marie-Ange died some time ago. Again, as with N in LImmortelle, Walter's 
attempts to find Marie-Ange are thývarted by an erasing of his past and a denial by other 
people of his own memories. As is the case elsewhere in Robbe-Grillet's works, Walter's 
story is complicated by the fact that it is difficult to tell which events are happening in the 
past or present, and which are dreams or imaginings on Walter's part. For example, 
when Marie-Ange appears on the screen, it is unclear whether she is a ghost, a dream, or 
a figment of Walter's imagination. Towards the end of the film, he wakes up next to his 
partner, who had been known as Sara Zeitgeist, his boss, throughout what the viewer 
must now take to be the dream from which he has just awoken (i. e. the whole of the film 
preceeding this scene). A remark made by Robbe-Grillet indicates the way in which 
dreams can be mistaken for memories: 
Rappelez-vous cette m6ditation de Descartes, ofi il faisait remarquer que, 
quand il avait rM une chose avec assez de force, le lendemain matin au 
r6veil, c'6tait comme du souvenir. 238 
However, Walter's waking reality, in La Belle Captive, is soon overtaken by elements of 
this dream; Sara turns out to be in league with the people who had been misleading him 
all along. Thus, time is destroyed; successive presents force Walter (and the viewer) to 
re-think the scenes they have just seen. The film is embodied from the perspective of 
Walter, it is only the information that he has that the viewer gains access to, and he lives 
in a constantly revised present tense, haunted by Marie-Ange in his dreams and 
imaginings. The film thus makes time seem strange, due to the fact that events are not 
definitively placed into any kind of time scale, the viewer follows Walter through 
whatever he is currently experiencing. 
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The question of the verifiability of the past is also at issue in L'Annee dendere a 
Marienbad. The story revolves around whether or not a man and a woman met and had 
an affair the previous year at Marienbad. The man, X, tries to persuade the woman, A, 
that they did indeed have an affair and had promised each other that they would meet up 
the following year. Robbe-Grillet, who scripted the film, claims that it is nothing more 
than the story of a persuasion, and should not be seen in terms of what happened or did 
I 
not happen the previous year at Marienbad. A seems to allow herself to be half- 
persuaded at some moments, and then denies all knowledge of any such events at others, 
leaving the audience yet again unable to establish whether anything did in fact happen 
last year at Marienbad. X's attempts at convincing A of the fact that they met last year 
are, on occasion, accompanied by such imprecise detail that the viewer must doubt that 
he really does have a truthful story to tell. One occasion that he recalls, for example, 
contains nothing of substance whatsoever: 
Voix de X: Nous nous sommes revus dans I'apr6s-midi du m8me jour. 
Voix de A: Par hasard, naturellement? 
Visage de A souriante. Le ton de X est un peu plus lointain. 
Voix de X: Je ne sais pas. 
Visage de X, toujours le m8me; cependant la phrase de Ay provoque une 
modification, une sorte de sourire A peine indiqu6, alors que le ton de A est 
redevenu plus hostile: 
Voix de A: Et en quel lieu 6tait-ce, cette fois-ci? 
Voix de X: En quel lieu... Ca n'a pas dimportance. 239 
What is remarkable about this sequence in terms of establishing a definitive version of 
events is that the certainty with which they speak about the past wavers throughout the 
2" Robbc-Grillet, quoted in discussion on Barilli, in Jean Ricardou ed., Colloque de Cerisy Rohbe-Grillet 
vol 1, p. 433. 
2'9 L Ann& derni&e 6 Marienhad, pp. 84-86. 
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conversation. Although for the greater part of the film, it is X who is the more persuasive 
I 
character, pulling A along in his wake, his description of the past takes on an air of 
uncertainty in this passage. At the same time, A, who is usually the passive partner in 
their friendship, gains momentarily in confidence. This is followed by a reversal, 
whereby A retums to her usual self, mistrustful of X, who at the same time smiles at re- 
gaining control of the direction of the conversation. The effect of the conversation is 
such as to leave the viewer undecided as to who is telling the truth. In spite of X's 
usually detailed accounts of their experiences last year, he is not always able to provide a 
convincing answer to A's queries. Thus, again, the truth about the past is denied or 
questioned on the one hand, constantly, by A, and on the other, occasionally by X's own 
vague recounting of events. 
So, a phenomenological analysis of time elucidates Robbe-Grillet's concerns in 
depicting time as lived, which coincide with Merleau-Ponty's aims in carrying out the 
phenomenological reduction. Just as the reduction signals a move away from expectation 
in terms of perception, so Robbe-Grillet's treatment of time fails to conform to expected 
conventions in literature and film. Let us now turn to look at the consequences of the 
reduction, in terms of the resultant strange-seeming way in which time is depicted in 
Robbe-Grillet's film and ficti6n. 
One of Robbe-Grillet's novels takes a particularly defamiliarising approach to 
time. Djinn, with its subtitle un trou rouge entre les paWs disjoints, refers, as Roch 
Smith notes, to memory as rendereý in the works Of prOUSt. 240 However, the novels deals 
with time on many levels. Firstly, the book was originally published alongside a set of 
grammar exercises in conjunction with an American academic, in the form of a teaching 
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text for American university students learning French. Therefore, the text had to contain 
examples of grammar usage in the context of a story. Robbe-Grillet duly includes 
examples of various tenses, such as the past historic, as, for instance when Marie 
demands that Simon tell her a story. 
Une histoire, Qa doit 8tre au passý historique. Ou bien personne ne sait 
que c'est une histoire. 241 
The irony, given this logic, is that Djinn itself, a good deal of which is narrated in the 
present tense, would not be a "real" story, since "une vraie histoire, c'est forcement au 
pass6". When the book was published as a novel in France, with a prologue and epilogue 
added, the prologue again suggested that the text, ostensibly discovered as a manuscript, 
was not a true story; it may or may not have been a factual account of Simon Lecccur's 
adventures. In fact, the prologue notes the similarity of the text to a school textbook, in 
which all the grammatical difficulties of the French language set out in increasing order 
of complexity. So, in the prologue, there is a very heavy din dWil to the text's original 
format, and the reader is forewarned about the very evident insistence on tense and time 
on a grammatical level within the text. 
On another level, however, the story itself twists and doubles back on itself, 
repeating the paving stone scene where Jean falls: 
Tout cela aurait donc d6jA eu. lieu, auparavant, une fbis au moins. Cette 
situation, pourtant exceptionnelle, que j'affronte ici, ne ferait que 
reprocluire une aventure ant6rieure, exactement identique, dont j'aurais 
v6cu moi-m6me exactement les p6rip6ties, ofi je jouerais le m6me role... 
Mais quand? Et oa? 242 
240 Smidi, p. 12 1. 
241 Djinn, p. 5 1. 
242 Ibid, p. 105. 
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Following this scene, the account of time Simon is given by Djinn is scarcely credible. 
Jean has some kind of illness which means that he remembers what is going to happen, 
creating what appear to be inconsistent and impossible situations for Simon. Djinn tells 
him that "Jean m6lange les temps. C'est cela qui d6r6gle les choses et les rend peu 
compr6hensibles. "24' Thus, although the novel is narrated from Simon's present tense 
perspective, 244 Djinn's account of Jean's illness attempts to render time more complex 
than living the past and future through the present. In the quotation above, one might 
well replace "Jean" with "Robbe-Grillet"; it is his deliberate disruption of time that 
makes it strange. His subversion of conventional depictions of time, then, concord with 
his formal strategies of making strange and of removing a familiar explanatory 
framework, as suggested in the pheAomenological reduction. 
Phenomenological time versus objective time 
Robbe-Grillet has insisted upon the notion that what he presents in his works is 
time as it is lived, rather than the time measured by clocks or calendars. Merleau-Ponty, 
meanwhile, parallels this by insisting that time is precisely that: something that we live, 
that is not objectively measurable. Many instances of the failure of a character to 
measure time in an objective way are to be found in Robbe-Grillet's works. Although his 
characters make attempts to master what might be termed objective time (that is, time as 
measured by clocks or calendars), to measure it and to make their lives fit into its 
constraints, they find themselves unable to do so. Concerns such as these, i. e. the 
apparent incompatibility of time as it is experienced and time as it might be measured 
243 Djinn, p. 118. 
244 With the exception of the passages where there is a change of narrator, e. g. the final chapter. 
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objectively or scientifically have also been tackled in fiction by Proust, and in philosophy 
by Bergson, both of whom Merleau-Ponty mentions in his discussion of time. 
Part of the legacy of phenomenology is the work of Paul Ricceur, who, as David 
Wood explains, has attempted to reconcile objectively measured time with 
phenomenological time, and in doing so he 
( 
... 
) singles out as a persist6nt difficulty in the history of philosophy, that 
of reconciling, of doing equal justice, to both phenomenological and 
cosmological time. 245 
The problem with phenomenological time, for Ricceur is that it leads to a series of 
aporias, obstacles, blocked paths. Conversely, for Robbe-Grillet, it would seem that this 
is not a problem, rather it is just the way time is experienced. In his literary and filmic 
works, he deliberately constructs space and time into a labyrinthine web of dead ends and 
red herrings: "ici Fespace d6truit le temps, et le temps sabote 1'espace. La description 
pi6tine, se contredit, tourne en rond v1246 Robbe-Grillet, rather than seeking to resolve the 
differences between "objective" and phenomenological time, or time as it is experienced, 
seems to delight in further complicating the knots that Ricwur seeks to unravel. Any 
attempt to unravel these knots does not do justice to our experience of time, for Robbe- 
Grillet: 
Car il s'agit d'exp6rience v6cue, et non des sch6mas rassurants - et 
d6sesp6rants tout A la fbis - qui tentent de limiter les d6gats et d'assigner 
un ordre conventionnel A notre existence, A nos passions. Pourquoi 
cherclýer A reconstituer le temps des horloges dans un r6cit qui ne 
s'inqui&e que de temps humain? Yest-il pas sage de penser A notre 
propre m6moire, qui Westjaniais chronologique. ( ... 
) Nos livres ( 
... 
) ne 
... David Wood, 'Interpreting narrative', in David Wood ed., On Paul Ricceur., Narrative and 
Interpretation (London and New York: Routledge, 199 1), p. 3. 
246 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, p. 168. 
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pr6sentent aucune difficult'e particuli6re de lecture pour ceux qui ne 
cherchent pas A coller dessus une grille d'interpretation perim6e. 247 
Other nouveaux romanciers would doubtless agree, given that Michel Butor, for example, 
called the novel 
( ... ) 
le domaine ph6nomdnologique par excellence, le lieu par excellence 
o& 6tudier de quelle fagon la r6alit6 nous apparalt ou peut nous apparalitre; 
c'est pourquoi le roman est le laboratoire du r6cit. 248 
So, Butor's remark returns us once more to phenomenology, which emphasizes that a 
purely phenomenological account of fiction (in terms of time) can make sense in respect 
of the nouveau rontan. It is Robbe-Grillet's foregrounding of lived time at the expense of 
chronological time that makes his work understandable in phenomenological terms. 
In one of Robbe-Grillet's earlier novels, Le Voyeur, a tension is established 
between objectively measurable and phenomenological time. Mathias, the novel's 
protagonist, is constantly aware of time and calculates how much time he has in order to 
carry out his watch sales. Such an acute awareness of time is perhaps unsurprising in a 
watch salesman; however Mathias is not the master of time, a fact which is predicted by 
the garage owner's remark as Mathias hires a bicycle from him: 
"Vous 6tes voyageur? demanda Phomme. 
- Bracelets-montres", acquiesa Mathias, en donnant une tape 16gere i sa 
mallette. ( ... 
) 
"Vous Wen vendrez pas une, dans ce pays d'arri6r6s. Vous perdez votre 
tempS. 249 
211 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, p. 150. 
248 Nfichel Butor, Te Roman comme recherche' in Essais sur le roman (Paris: Gallimard, copyright Lcs 
Editions de Nfinuit, 1960,1964), p. 9. 
249 Le Voyeur, p. 48. 
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His prescient remark proves to be true in two senses: Mathias literally loses time, in the 
sense that he fails to meet his time-regulated sales targets, and also, in the middle of the 
novel, he loses an hour or so of his memory, a time during which a local girl disappears 
and is murdered. Mathias realises, even at the stage when he is calculating the length of 
time required for each sale, that the project is unrealistic, especially given that some 
people will surely refuse to buy anything: "Autant valait abandonner tout de suite, 
puisqu'il n'avait m8me pas assez de temps pour se libdrer de tous les refu S. 
11250 
Rather than being able to plan and to live his life by measurable time, Mathias 
finds himself in a world of reverie, dipping into memories of the past as his present 
experiences ffigger replays of past events. Although he is on the island for a length of 
time that could be measured by clocks, any awareness of measurable, objective time 
evaporates for Mathias, whd lives in a disjointed world of immediate sensation, memory 
and fantasy. His attempts to impose order and to divide his experiences up according to 
measurable time fail, instead of which, he lives either in the present, in the re-lived 
present of memory, or in the projected present of fantasy. I 
Conclusion 
This examination of time in Robbe-Grillet's works has revealed the difficulty of 
establishing a definitive chronological time scale, due to the fact that his presentation of 
time amounts to rendering time as it is experienced rather than as it may be measured. 
The way in which he depicts all time, future and past, from the perspective of the present, 
is consistent with a phenomenological account of time, and, as Deleuze's remarks on 
Marienbad demonstrate, this is true of Robbe-Grillet's cinema as much as it is of his 
250 Le Voyeur, p. 52. 
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novels. The idea that time is alw ays experienced from the present, coupled with the 
notion of suspending a conventional explanatory framework, as suggested by the 
phenomenological reduction, explain why Robbe-Grillet's rendering of time is so 
unfamiliar and dificult to make sense of 
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ýChapter Five 
The body as a sexual being: 
sexuality and subversion 
Having established in previous chapters that Robbe-Grillet's film and fiction can 
be understood as an articulation of bodily existence, this discussion of sexuality in his 
works will explore the extent to which a phenomenological understanding of sexuality 
can explain the proliferation of sexual and eroticised images and descriptions in his 
I 
novels and films. An important consequence of Merleau-Ponty's notion of the corps- 
propre is that human beings are sexual beings. He devotes a chapter of PhellonlMologie 
de Ja Perception to this very subject, arguing that existence is inseparable from sexuality, 
and that sexuality suffuses all our perceptions to some extent or other. In the same way 
that human beings are inescapably temporal and spatial beings, since human existence 
occurs within a body situated permanently in the perspective of the here and now, so they 
are inescapably sexual beings.. This is of course because human consciousness inhabits a 
body; human existence is undeniably bodily and therefore is undeniably sexual. Hence 
the interconnectedness of the topics discussed previously, namely, perception, situation in 
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space and time, and now sexuality, all of which hinge upon the notion of the body- 
subject. 
Robbe-Grillet's film and fiction are remarkable for the number of scenes or 
descriptions they contain that include depictions of sexuality. Indeed, the issue of 
sexuality is arguably the one that has caused the most controversy in terms of critical 
responses to his auvre, notably from critics who side with the feminist viewpoint that his 
works are misogynistic. He counters such objections with the defence that the inclusion 
of images of deliberately exaggerated sexual violence is part of his project of subverting 
the hackneyed sexual stereotypes of western popular culture. To date, discussions of 
sexuality in Robbe-Grillet's films or novels have consisted either of attacking him for 
these violently misogynistic tendencies, or of defending him as one who revels in the 
playful and humorous possibilities to be gained by revealing the trite and predictable 
nature of sexual stereotypes. The debate perhaps reached its zenith in the seventies when 
Glissements progressifs A plaisir was condemned as being pornographic in an Italian 
CoUrt. 
25 1 However, since then, the debate has reached something of a stalemate, with 
neither side developing the argument further in more recent responses to his work. This 
is equally true of Robbe-Grillet himself, when questioned about the sado-erotic scenes in 
his latest novel in recent interviews. To the extent that he has consented to engage in the 
debate at all, he has adhered to his usual position, rather than elaborating on it. 252 I-E s 
refusal to engage willingly in this debate could be attributable to the monotony of the 
issues raised on the topic, its stagnation over the years. However, where his artistic 
21' See Robbe-Grillet's interview with Francois Jost in the booklet accompanying the Nrideo box set Alain 
Rohhe-Grillet. - (Euvres Cin6matographiques, pp. 52-53. 
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practice is concerned, far from being bored with the depiction of eroticism, he has 
continued to embrace it, and to explore it in fiction and cinema, whatever the reasons for 
his dismissal of questions on the subject . 
253 Rather than taking either of the well-beaten 
paths of the two opposed and stagnant positions then, the intention in this chapter is to I 
attempt to drive the debate forward by examining the possibility that phenomenology 
might be able to offer an alternative understanding of Robbe-Grillet's work as far as 
sexuality is concerned. It is striking that, where studies have been devoted in the past to 
examinations of Robbe-Grillet's work in phenomenological terms, the question of 
sexuality has. been ignored. 254 Reactions to his early works included some persuasive 
arguments that Robbe-Grillet's novels have a bodily and sensory focus, which may be 
elucidated by phenomenological philosophy, although these early analyses ignored the 
question of the body as a sexual being. This is surprising not only because of the fact that 
Robbe-Grillet's work abounds with references to sexuality, but also because 
phenomenology, and especially Merleau-Ponty's conception of it, is bound up 
inextricably with carnal, and therefore sexual, existence. Perhaps, then, given that so 
many features of Robbe-Grillet's work can be elucidated by phenomenological 
philosophy, the question of his depiction of sexuality may be similarly understood and 
explained by the application of a phenomenological approach. What is proposed in this 
discussion is the possibility of a phenomenological reading of Robbe-Grillet's films and 
novels, one based upon a bodily understanding of sexuality, to establish whether it can 
252 In an interview at the Institut Franqais in London in March 2002, and in a televised interview with 
Guillaume Durand for Campus on France 2 broadcast on 4 October 200 1, Robbc-Grillet was disn-dssive of 
any discussion of sado eroticism in La Reprise. 
" Whilst it is true that Robbe-Grillet's pronouncements on aspects of his work have been unchanging over 
the years, viz. his anti-realist stance; his critical view of his own %vork has bcen influenced, in some cases, 
by such figures as Barthes and Ricardou. Feminist critique of his ivork does not, however, appear to have 
altered his stance on sado-croticism. 
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provide a more satisfactory explanation for the inclusion of scenes depicting sex and 
eroticism in his work than that advanced by Robbe-Grillet himself Furthermore, this 
chapter will discuss whether Robbe-Grillet's passage from ambiguous depictions of 
sexual situations to more explicit and violent situations can be explained in 
phenomenological terms, as both are elucidated by Merleau-Ponty in his account of the 
body as a sexual being. 
Robbe-Grillet himself has commented extensively in interviews on his depiction 
of eroticism and sexuality. There is a discernible heightening of his interest in depicting 
scenes of a violently erotic nature as his career progresses, Whilst sado-eroticism in 
some form has been present from the beginning of his career in narratives such as Le 
Voyeur, with the murder and possible sexual assault of a teenage girl, its treatment was 
relatively subtle in such early works. In the case of Le Voyeur's Mathias, even though 
some of what he perceives and imagines can be inferred by the reader, the question of the 
girl's rape is* not finally resolved, and thus an air of ambiguity surrounds the novel. 
Following such ambiguously described situations is a shift in later works to more explicit 
depictions of sexuality, inclUding scenes of rape and torture. These depictions of sexual 
violence and of overt eroticism, are to be found in works such as La Maison de rendez- 
vous and Projet pour une Hvolution 6 New York, both of which describe erotic or sado- 
masochistic scenes in detail. Arguably, the depiction of sexual violence in his later works 
is simply a continuation of what had already been done in for example, Le Voyeur. 
However, the graphic and explicit detailing of such scenes is what constitutes their 
development into something more unsettling, more violent. Critics have attacked Robbe- 
Grillet on the grounds that his work is misogynistic and even pornographic. It is usually 
"' See Bernal, Barilli, Carrabino. 
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the later novels and films that come under attack from detractors for their violent content, 
but Robbe-Grillet has always staunchly defended his own works, both in interviews and 
in explanatory essays, and we shall now turn our attention to accusations made against 
him and to the defence he puts forward. 
Objections to Robbe-Grillet 
Firstly, let us look in more detail at the case against Robbe-Grillet. He is a writer 
and filmmaker who has produced enough theoretical pronouncements to allow us to 
conclude that he is well informed about the debates concerning sexuality that have 
ensued from his work, and that he certainly includes sadistic images in full knowledge of 
the way they are likely to be' received. In the introduction to the screenplay of one of his 
more controversial films, Glissements progressifs di, plaisir, he argues along Saussurean 
lines that the elements making up the film are the conventions with which we are over- 
familiar, but that they are divested of their usual meaning in the context of the film: 
Selon Pirremplagable opposition saussurienne entre langue et parole, 
disons que les sc6nes de com6die, le goOt du sang, les belles esclaves, la 
morsure des vampires, etc., ne repr6sentent pas la parole de ce film, mais 
seulement sa langue. Cest la parole d'une soci6t6 qui a 6t6 d6coupde en 
morceaux afin de la faire r6trograder A Ntat de langue. Et c'est cette 
langue seconde qui va servir de r6servoir A mat6riaux pour produire une 
parole nouvelle, une structure non r6concili6e, ma propre parole. 255 
This analysis has been supported by commentators on Robbe-Grillet's work, by way of 
justification for the presence-of sexual and sado-erotic scenes. One such is Ben Stoltzfus' 
defence of Projet Pour Une RAolution 6 New York. This novel contains a scene 
depicting a naked woman chained up and made to sit astride a circular saw, with the 
255 Alain Robbe-Grillet, Glissements progmssifs du plaisir (Paris: Lcs Editions de Minuit, 1974), p. 14. 
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horrific results described in graphic detail. For Stoltzfus, such a scene is not to be 
understood literally, it is not to be taken as a realist depiction of an act of violence against 
a woman. Rather, the violence is "directed against the langue of cultural ideology, taboo, 
social codes, [etc. y. 256 The trouble with Stoltzfus' defence is partly that the passage in 
question does not read as if it were an attack upon cultural ideology in the same way that 
other passages in Robbe-Grillet are more obviously parodies of cultural stereotypes or 
genres. Although elsewhere, Robbe-Grillet clearly does play with conventions in respect 
of plot, characterisation, genre, etc., when it comes to describing erotic scenes, the 
playfulness is less evident. Ann Jefferson has criticised Stoltzfus' position, again using 
I 
Saussurean terminology. She complains that 
What Stoltzfus doesn't acknowledge is the fact that Robbe-Grillet's 
scenario is based consistently on a highly sexist division of roles in which 
langue/woman is attacked and dismembered by the phallic performance of 
male parole ( ... 
) doesn't this merely repeat the stereotypes and the 
ideologically inspired oppositions from which writing is supposed to 
release it? 257 
So, it seems that Robbe-Grillet's artistic practice fails to live up to the aims of his theory. 
Melinda Camber, for one, has argued that it is difficult, if not impossible, to claim to 
challenge sexual stereotypes when they themselves form the basis of the work. Of his 
film Glissementsprogressifs duplaisir, she comments that: 
Alain Robbe-Grillet seems to be attempting the impossibly difficult task of 
incorporating a critique of his film within the film ( ... 
) mag critics 
dismiss his "ironic" treatment of eroticism as mere pornography. 25 
156 Ann Jefferson's summary of Stoltzfus' argument 'The sex behind the text', in The Times Literary 
Supplement, 7 March 1986, p. 245. 
257 Jefferson, p. 245. 
258 Melinda Camber, 'Robbe-Grillet: the 'ironic' treatment of eroticism', The Times, 29 October 1974, 
p. 12. 
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So, what is needed then, is an approach to Robbe-Grillet that takes into account the 
objections raised by feminists, but which provides an alternative to the subversion-of- 
cultural-stereotypes theory as advanced by Robbe-Grillet and Stoltzfus. In the search for 
an alternative, this discussion wil 
.I 
attempt to ascertain whether the applicability of 
phenomenology to the bodily focus of his novels can be extrapolated to his depiction of 
sexuality. However, we must firstly consider Robbe-Grillet's own line of defence. 
Bricolage 
Robbe-Grillet's usual defence and that of those who argue with him in favour of 
his inclusion of scenes of sexual violence in his films and novels is that he is merely 
exaggerating, sometimes to what he considers to be humorous effect, the depictions of 
sexuality that already exist in western culture. This has been referred to as a process of 
259 cultural bricolage , of taking elements of culture and putting them back together so as 
to highlight the fact that some of them are in fact clich6s; hackneyed stereotypes upon 
which we rely all too often for a ready-made understanding of novels, films, etc. In 
questioning our usual understanding of such clich6s, Robbe-Grillet is continuing the aims 
he set out in Pour Un Nouveau Roman, he is attempting to undermine our cultural 
expectations. 
. 
The stereotypical elements of culture he includes in his works are not 
meant to be representations of sexual relationships that hold a mirror up to reality, nor are 
they realist accounts of such relationships - they do not rely upon over-used literary or 
cinematic techniques to convey meaning, rather, they reveal these techniques in all their 
falseness. This, then, is Robbe-Grillet's defence, and it is apt at this point to examine 
examples of the kind of bricolage carried out by Robbe-Grillet in his novels and films in 
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order to detennine whether it can truly be said to throw into relief the kind of stereotypes 
that culture usually relies upon. This process, if it does indeed prove to be what Robbe- 
Grillet is carrying out, is akin once more to the process of phenomenological reduction; 
of "making strange" cultural commonplaces and suspending our usual attitude towards 
them. The success of his endeavours vvill then be able to be measured by the extent to 
which he does indeed manage to "make strange" these clichds. 
A novel often singled out for criticism in this respect is Projet Pour Une 
Rivolution d New York. This is a novel that clearly plays with many different elements 
of popular culture, with, for example, its references to a television programme popular at 
the time. There is a referende to the dire special effects of Mission Impossible, when the 
characters in Projet Pour Une Nvohifion 6 New York peel rubber masks off their faces. 
It was perhaps because of the less than convincing appearance of the masks that Robbe- 
Grillet chose them. They are a ver y obviously fake element of popular culture, but one 
about which we are prepared to suspend our disbelief every time we view the 
programme. The Robbe-Grillet version of the removal of the Mission Impossible masks 
is arguably more disturbing than the television original - Robbe-Grillet's character 
removes not only his mask but also chunks of his skin: 
L'un des hommes, qui Warrive pas A se d6faire de son visage demprunt, 
trop bien coII6 A sa vraie t6te, press6 Wen finir ( ... ) s'dnerve, tire au hasard 
sur les divers bords ou saillies qui peuvent offrir une prise, et se met A 
d6chirer par lambeaux ses oreilles, son cou, ses tempes, ses paupi&res, 
sans rnýme s'apercevoir qu'il est en train d'arracher dans sa hdte des 
grands morceaux de sa propre chair. 260 
... See Smith's definition, mentioning Uvi-Strauss' bricolage, p. 167, note 2. 
260 Projetpour une r&olufion a New York, p. 6 1. 
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So, here is a very straightforward reference to a part of popular culture that we are 
expected to accept unquestioningly when we watch the programme. We swallow the 
detective thriller whole, in spite of its obvious lack of realism, and Robbe-Grillet hints at 
this in his reference to Mission Impossible. We do not attribute any kind of realism to 
such special effects, but we accept them nevertheless, as part of the genre of TV 
programme we are viewing. 
In contrast to the rubber mask episode, there is a scene later in the novel which 
depicts "la belle Joan' )261 chained d9wn astride a circular saw. It is quite clearly a sexual 
torture; having burned her genitals, the narrator describes the effect of the saw: 
L'6cartement des longues jambes, bien tendues par les liens, fait p6n6trer 
davantage les pointes d'acier dans les chairs tendres du p6rin6e; des filets 
de sang commencent A couler sur le plat de la lame et i la face interne des 
cuisses ( ... 
) le sexe ( ... 
) oii la scie a p6nkr6 de plus en plus A chaque 
mouvement convulsif de la patiente, labourant les chairs et entamant le 
pubis, - barbouilld de sperme, bien plus haut que le sommet de sa fente 
naturelle. 262 
One might argue that this is- again a reference to popular culture in the same way as the 
rubber mask scene above; it bears a certain resemblance to a scene from a James Bond 
f IM. 263 I The saw-blade scene in Projet pour une r&ohition j New York is very 
reminiscent of the moment where James Bond narrowly avoids being sliced in half by a 
laser by the eponymous villain in Goldfinger. 264 The difference is that Bond's wit and 
skill of course allow him to escape unscathed, and, unlike the unfortunate young woman 
261 Projet pour une r&olution 6 New York, p. 179. 
262 jbid, p. 181-185. 
263 A reference to the spy genre was made in Robbe-Grillet's clin d'ceil to Bond in Trans-Europ-Erpress; 
Jean-Louis Trintignant is seen in the film in front of a poster advertising From Russia with Love, copying 
the pose of Scan Connery as he holds his gun. There is a still from the film illustrating the scene in 
Obliques: Robbe-Grillet, 16-17, p. 123. 
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who is tortured in Projet pour une Revohition 6 New York there is no graphic detail of his 
mutilated genitals. This could account for a critic's description of the novel as "rien 
d'autre qu'une petite histoire de saoiqu&'. 265 So, unless exaggeration alone can be said 
to constitute the parodying or subversion of the scene from Bond, it is difficult to 
ascertain how Robbe-Grillet could justify such a scene as an example of cultural 
bricolage. 
Bricolage: women as dolls 
The argument concerning Robbe-Grillet's use of cultural stereotyping to subvert 
western culture, to reveal the -stereotyped images it employs has also reared its head in 
relation to Robbe-Grillet's most recent novel, La Reprise. Tom Bishop has argued that 
Robbe-Grillet's inclusion of scenes of sexual violence in this novel amount to no more 
than an attempt to parody pornogtaphy. 266 The novel contains passages depicting the 
sexual torture of Gigi, its precocious, coquettish, heroine. Bishop's point seems to be that 
it is obvious that Robbe-Grillet is parodying sexual torture if one considers the fact that 
Gigi, the subject of this torture, is described as doll-like: 
Toute. l'imagerie drotique de I'auteur est IA: cordes, chalines, feu, 
g6missements de nymphettes supplici6es mais triomphantes. Mais cet 
6rotisme convenu est moins pomographique que parodie du genre. Les 
poses de Gigi copient celles de poup6es: il est question d'un "salon de 
poup6es 6rotiques" (,.. )267 
264 Guy Hamilton, Goldfinger (U. K: Danjaqu Productions, Eon Productions, 1964) As Goldfinger was 
released in 1964, and Projet pour une r6volution 6 New York published in 1970, Robbe-Grillct could have 
seen the film in advance of writing the book. 
265 Pierre Bouregcade quoted in Susan Suleiman, 'Reading Robbc-Grillct: Sadism and Text in Projet Pour 
Une R&olution 6 New York', in Romanic Aeview, 67,1 (January 1977) 43-62 (p. 43). 
266 Bishop, Torn, 'Topologie d'une reprise ou le rctour de Robbe-Grillct', in Critique: Alain Robbe-Grillet, 
aofit - septcrabre 2001,651-652 (aofit-septembre 2001) 295-604. 267 Ibid, p. 602. 
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Indeed, Bishop is correct in his assertion that Gigi is very closely associated with dolls; 
she and her mother live in a toyshop selling dolls. 268 The problem with his argument here 
is twofold. Firstly, even though Gigi might be "triomphante", since she is trying to 
outwit her male torturers, this in no way excuses their torturing her. Moreover, if what 
Bishop means by parody is a humorous or satirical mimicing of pornography, the parody 
is scarcely noticeable when sexual violence towards a woman is being straightforwardly 
re-enacted. Secondly, his argument is objectionable on the grounds that he suggests that 
the doll-like description of Gigi makes her character an obvious parody. She is not a real 
person, she is just a symbol for one, a dummy or stand-in, therefore no real harm is being 
done and the implication is that we, as readers, ought not to worry about it. Yet, this 
attitude in itself is not so much a parody of patriarchal popular culture, as a copy of it. 
That it is acceptable that women should be considered as little more than sex objects, as 
chattels, as Barbie dolls or mannequins is suggestive of an attitude firmly rooted in 
patriarchal culture rather than one distanced from it or mocking it. It is true that the 
people of both sexes depicted in Robbe-Grillet's film and fiction lack psychological 
depth, as a result of Robbe-Grillet's rejection of a realist style of characterisation. 
However, to reduce females to the level of inanimate dolls is to objectify and de- 
humanise them, and appears less than even-handed when the male characters in his 
novels and films are not caricatured in the same way. 
The depiction and description of females in doll-like terms is an image that is 
often repeated in Robbe-Grillet's films and novels. In this respect, a lin. e linking female 
characters can be traced right the way through his career, so that Gigi has something in 
268 La Reprise, see p. 67; the namý of the toyshop, Die Sirenen der Ostsee, Mic Mermaids of the Baltic) 
with its reference to mermaids, suggests females who are both attractive and dangerous. 
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common with the description of many other female characters: in Djitm, Simon is unable 
to decide whether Djinn is a mannequin or a real woman. Whatever she is, she holds a 
strange power over him; female sexuality is depicted as dangerous, something threatening 
to men. Also, in Glissements progressifs du plaisir, the two female protagonists, Nora 
and Alice play strange ritualistic games of torture with a female dummy or mannequin, 
daubing it with fake blood (it is so bright red that nobody would believe it to be real) and 
with eggs. Nora herself also takes the part of the dummy as Alice covers her in "blood" 
and raw eggs. These two are once more strongly suggestive of female sexuality and 
reproduction; the red paint suggesting menstruation, blood loss due to childbirth or loss 
of virginity, and the eggs suggesting fecundity. 
Robbe-Grillet's depiction of women, it seems, has changed little over the course 
of his career, in spite of feminist objections to his works. The doll-like Gigi, Djinn and 
Nora are all foreshadowed in an early novel, Le Votyetir, although in this novel the link is 
not made in a direct way between Jacqueline, the murdered girl, and any kind of doll-like 
appearance or behaviour. However, the use of certain descriptive words and sentences 
are repeated throughout the novel to make a connection between women, dolls or 
mannequins, and the kind of behaviour that merits punishment. This begins with the 
waitress in the caf6, who is described as having: 
un visage peureux et'des mani6res mal assur6es de chien battu ( ... 
) [et de] 
longs cils de poup6e dormeuse. Ses fonnes un peu fr6les ajoutaient 
encore A son air vuln6rable. 269 
From the first, the waitress is depicted as a victim. When she clumsily pours the wine for 
the men talking in the caf6, she is ; colded. The men in the caf6 are talking about some 
269 Le Voyeur, p. 56. 
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unidentified female, although their remarks could conceivably apply to the waitress 
herself, the context of their conversation is not fully revealed, nor is its subject: 
"Elle m6riterait... " ( ... 
) "Des claques... " 
Mathias apergut les grands yeux sombres de la fille. ( ... ) L'essuyage des 
verres 6tait termin6; pour se donner une contenance, [la serveuse] mit ses 
mains derri6re le dos, sous pr6texte de renouer les cordons d6faits des son 
tablier. 
'Te fouet! " reprit la voix du jeune homme. 270 
The waitress appears uncomfortable when the men talk of the unidentified woman in this 
way - she fiddles with her apron strings so as to pretend to be occupied, rather than 
preoccupied, by their conversation. However, this is no co-incidence, since throughout 
the novel Mathias pays particular attention to females whose hands are behind their back, 
leading the reader to think that Mathias' proclivities include sexual encounters with 
women who are bound in this position. So the waitress appears not only timid, but (also, 
perhaps in Mathias' mind) sdxually compliant. 
In an identical remark made by Jean Robin, whose house Mathias visits for lunch, 
it becomes clear that Jacqueline (the girl who is later murdered) was the subject of the 
conversation in the caf6. Jacqueline is apparently worthy of even more reproach than the I 
waitress. Jean's remark that "Elle m6riterait le fouet, cette garce! " leads Mathias to 
conclude, 
d'apr&s tout ce qu'il entendait dire depuis le matin, il semblait en effet que 
la gamine efit besoin d'Etre fouett6e ou mEme de recevoir un chatiment 
plus s6v&re. 271 
270 Le Voyeur, p. 59. 
271 Ibid., p. 14 1. 
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The timid, compliant waitress and the naughty Jacqueline are linked further by doll- 
related vocabulary when, after Jacqueline's body is found, its discovery is reported by 
one of the locals: 
Le marin qui en faisait le r6cit ( ... ) ne semblait d'ailleurs nullement 6mu 
par ce qu'il rapportait: il aurait 6t6 question, aussi bien, d'un mannequin 272 de son rejet6 au rivage. 
The link between women conceived of as dolls, and as (sex) objects begins to become 
apparent from the moment when Mathias first notices the waitress. So, the de- 
humanising and objectifying of women (describing them as dolls or mannequins), is 
coupled with the implication -that Jacqueline's behaviour somehow made her fate less 
surprising, that she was "asking for it". The belittling of Jacqueline's death by the 
islanders is indicative of a certain attitude towards female sexuality that firstly views 
women as sexualised objects (dolls) and that excuses sexual violence towards women if 
they are considered to be behaving in a seductive or wanton way; that is, displaying their 
sexuality overtly. 
The association of women with dolls, then, would appear to be a straightforward 
borrowing from patriarchal attitudes towards women. Whilst it is undoubtedly part of 
popular culture and is evident in advertising, films, television, etc., Robbe-Grillet's use of 
the idea that women are doll-like does nothing to parody popular culture, rather female 
characters emerge the worse for it; they are tortured, raped or murdered. 
272 Le Voyeur, pp. 174-175. 
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Bricolage: la sirenelle saunion 
The potential danger represented by women is alluded to in Robbe-Grillet's works 
via the depiction of women as mermaids or sirens. This is linked to the connection 
between women and dolls in La Reprise, via the name of the shop selling dolls and other 
toys where Gigi and her mother live: Die Sirenen der Ostsee (the mermaids of the 
Baltic). 273 However, this in itself carries no hint of the danger that is suggested elsewhere 
in relation to mermaids. In Un Rggicide, there is a warning about the sexual allure of the 
mermaids that visit the island: 
"Sur les plages torrides, au creux des rochers, nous trouverons les jeunes 
femmes aux 6cailles dordes, ä la nage rapide et souple, ä la chevelure 
d'algues onduleuses. 
. "Elles sont filles de l'icume, nýes du soleil ä la cr8te des vagues et leur rire, qui ne cesse jamais, endort les plus grandes peines. ( ... 
) ddjä tu 
attends celle qui vient pour toi, ton amante au goüt de sel... ge274 
So, once more, female sexuality is depicted as dangerous, treacherous, to men. 
Elsewhere, however, the mermaid is depicted as a victim. Souvenirs A triangle dor 
contains several word plays that suggest a connection between women and fish, 
especially via the confusion over the name of one of the female characters, Ang6lica 
Salomon. "Vous vous appelez Ang6lica Salomon. Salomon, et non pas Salmon comme 
cela figure par erreur sur votre feuille de contr6le sanitaire". 275 Mermaids/females 
become victims in this novel when they are turned into tins of salmon, the fate that is 
hinted at by Ang6lica's surname. There is another suggestion of this during the point in 
the novel when the interrogators/narrators are trying to clarify their jumbled story: 
273 La Reprise, p 67. 
274 Un ROgicide, pp. 117-118. 
I 
193 
Le seul poisson en cause serait la jeune fille elle-m6me, quand les marins 
l'ont remontde A la surface, prise dans leurs filets de pdche. 
L'usine en bordure de mer, qui constituait le but avou6 de votre 
parcours, se trouve pourtant bien 6tre une conserverie? 
Je ne sais pas... Et, de toute mani&re, elle est abandonn6e, comme j'ai pris 
la pr6caution de le dire d6s le d6but. 276 
Thus, the connection between the woman who is caught like a fish, and the canning 
factory is dismissed at this point, but it is stated explicitly later, when the food produced 
by the factory is explicitly named: 
Quand ( ... 
) une prisoni6re est r6form6e ( ... 
). elle est livr6e A la conserverie 
et vendue dans le commerce, apr6s d6coupage et pr6paration approprides, 
sous 1'6tiquette de "saumon aux aromatee'. Vous reconnaltrez ces boltes 
sans mal, parmi les innombrables piles des supermarch6s, i la jolie figure 
277 de sir&ne qui les ome. 
There is more than a hint, therefore, that a female victim could become a victim of 
cannibalism. This is reminiscent of the scene from Le Jeu mec lefeu, where one of the 
girls who is imprisoned in the brothel is used, almost like a slab of meat, or a garnish, on 
a bed of spaghetti in red sauce. The red sauce, with its likeness to blood, as will be 
discussed in more detail presently, carries connotations of female reproduction, 
menstruation, and sexuality. The artful arrangement of the girl's naked body in the scene 
in question does suggest that it is a carefully composed tableau Wiwi/ or an unreal scene; 
nevertheless, the notion that female sexuality represents danger and that females are to be 
punished for it is in evidence in both Le Jett avec lefeu and in Souvenirs du triangle dor. 
275 Alain Robbe-Grillet Souvenirs du triangle dor (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1978), p. 176. 
276 Souvenirs du triangle dor, p. 67. 
277 Souvenirs du triangle dor, p. 76. 
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Bricolage: vampires, horror and fake blood 
In another borrowing from popular culture, Robbe-Grillet works the myth of 
vampirism into his film La Belle Caplive which is, as its title suggests, the story of a 
woman, Marie-Ange, who is captured. She is captured by a group of mysterious men, 
who use her to seduce Walter Naime. Walter finds himself compelled to follow her. 
Thus, whilst Marie-Ange's appearance (white robes, blond hair) and name (Marie 
suggests the mother of Christ) are both suggestive of something angelic or holy, they 
belie the fact that she turns out to be part of a dangerous game of manipulation. As 
Beauvoir remarks, "la femme est A la fois t3ve et la Vierge Marie. "278 Although there is, 
at first, no suggestion that Walter is a vampire, he orders a vodka and tomato juice or 
Marie Sanglqnte at the bar where he meets Marie-Ange, who expresses disgust at the 
taste of the cocktail. However, when she is offered the same drink later in the film, she 
drinks it willingly, and the yiscous red liquid drips from her lips rather as blood drips 
from a vampire's mouth in so many horror films. Having seduced Walter, Marie-Ange 
bites his neck, leaving two red teeth marks. Once again, Robbe-Grillet has selected 
elements of popular culture that are obviously and instantly recognisable. Their potential 
for comic exploitation is evident, due to a link with Hammer Horror-style vampire films. 
Such films are funny rather than frightening, and that clearly deal with myth rather than 
reality. However, there is something darker at work here; Sara Zeitgeist, Walter's boss, 
is something of a dominatrix figure. Her instructions to Walter are always no-nonsense, 
whilst her appearance (straddling a motorbike, in a masculinised pose, wearing leather 
and a lacy shirt) suggests both a (sexually) dominant woman (the leather and the 
motorbike), and hints at all things gothic and vampiric (the lacy shirt). Sara and Marie- 
I 
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Ange are in league with the group of mysterious men who initially capture Marie-Ange, 
and together they lead him to his death, by the means of their sexual allure. Sara, then, is 
aftnimefatale in this scenario, in league with the group that leads him to his doom. The 
belle captive herself, whilst initially apparently a victim, is used by the group as bait to 
capture Walter. 
So, certain elements of the vampire film are present in La Belle Captive, however 
many of the traditional elements of a vampire film are missing, and the viewer's attempts 
to understand the film as a vampire story are hindered, the film being far more complex 
than it first appears. There are elements of the film noir here, in that there is a male 
protagonist who is trying to solve a mystery, and twofenimesfatales who lead him to his 
death. However, the inclusion of elements that are not usually found in film noir or 
vampire films, such as the inclusion of what might be called "living paintings", (in the 
style of Magritte's La Belle Captive series) is a striking feature of the film. It is partly 
their presence that signals to the viewer that predictable genres are not being respected, 
and that the film cannot be read according to the conventions of these genres. 
Just as Magritte challenged conventional depictions of reality, Robbe-Grillet is 
challenging the way in which we attempt to understand film. Indeed, the link between 
surrealism and English gothic literature was made by Breton: "I believe in the future 
resolution of those two states, in appearance so contradictory, that are dream and reality, 
in a sort of absolute reality; of surreality. v9279 Breton suggested that the English gothic 
novel (and hence, the vampire novel) examplified this. Equally, dream and reality come 
I 
into play in La Belle Captive - the film is clearly divided in to two sections: Walter's 
278 Beauvoir, Simone de, Le Deuxiýme Sexe vol I (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), p. 236. 
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dream, followed by the morning after his dream. Eventually, the dream spills over into 
reality. Robbe-Grillet notes, in relation to the film, that there is a communication 
between two worlds: 
What interests me in Magritte is the presence on his canvases of several 
worlds, often of two worlds, that ought not to communicate but that 
connect through an opening. Through this opening, one sees another 
world. Magritte's presentation of two worlds that ought to be separate but 
are connected seems to me to have a relationship to the story of the Greek 
legend of "The Bride of Corinth" in which a young man falls in love with 
a woman who, unbeknownýt to him, is dead, is a ghost. My interest in 
Magritte brought forth a whole series of scenes of going through - going 
through a barrier, going through a painting, and so forth; and this 
relationship obviously recalls the sexual act. 280 
There are movements between two worlds, what one might call "goings through", on 
several levels- in the film. Marie-Ange and the other characters in the film pass from 
Walter's dream into reality. Marie-Ange is often seen framed by velvet curtains, on the 
beach, in a 'living painting'. - The curtains on the beach perhaps represent an opening, a 
point of passage, a going through. They resemble theatre curtains, which again suggests 
the meeting point of two worlds - the curtains being between the 'real' world of the 
audience and the drama being acted out on stage. Equally, the mythical Bride of Corinth, 
I 
(or Marie-Ange in the film) exists between the living and the dead, she can pass between 
these two worlds. Following the moment when Walter is seduced and bitten on the neck 
by Marie-Ange, is a ndse-en-scMe of Magritte's painting, in which the camera moves 
through a picture frame towards some velvet curtains. Then Walter wakes up, screaming 
and clutching his neck where Marie-Ange has bitten him. This is a crucial moment in the 
279 Quoted in David Pirie, A Herithge ofHorror., The English Gothic Cinema 1946- 1972 (London and 
Bradford: Gordon Fraser, 1973), p. 19. 
2'0 Anthony N. Fragola, & Roch C. Smith, The Erotic Dream Machine: Interviews with Alain Robbe- 
Grillet on hisfilms (Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), p. 103. 
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film, as it marks the beginning of Walter's obsession with Marie-Ange. The passage 
through the picture framc and twýards the curtains indicates Walter's passage into the 
control of Marie-Ange. This is reflected in the camera work, as, accordingly, the 
camera's penetration of the picture frame occurs at the same moment that her teeth 
penetrate his neck. The bite Marie-Ange inflicts upon Walter, as well as her seduction of 
him, represent a passage from the world of the dead to that of the living - in vampire 
stories the penetrative power of the sexual act and of biting are closely linked, if not 
interchangeable. So, it is through the seduction of Walter and through drinking blood 
(both Walter's blood and the bloody Mary) that Marie-Ange moves from the helpless 
captive to a position of power. She breaks free from her handcuffs and becomes the 
dominant sexual partner, at the same time gaining strength and changing from being on 
the point of death or collapse to being full of life and stronger than Walter. 
It has been suggested by Robbe-Grillet that there is a kind of role reversal here. 
Walter is an especially weak character - his actions are controlled for him by Sara and 
Marie-Ange; he appears to have little or no volition. If it is accepted that weakness is 
usually characterised as feminine, and control and power masculine, then it is true that 
there is to some degree a reversal of feminine and masculine roles. Robbe-Grillet sees 
this as a defence against feminist critics, and was asked about this in an interview: 
Interviewer: In La Belle Captive, Sara is dressed in leather, on a 
motorcycle - both symbols of masculine sexuality - and Marie-Ange, 
whose femininity is emphasised, is the dominant sexual partner. Do these 
leading women represent an answer to feminist attacks on your films? 
R-G: Yes. Moreover, one of the things that displeased Mesguich [who 
played Walter], who is very macho, was that he had a role that was really 
quite feminized, whereas Cyrielle Claire, who played Sara Zeitgeist, had a 
281 role that was masculinized . 
"' Fragola and Smith, p. 107. 
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However, if what feminists object to in Robbe-Grillet's work is the stereotyping of 
females, the reversal of roles outlined here remains stereotyped. The dominatrix-cum- 
fenimefatale as incarnated in Sara and the not-so-innocent captive played by Marie-Ange 
are both predictable types found infilm noir and horror. Robbe-Grillet appears to have 
taken up both genres and re-worked them, subverted certain elements of them, and added 
to them in his references to Magritte. Gender roles however, have not been subjected to 
any kind of re-working. Marie-Ange, the innocent helle captive, becomes afeniniefalale 
when she uses her feminine charms to lure the protagonist to his death. Her apparent 
innocence is part of her danger; as a vampire, she is a jenime fatale as well as a belle 
captive. Sara, meanwhile, is more obviously afenimefatale, she is clearly in control of 
Walter from the start, but his trust in her turns out to be misplaced. So, once more, for all 
of Robbe-Grillet's original re-working of the vampire genre, predictable gender roles 
remain undisturbed. 
So, whilst it is true that to some extent, Robbe-Grillet's film undermines his 
viewers' expectations of thefilm iýoir and vampire genres via such devices as the non- 
resolution of the central mystery, a complex temporal re-ordering of events, and the 
intermingling of dream and reality, there is one generic convention to which he 
consistently adheres, that of gender roles, which is surprising given his professed interest 
in subversion. Arguably, it may well be the case that in order to subvert a genre, 
recognisable elements of that genre must remain intact. However, the occasional reversal 
of masculine and feminine qualities (strong females and weak males), is not in itself a 
reversal of conventional gender typing. Robbe-Grillet aims to take genres, myths and 
199 
conventions and to re-work, exaggerate or undermine them in order to illustrate that a 
film's meaning is a process of cultural construction. The problem with gender roles in La 
Belle Captive is that they are so close to those found in conventional filmic genres that, 
once again, the subversion is not clear. 
Blood, religion, myth and danger 
Just as the vampire myth forms a link between blood, sex and danger or even 
death, female sexuality and' reproduction are linked in patriarchal attitudes to women. 
Whilst the blood in some of Robbe-Grillet's films is obviously fake (LaBelle Capl&e, 
Glissementsprogressifsdiiplaisir), in other works it is less obviously so. Thisisdue, in 
part, to the fact that Robbe-Grillet, intentionally used bright red liquids in his films to 
represent blood, whereas the same parodying of bad filmic special effects cannot literally 
be achieved in a novel. The associations between blood and female sexuality reveal the 
power of female sexuality over the main character in La Belle Captive, and thus, 
potentially of a threat to male dominance. In the same way, descriptions associated with 
blood in Robbe-Grillet's novels subtly suggest a threat posed to men by women's 
sexuality and reproductive cycle. There are examples of this in one of Robbe-Grillet's 
early works, La Jalousie. Throughout the novel, there is a link between stains and the 
female character, A..., who may or may not be having an affair with her neighbour, 
Franck, under the nose of her never-mentioned, yet ever-present partner, from whose 
point of view the novel is narrated. The association of a woman with a stain might be 
considered to indicate women's supposed impurity. The colour of the stain on the wall 
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and the pulpdd remains of the millipede, with their red-brown hue are suggestive of 
menstruation: 
[le mille-pattes] n'est plus qu'une bouillie rousse, oý se m8lent des d6bris 
d'articles, m6connaissables. 
Mais sur le mur nu, au contraire, l'image de la scutigere dcrasde ( ... ) se 
prisente plutÖt comme une encre brune (... )282 
The millipede is linked in the novel with A... 's suspected infidelity - in one episode, as 
Franck crushes the beast, A... 's hand clutches the tablecloth which transforms into bed 
linen - and thus with her impurity. Beauvoir argues that woman is seen as other, as 
dangerous, mysterious, unknowable, and this is bound up with female sexuality, 
reproduction and the menstrual cycle. Beauvoir reminds us that it used to be thought that 
menstruating women could cause crops to f 283 ail and mayonnaise to curdle. It is not the 
mere fact that menses contain blood that mean that they are associated with such danger, 
it is the fact that they are closely linked to women's sexuality and reproduction: 
( 
... 
) les pouvoirs malfficlues du sang menstruel sont plus singuliers. 11 
incarne Fessence de la f6mininit6. ( ... 
) En v&46, ce West pas ce sang qui 
fait de la femme une impure, mais plut6t il manifeste son impuret6; il 
apparalit au moment o6 la femme peut 6tre f6cond6e; quand il dispareit, 
elle redevient g6n6ralement st6rile; il jaillit de ce ventre o6 s61abore le 
fectus. A travers lui s'exprime Phorreur que Phomme dprouve pour la 
f6condit6 f6minine. 284 
Is it then a co-incidence that an object that is suggestive of A... 's adulterous sexual 
behaviour should be described as having the same colour as menstrual blood, a symbol of 
the otherness of women and the fear they engender in men? The whole novel exudes a 
sense of unease on the part. of the unmentioned narrator, an apprehension about A... 's 
282 La Jalousie, p. 129. 
283 Simone de Beauvoir, Le DeuriMe Sexe, p. 245. 
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behaviour with Franck. The narrator's misgivings are hinted at when he notices that the 
I 
millipede has formed the shape of a question mark: "la peinture reste marqu6e d'une 
forme sombre, un petit arc qui se tord en point d'interrogation ( ... 
). 28' Even the curls of 
A... 's hair as she brushes it mimic the same shape, albeit upside down, in the manner of a 
Spanish question mark Q): "Mais la m6che rebelle derneure sur la soie blanche, tendue 
par la chair de 1'6paule, oýi elle trace une ligne onduleuse termin6e par un crochet. t)286 
Both of these elements, the red colour and the question mark shape also appear in a 
passage where A... is erasi ng a word a letter (from/to Franck? ): "Le flot des lourdes 
boucles aux reflets roux fremit aux moindres implusions que lui communiquent la 
t6te. "287 This passage is significant not only for the implication that she is erasing some 
kind of secret, perhaps her secret affair, but also for its auto-erotic overtones; the 
movement of A... 's body as she erases the word is suggestive of masturbation - another 
"dirty secret". 
288 
So, whilst the apparently synthetic colour of the red paint used in his cinema 
suggests that ; RObbe-Grillet is playing with the notion of blood and its connection with 
sex, passages such as the one outlined above would tend to suggest that, when Robbe- 
Grillet is not making an ove. rt and obvious reference to blood in connection with female 
sexuality, the blood described is of a more realistic, dirty, brownish red that might be 
connected with menstruation. That the millipede stain, with its associations of adultery, 
and therefore of threat, is reminiscent of menstrual blood is indicative of the paranoia that 
284 Beauvoir, Le DeuWme Sexe, pp. 245-247. 
285 La Jalousie, p. 64. 
286 La Jalousie, pp. 134-135. 
287 La Jalousie, pp. 13 3-134, emphasis added. 
288 See Jeremy F. Lane's discussion in 'The Stain, The Impotent Gaze and the Tlieft of Jouissance: 
Towards a 2ileldan reading of Robbe-Grillet's La Jalousie', in French Studies, 55,2 (April 2002) 193-206 
(p. 200). TWs passage will be discussed further later in this chapter. 
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surrounds male-female relationships in Robbe-Grillet's art. Women, as Beauvoir has 
suggested, are described in terms of their otherness: 
elle est consider6e non positivement, telle qu'elle est pour soi, mais 
n6gativement, telle qu'elle apparait A Phornme. elle est toujours 
d6finie comme Autre. 289 
Whilst feminist critics of Robbe-Grillet may well have grounds for complaint in terms of 
the very blatant victimisation and suffering of women in Robbe-Grillet's works, the 
remainder of the women he depicts are presented as a danger to men, albeit in more 
subtle ways, thus women are either victims or threats. 
The "tache" is further implicated with adultery, when Franck and A... are away in 
town. A single place setting has been laid at the table, suggesting that the narrator is 
alone in the house, yet a reminder of their guilty secret remains even in a stain on the 
table cloth in the place where Franck usually sits: 
A droite de la lampe, une petite tache de sauce marque la place de Franck: 
une empreinte allong6e, sinueuse, entour6e de signes plus tenus. De 
Fautre c6t6, les rayons viennent frapper perpendiculairement le mur nu, 
tout proche, faisant ressortir en pleine lumi&re l'image du mille-pattes 
6cras6 par Franck. 290 1 
So, the stain on the table-cloth (left by Franck? ) draws the narrator's eye back again to 
the millipede stain on the wall. The mark left by Franck becomes the intentional object 
of the narrator's perception, it stands out from his visual field even though he does not 
solicit it deliberately. Merleau-Ponty remarks that when in a situation of grief or upset, 
our conscious mind does not choose the objects seized upon by our senses: 
2"9 Beauvoir, Le Deuxiýme Sexe, p. 236. 
290 La Jalousie, p. 145. 
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Pendant que je suis accabI6 par un deuil et tout A ma peine, deJA mes 
regards errent devant moi, its s'int6ressent sournoisement a quelque objet 
brillant, its recommencent leur existence autonome. 291 
The narrator's grief here is for the perceived breakdown of his marriage. Although it is 
not made explicit, there seems to be some form of paranoia in his fixation with any object 
that might indicate his wife's (real or imagined) affair with Franck. 
Also linked to the notion of blood and female sexuality in Robbe-Grillet's works 
is the theme of religion. Beauvoir reminds us that woman is both Eve and the Virgin 
Mary, as discussed earlier, and that women's blood represents danger. For Robbe-Grillet, 
the themes of blood and religion are connected via the crucifixion. This is the fate of 
Christine in Souvenirs du Triangl, ý dor, her name suggesting the fate she shares with 
Christ. 292 The crucifixion of Christine is also a sexual torture, however: 
Le pr8tre ( ... 
) tend le cierge A bout de bras vers la supplici6e qui 
commence A perdre ses forces; et, pour la ranimer, il 6teint tout en haut 
des cuisses, dans la fente m6diane qui s'ouvre sous la toison noire 
triangulaire, souill6e de vermillon. L'adolescente se tord faiblement sur 
sa croix. ( ... 
)A la septi6me flarnme qui la p6n6tre, le spasme est si 
violent qu'elle pense expirer... 
Christine se r6veille, secou6e par une longue jouissance, sur son lit de 
fer. 293 
Christine does wake from her crucifixion, soon realising that she is in a coffin, just as 
Christ came back to life and rose from the tomb. Christine's experience, however, seems 
to have been a sexual, rather than a, spiritual one. Again, sex is linked to blood, to death 
and to danger in this description - the vermilion blood, however, suggests a degree of 
"' Merleau-Ponty, PHnomenologie de la perception, p. 100. 
292 Many of the names of his female characters are suggestive of religion, such as Maric-Ange in La Belle 
Captive, and Angdlina. in Souvenirs A Triangle dor. 
293 Souvenirs A triangle dor, p. 213-214. 
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unreality. Another sexualised crucifixion is enacted in Le Jell avec le Feu, where one of 
the girls who is being kept prisoner is crucified in a rather stylised way, The girl is not 
only crucified, but has been cut or stabbed, and blood from the wound trickles from one 
of her breasts. That it should be an erogenous part of the body that is injured in this way, 
rather than the hole pierced in Christ's side at his crucifixion, again links blood, female 
sexuality and death. The flow of blood, whether real or fake, is also associated with 
sexuality and religion in Glissements progressifs dit plaisir. Alice, watched by Sister 
Maria, is painting to amuse herself in the cell where she is kept prisoner in the nunnery, 
and takes advantage of Maria's innocence to tease her: 
Maria - est A genoux par terre pour regarder de plus pr6s, ecoutant 
scandalis6e et curieuse les propos de la prisonni6re: 
"Qu'est-ce que tu fais, toi, le soir, quand tu te mets au lit? 
- Je dis ma pri&e. 
- Non, apr6s, toute seule dans ton lit?... Tu te caresses? Tu ne sais pas 
bien faire, peut-6tre?.... Je Vapprendrai, si tu veux ... ( ... 
) 
D'un geste soudain, Fautre ne se m6flant pas du tout, Alice lui applique sa 
main droite pleine de peinture frakhe sur le sein, de mani6re i laisser une 
belle empreinte rouge sur 1'etoffe blanche. ( ... ) [Alice] macule encore la 
robe de la bonne socur A 1'emplacement du sexe. 294 
Another nun, having witnessed the scene, warns Maria that she will be punished, and 
scolds Alice also. So, female sexuality is presented as transgressive, something to be 
punished, especially in connection with religion. 
In the light of this discussion of religion and transgressive behaviour, it is notable 
that in LImmortelle L also makes explicit the link between women and impurity, in a 
religious context. On meeting N in the mosque, she remarks that: 
294 Glissementsprogressifs du plaisir, pp. 97-98. 
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Les femmes ne peuvent pas prier a cet endroit Parce qu'elles sont 
impures ( 
... 
) Ce sont A la fbis des 6tres inf6rieurs et des demons Elles 
ne sont bonnes que pour faire Famour. 295 
Once more, the exclusion, otherness, inferiority, and dangerous sexuality of women are 
highlighted in this remark. LImmortelle is a film in which myth and danger surrounding 
womanhood is of major importance. The portrayal of the female in LIntmortelle is 
bound up with the theme of exoticism. As the action takes place in Turkey, the narrator 
finds himself in a foreign environment, one which his French cultural background makes 
him ill-equipped to understand - both on a linguistic and a cultural level. 
Correspondingly, he has difficulty in understanding the habits and behaviour of L, with 
whom he is apparently having some kind of on/off affair. L warns N not to have too 
much faith in her: 
Ne soyez pas si sfir de vous... N'ayez pas trop conflance en moi ... 
296 
L's warning implies that she herself is not to be trusted, since she is the one who 
bewitches N and weaves this exotic mystery around him. L's beauty and enigmatic allure 
are clear from the first time the audience lays eyes on her. Her face, the first time we see 
her, is looking motionlessly into the camera, yet an air of mystery is suggested in that she 
seems to be focusing on something beyond the camera; she has a vague and mysterious 
smile, which Robbe-Grillet describes in the cin6-roman thus: 
Les traits du visage sont parfaitement immobiles et We riment rien, si ce xp 
97 West qu'un lointain sourire, un peu tendre, un peu dangereux. 2 
"' LImmortelle, P. 62. 
296 Jbid, p. 166. 
297 LImmortelle, P. 15. 
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She is therefore afeniniefatale, promising delight and danger, she seduces N, and it is his 
obsession with her that leads him to his death. It is in this respect, then, that Robbe- 
Grillet's depiction of her adheres to the stereotype of woman as other, woman as danger. 
So, whilst the form of the conventional mystery story in Robbe-Grillet's cinema is 
subverted (there is no explanatory dMouentent at the end), the depiction of the lead 
female character remains strongly tied to patriarchal depictions of woman as other, and 
this is linked to the otherness of exoticism. The way in which L seduces N is a part of the 
exotic setting of the film. She and N go to watch a Turkish dancer perform a belly dance. 
During the original performance, N places his hand upon L's neck. This takes on sexual 
and sado-masochistic resonances when viewed in the context of other scenes in the film. 
There are many close-ups on L's neck during the film, often with hands (presumably N's 
hands) encircling her neck, perhaps suggesting that N has some fetishistic desire to 
strangle her. L later copies the dancer's movements, re-enacting the performance when 
they return to N's flat. She appears to be aware of the power of her sexuality in doing 
this, knowing that the memory of the exotic dance they have seen is likely to be 
irresistible to N. Although the film is structured around N's gaze and his experiences, 
L's exhibitionism ensures that N's gaze is focused upon her, and she thus gains control of 
him. 
L: [Les maisons] C'est aussi pour les touristes, vous voyez bien. 
N: 'Mais il n'y a pas de touristes. 
L: 11 ya vous et moi. 
N: Ni moi, ni vous. Je me demande bien ce que vous faites A 
Istamboul... 
L: Je me prom&ne avec vous... et cwtera... 
N: Et le reste du temps? 
L: Je vous attends, mon seigneur... Qu'est-ce que vous voulez que 
l'on fasse ici? C'est un d6cor d'op6rette, pour une histoire d'amour. 
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( ... ) 11 se penche sur elle, comme pour 
l'embrasser. Elle se d6gage 
gentiment. 
L: Pas ici. 11 ya trop de fen8tres tout autour. 
() 
298 N: Qu'est-ce que Qa peut faire, puisque ce sont de fausses maisons. 
What is intriguing about this sequence is that whilst L is using her charms to direct N's 
gaze onto herself, and thus to gain some control over him, she in turn is subject to the 
control of others via their &azing at her. L claims that the graveyard and the nearby 
houses are there for tourists, and that the environment in which she and N find 
themselves is the backdrop to an operetta, for a love story. However, theirs is not a 
straightforward love story; she is reluctant to let N kiss her for fear of being seen. When 
N asks her why it should matter, if they are fake houses, L has no answer. L encourages 
N to think of Istambul as a false and mythical city, where, against a backdrop of 
crumbling mosques, women are sold into slavery and kept in harems. However, her 
claim that the myth to which she alludes is false is undermined by the fact that she 
behaves as if there were a real danger to her and N. Her actions belie her words. So, in 
turn, the power of the gaze is used to control L and N. M and a whole group of Turkish 
people carry out a surveillance of N's flat and of L's movements throughout the film. L 
dislikes being seen in public with N, for fear that they are being watched. So, whilst 
using the gaze to her advantage to play the role offenime fatale, L is also subjugated to 
the gaze and becomes a helle captive, rather like Marie-Ange in La Belle Captive. N 
wants her to become his captive in that he wants her for himself, as is illustrated in the 
examples cited earlier, when he appears almost to want to strangle her, to keep her under 
his control. However, he never really succeeds in doing this, as L always resists his 
298 jbid, pp. 75-76. 
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control. Furthermore, she never explains to N her exact relationship to the sinister M, 
who does appear to have some control over L and her movements. A visual symbol of 
L's captivity is displayed in the chain she always wears. (There is a link with M here, he 
has dogs that are often chained. ) Sometimes the chain is worn around her arm and 
shoulder, rather like an armlet, on one occasion, it becomes a necklace. In the love 
scenes in N's flat, it is draped across her neck, in a way which suggests that she may be 
tied down by it. The chain's significance, again, is never fully explained to the viewer; it 
could simply be a form of jewellery; yet it is an odd piece of jewellery to wear. It is 
rather too large to be a necklace, and is out of proportion on a woman with such delicate 
features, and it is usually wom in an unconventional way. L is dismissive of its 
significance, saying, "celle-ci West pas une vraie chalne. "299 
Further evidence for L being some kind of captive, under the power of M, is 
hinted at on other occasions in the film. When N investigates the circumstances 
surrounding L's death, he is confronted by a bewildering and contradictory series of 
information about local customs ýnd people. Some of the information comes from 
Turkish people whom N cannot understand. Some of it comes from his fellow ex- 
patriates. He consults a French friend, Catherine, who informs him of what goes on in 
hushed tones, whilst looking about her to make sure that nobody is listening to their 
conversation: - 
CATHERINE: Vous savez qu'il se passe ici des choses particuli6res... 
N: Quel genre de choses? 
CATHERINE: Des. enl6vements, des prisons secr&tes, des filles qu'on 
vend... Et toutes sortes de trafics bizarres... pour le compte de pays 300 6trangers... 
299 LImmortelle, p. 53. 
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Equally, the possible slavery of L is hinted at by an old man who sits outside the mosque 
where L and N once met. Upon seeing N's bandaged hand, the old man remarks in his 
broken French: 
LE VIEILLARD: Tr6s beau mosqu6e... Magnifique... Etrangers 
revenir ici toujours... 
LE VIEILLARD (off): Bless6, monsieur? Main bless6e? Accident? 
Bataille... Maris turcs tr6s jaloux... Les madames enferm6es harem... 
Vieux... Tr&s vieux... Les madames pas sages, il fait mourir ... 
301 
I 
By referring to these notions of harems and jealous husbands, the old man draws 
attention again to the danger and otherness of the east. This is underlined not just by the 
meaning of his words, but also by his rather over-stated accent, with emphasis placed on 
the word "mourir". 
So, again, myth is used to define and describe the situation of the female 
character, albeit in such a way that the audience and N remain unsure as to the exact truth 
of the circumstances. As Beauvoir indicates in her remark that women are both Eve and 
the Virgin Mary, if a woman is not afemmefatale, a danger to men, then she is a belle 
captive, controlled by men. In a film that is in many ways full of subversion and 
I 
unexpected formal techniques, Robbe-Grillet clings to stereotyped depictions of the role 
of the main female character. 
Furthermore, since N is the protagonist of the film, it is from his point of view 
that events unfold. Laura Mulvey has argued that cinema tends to encourage its viewers, 
even its female viewers, to take up and identify with a male perspective when viewing a 
film. Mulvey uses psychoanalytic theory as a basis for her discussion of viewer 
identification with characters on the screen in her seminal article 'Visual Pleasure and 
300 LImmortelle, pp. 168-169. 
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Narrative Cinema'. 302 She argues that, when viewing a film, the "conditions of screening 
I 
and narrative conventions give the spectator an illusion of looking in on a private 
world". 303 Thus, the viewer's voyeurism is exploited by cinema, the viewer projects his 
or her "repressed desire on to the performer". 304 This results in the viewer being able to 
forget his/her own identity for the duration of the film and identify instead with the 
characters (or with one particular character, as is the case in LInInlortelle) on the screen. 
Mulvey claims that the attraction of such an identification for the viewer is based upon a 
nostalgia "reminiscent of that pre-subjective moment of image recognition' 9305 (i. e. 
Lacan's mirror phase, where a child, upon seeing its own reflection ceases to identify 
with its mother and develops a sense of self-identity). Moreover, due to cinematic 
conventions, the viewer tends to identify with the male lead character: 
The determining male gaze projects its phantasy on to the female figure 
which is styled accordingly. In their traditional exhibitionist role women 
are simultaneously looked at and displayed, with their appearance coded 
for strong visual and erotic impact so that they can be said to connote to- 
be-looked-at-ness. 306 
This is most definitely the case in LImmortelle; the film plays on the myths surrounding 
womanhood, re-inforcing the partriarchal view of woman as other, as danger. 
Nevertheless, N is fascinated by L, and she becomes, as Mulvey has it, an "erotic object 
for the characters within the screen story, and (an) erotic object for the spectator within 
307 the auditorium" . Thus even the 
film's narrative perspective presents a conventional 
301 Ibid, P. 180. 
302 Mulvey, Laura, 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', in [editor anonymous] Screen: The Sexual 
Subject (Routledge, London, 1992). 
303 Jbid, p. 25. 
304 Ibid, p. 25. 
305 lbidý p. 26. 
306 Mulvey, p. 27. 
307 Jbid, p. 27. 
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depiction of women, with its lingering shots on L's body, she is an object for N and for 
the viewer. 
Feminism and phenomenology 
Before turning to look at a possible phenomenological explanation of sexuality in 
Robbe-Grillet's work, it should be mentioned that phenomenology itself also been 
accused of taking a sexist stance. Merleau-Ponty has variously been criticised and 
praised by feminists, so their arguments are an important consideration before 
formulating a phenomenological approach to this aspect of Robbe-Grillet's work. 
For Merleau-Ponty, in perception, there is an indeterminate background or field 
against which objects are made determinate by the act of perception. So, there is a 
passage from the ambiguous to the determinate. There is also a degree of ambiguity at 
work in perceptions of a sexual nature. Merleau-Ponty claims that, as perception is a 
bodily act, and as our bodies are sexual beings, an element of sexuality permeates all 
perception to some degree, so that it is sometimes difficult to identify a perception as 
sexual or non-sexual. Furthermore, in sexual situations, the body can be used as a means 
of controlling, or of gaining power, so there is an element of mastery and enslavement at 
work. 
Feminists have pointed out that the basic problem for a Merleau-Pontyan 
phenomenology of the body as a sexual being is that Merleau-Ponty describes experience 
from a male perspective. Whilst he can hardly be blamed for describing his experience 
from the only perspective available to him, his account of sexuality would perhaps not be 
as objectionable to feminists if he had aclaiowledged that he was describing this 
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perspective. Their argument with, Merleau-Ponty is that he considers examples from 
308 
male-centred, heterosexual experience to be universal. In other words, he takes no 
account of sexual orientation or, more importantly for feminists, of sexual difference, 
thus ignoring the possibility that a female perspective, since it is necessarily based in a 
biologically different body, might offer a different experience of sexuality. This sexual 
difference was noted by Beauvoir, who accepted the phenomenological account of the 
body's situation in the world as being of vital importance to any account of human 
existence. However, she implicitly criticised her male counterparts' assumption that a 
male perspective was a neutral or universal one, and moreover she criticised the 
patriarchal implication that biology could determine superiority or subordination: 
Cependant, dira-t-on, daný la perspective que j'adopte - celle de 
Heidegger, de Sartre ou de Merleau-Ponty - si le corps West pas une 
chose, il est une situation: c'est notre prise sur le monde ( ... ) le corps 6tant l'instrument de notre prise sur le monde, le monde se pr6sente tout 
autrement selon qu'iI est appr6hende d'une mani6re ou d'une autre. ( ... ) Mais ce que nous refusons, c'est I'We qu'elles constituent pour elle un 
destin fig6. [Les donn6es biologiques] ne suffisent pas i d6finir une 
hi6rarchie des sexes; elles Wexpliquent pas pourquoi la femme est I'Autre; 
elles ne la condamnent pas A conserver ijamais ce role subordonn6.309 
This may seem an obvious objection to Merleau-Ponty, yet paradoxically, it is the very 
fact that phenomenology is a philosophy based upon bodily experience that has led some 
feminists to argue that it may be of value to feminism. Elizabeth Grosz has, for example, 
argued that 
... For discussions of the problems posed by a male-centred phenomenology, see, for example, Dorothea 
Olkowski, 'Feminism and Phenomenology', Simon Glendinning, ed., The Edinburgh Encyclopedia of 
Continental Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), pp. 323-332, Gaylyn Studlar, 
, Reconciling Feminism and Phenomenology: Notes on Problems and Possibilities, Texts and Contexts', 
Quarterly Review ofFilm and rideo, 12,3 (July 1990) 69-78. Butler, Judith, 'Sexual Ideology and 
Phenomenological Description: A Feminist Critique of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception% 
jcffner Allen, and Iris Marion Young, eds., The Thinking Afuse: Feminism andAfodern French Philosophy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 85-100. 
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[Merleau-Ponty's] emphasis on lived experience and perception, his focus 
on the body-subject, has resonances with what may arguably be regarded 
as feminism's major contribution to the production and structure of 
knowledges - its necessary reliance on lived experience (... )310 
Another way in which the aims of phenomenology coincide with those of feminism is in 
the procedure of the phenomenological reduction. Gaylyn Studlar has claimed, in 
relation to cinema, that there is valýe for feminism in a procedure that endeavours to put 
aside commonly accepted explanations of experience to allow for a re-appraisal of it: 
The feminist effort to make strange the "common sense" of patriarchal 
filmic discourse shares unrealized similarities with the phenomenologist's 
attempt to bracket out (or make strange) nalve notions of reality before 
advancing to a neutral description of the immediacy of experience. 311 
So, phenomenology and feminism are not necessarily the antithesis of each other, as is 
often supposed they might be. The question is, taking account of the potential for a 
feminist re-working of phenomenology, whether such an approach to Robbe-Grillet can 
make his depiction of sexuality on the screen and on the page any more acceptable to 
feminists. Studlar's identification of some common ground between the 
I 
phenomenological reduction and the feminist desire to make patriarchy seem less 
"normal" may well prove a helpful step forward in this respect. Robbe-Grillet's 
expressed interest in subverting the norms of representation as reproduced in what he 
calls theparole of society has a resonance with this position too. What has to be asked is 
whether or not Robbe-Grillet manages to "make strange" the patriarchal norms or 
whether his texts and films remain positioned within them. 
309 Beauvoir, Le DeuxiMe Sexe, pp. 72,70. 
31 0 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodfes. ý Towards a Corporeal Fenfinism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 94. 
311 Studlar, p. 72. 
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Phenomenology: the link between perception and sexuality 
It is perhaps odd that previous phenomenology-based commentafieS312 on Robbe- 
Grillet's fiction (none have yet been attempted on his cinema) have failed to mention 
sexuality, given that it is a topic so closely linked to perception and to a bodily awareness 
of the world. Bodily perception, for Merleau-Ponty, always contains an element of 
sexual perception. Our sexuality is a factor in choosing which part of our perceptual field 
to attend to, and although a perception may not necessarily be experienced as sexual, 
sexuality guides certain parts of experience. Indeed, existence always has a double 
meaning, for Merleau-Ponty, the result of which is that 
il est impossible d'assigner, pour une d6cision ou une action donn6e, la 
part de la motivation sexuelle et celle des autres motivations, impossible 
de caract6riser une d6cision ou un acte comme "sexuel" ou "non 
sexuel". 313 
Those aspects of reality upon which the protagonists of Robbe-Grillet's works focus their 
attention are often guided by their sexuality, although this is not always acknowledged 
explicitly. There is an example of this in Les Goninies, as Wallas, a detective, notices the 
assistant in a stationery shop: 
D'un demi-sourire elle Pencourage. Wallas prend la gomme dans sa main 
pour 1'examiner avec plus d'attention; puis il regarde la jeune fille, ses 
yeux, ses I&vres charnues l6g&ement entrouvertes. II sourit A son tour. 
( ... 
) Elle le raccompagne jusqu'A la porte. Non, ce West plus une enfant: 
ses hanches, sa d6marche lepte sont presque celles d'une femme. 314 
312 Bemal and Carrabino's studies. 
313 Merleau-Ponty, PUnominologie de la perception, pp. 196-197. 
314 Les Gommes, p. 66. 
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These observations by Wallas are not explicitly sexual, they are afforded no more 
importance in the course of the narrative than, for example, the description of the rubber 
he buys from the shop. Nevertheless, he notices the voluptuousness of her slightly open 
lips and her almost-womanly hips, both of which suggest that his perception of her is 
guided by his bodily existence, his existence as a sexual being, as Merleau-Ponty 
suggests. 
Another apparently innocent image carries sexual connotations in Topologie 
d'une cWfantdnie. When the mother of the twins passes a man selling watermelons, the 
little girl asks her mother to buy her a slice of the fruit. Her twin brother observes closely 
the effect the knife has made; the fruit seller has cut 
une entaille b6ante dans le ventre rouge du fruit ( ... ) de la fente ouverte a 
vif dans la chair rose, plac6e verticalernent par les soins du vendeur, 
s'6coule un liquide röugeätre qui forme bientät une flaque sinueuse, juste 315 
sur un carreau blanc de la nappe. 
The description, although on the one hand a perfectly innocuous image of the melon 
sliced open, does hint at female *enitalia, especially given its shape, colour and the 
reddish liquid that flows from it. This is reinforced in the description that follows: 
Ensuite, 1'enfant regarde sa petite socur, qui mord dans la tranche dont elle 
tient A deux mains 1'6corce verte; des gouttelettes de jus ont couI6 sur la 
robe blanche et form6 une tache irr6guli6re au niveau du pubis. 316 
Thus, a link is hinted at between the red juice and deflowering or menstruation, in either 
case, the little boy is fascinated by it. To read this is as a perception guided by sexuality 
is possible, given that it is a-male gazing at a female; however, to read it as an innocent, 
non-sexual gaze is also possible, as there is no definite mention of sexuality. 
31 3 Alain Robbe-Grillet, Topologie dune cWfant6me (Paris: Lcs Editions de Mnuit, 1976), p. 6 1. 
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Similar situations exist in 
iobbe-Grillet's 
cinema, although in one instance the 
intermingling of sexual and non-sexual perception on the screen is so subtle that it only 
becomes apparent that there is a hint of sexuality involved when the scene is described in 
more explicit terms in the cin&ronian. Without the chie-roman, the reason for the shot's 
inclusion in the film is difficult to ascertain. Furthermore, without an understanding of 
sexuality that underlines the interrelated nature of sexuality and perception, the shot 
would be equally difficult ta understand. The shot in question is a close-up of a sculpted 
detail on a table leg, and comes in between a shot of N looking in a mirror and making 
hand gestures in the air, and a shot of L by the sea, a memory of the time she and N spent 
there. The hand gestures made by N are sufficiently similar to the way in which he had 
I 
previously caressed L's face to call their intimate moments to mind. The close up of the 
table leg is more difficult to interpret, however, and it is only through the cille-ronlan that 
the reader/viewer realises that it is meant to represent a memory of L's body: 
245: 11 6tend lentement sa main valide, doigts ouverts, vers son image 
dans la glace, et fait le geste d'effacer, ou de caresser, qu'iI a r6pW 
souvent sur le visage de L. Puis il laisse retomber le bras, et abaisse le 
regard vers le sol, ou vers le pied de la table. 
246: D6tail d'un motif sculpt6 ornant le pied de la table, tel que Papergoit 
N: deux roses accol6es, qui saillent comme des seins. 
247: L marchant vers la cam6ra juste A la limite de Peau (... )317 
So, a perception that appears, on viewing the film, to have no connection with sexuality, 
k 
takes on a sexual significance when explained in the cini-ronjall. As N is remembering T. I- 
in the preceding shot, it seems that the memory of their intimacy is guiding N's 
perception in shot 246. As Merleau-Ponty suggests, perception and sexuality are linked 
"I Topologie dune cit6fantinie, pp. 61-62 
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here in such a way that perception is structured by sexuality, N's memory of L's body is 
guiding his eye to view the ýarved rose not just as a rose but as a female form. It is L's 
body, rather than just any female body, that is suggested by the carved rose, so it seems, 
since the shot is immediately preceded and followed by shots which also call L to mind; 
in the familiar hand gesture and in the image of L by the sea. So, this brief point of view 
shot reveals not only that memory guides perception, but also that sexuality guides it, N 
picks out an object that has a sexual significance from a field of many possible objects 
that do not. This is not apparently a conscious decision, it is a quick glance, and as such 
is afforded no particular attention in the film, hence its apparent insignificance when 
considered without the benefit of reading the cin&ronian. Just like the passing glance of 
Wallas to the shop assistant, N's glance at the rose has a link with sexuality, although 
when this is filmed, it is afforded no special significance, there is no obvious or 
predictable nod to its sexual content. Robbe-Grillet could, for instance, have followed 
the rose shot with a close-up of L's breasts to make the significance of the carved rose 
clearer to the viewer. However, he clearly seeks to avoid such hackneyed techniques, 
and this might be considered an example of his rejection of over-used narrative and 
cinematic forms, in favour of a more defamiliarising technique. This returns us once 
more to the possibility of seeing Robbe-Grillet's artistic aims and cinematic or literary 
techniques as. a further example of the phenomenological desire to see the world afresh, 
as outlined in the phenomenological reduction. 
La Jalousie, a novel. suffused with a sexual tension to which explicit reference is 
never made, contains a scene of a similar nature. Just as the scene described above from 
L'Immortelle is from one individual's perspective, the perspective from which La 
31 7 LImmortelle, p. 162.1 
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Jalousie is narrated is strongly suggestive of an unmentioned protagonist. Once more, it 
is presented in such a way that sexuality is scarcely suggested, the boundary between the 
sexual and the non-sexual is blurred. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty's account of perception and 
sexuality, with its implications of ambiguity, seems particularly apt in regard to this 
novel, which rests upon the tension created between various ambiguous possibilities. 
One scene in particular contains such ambiguous references to sexuality, and is repeated 
throughout La Jalousie. This scene has already been discussed from the point of view of 
stereotypical representations of women, but there is more to uncover in it. The scene in 
question carries associations of hiding evidence of some secret, perhaps of adultery. A 
appears to be rubbing out a word oft a letter, using a razor blade and a rubber of the kind 
used to erase typewritten mistakes. She uses the same items in an attempt to remove the 
stain left on the dining room wall by the crushed millipede. These events are linked, 
then, by the fact that a stain is involved in both cases, suggesting impurity, dirtiness, 
something to be erased, hidden or denied, and also by the fact that the crushing of the 
millipede is linked to Franck's virility. All of these associations combine to suggest 
some guilty secret, possibly an act of adultery. The ambiguity in these scenes is 
highlighted by the mention of a shape that is reminiscent of a question mark, underlining 
the doubt that the reader assumes exists in the mind of the narrator. It is also perhaps 
indicative that Robbe-Grillet is gently teasing his reader - is there really a narrator (if so, 
I 
why does he never refer to himself? ), is there really any adultery going on? 
The first part of the scene, then, begins with the unmentioned narrator viewing an 
apparently non-sexual activity; the erasing of a word in a letter. A... is bent over her 
work in such a way that it is difficult to discern exactly what she is doing, although the 
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movements of her hair may be interpreted either as the action of rubbing out a word, or 
may suggest masturbation: 
L'opulente chevelure noire est libre sur les 6paules. Le flot des lourdes 
boucles aux reflets roux fr6mit aux moindres implusions que lui 
communiquent la t6te. Celle-ci doit 6tre agit6e de menus mouvements, 
imperceptibles en eux-memes, mais amplifids par la masse des cheveux 
qui parcourent d'une 6paule A Fautre, cr6ant des remous luisants, vite 
amortis, dont l'intensitd soudain se ranime en convulsions inattendues, un 
peu plus bas... plus bas encore... et en dernier spasme beaucoup plus 
bas. 318 
As mentioned earlier, Jeremy Lane has indicated in his discussion of La Jalousie, A 
appears to be. concealing some kind of dirty secret, whether it be masturbation or the 
erasing of something incriminating in the letter. Merleau-Ponty's suggestion that 
perception can be motivated by sexuality seems especially apt here, given that what the 
narrator describes has the potential to be viewed as an auto-erotic act or as a banal act of 
erasing a word. It is perhaps significant in terms of the narrator's apparent paranoia 
about his partner, as well as being in some ways typical of the description of A... that she 
is often associated in the text with stains. This was noted earlier in relation to blood and 
female sexuality; however, stains of a more general nature are also associated with A 
throughout the text. An example of this occurs in a later description of her at dusk where 
the light behind her forms a "tache": 
Seul le carr6 de la fen6tre fait une tache d'un violet plus clair, sur laquelle 
se d6coupe la silhouette noire de A... 
Later still, the light carried by the boy servant again throws A... 's face into relief, and as 
the impression of it remains on the unmentioned narrator's retina in a highly evocative, 
phenomenological description, A... herself again becomes a "tache": 
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A... n'a pas d6toum6 la t6te pour s'addresser au boy. Son visage recevait 
les rayons de la lampe sur le cOt6 droit. Ce profit vivement 6clair6 persiste 
ensuite sur la r6tine. Dans la nuit noire oU' rien ne sumage des objets, 
m6me les plus proches, la tache lumineuse se d6place i volont6, sans que 
sa force s'att6nue, gardant la d6coupure du front, du nez, du menton, de la 
bouche... 
La tache est sur le mur de la maison, sur les dalles, sur le ciel vide. Elle 
est partout dans la va116e, depuis le jardin jusqu'ä la riviere et sur Pautre 
versant. Elle est aussi dans le bureau, dans la chambre, dans la salle ä 
manger, dans le salQn, dans la cour, sur le chernin qui s'61oigne vers la 
grand-route. 319 
This passage might be described as "evocative" and "phenomenological" because it 
contains so many detailed descriptions of the minutiae of perceptual phenomena. In it, 
A... is reduced to a "tache", and in the second paragraph, the reader might initially 
believe that a repeat of the description of the millipede is about to start again - "la tache 
est sur le mur... ". Instead, the "tache" is A..., she has become a stain just like that made 
by the millipede, like the spot of oil on the drive that can momentarily be obliterated by a 
fault in the window pane, but in this passage, the stain that she has become is 
everywhere. No amount of attempting to obliterate it by rubbing it out or viewing it 
through a bubble of glass 6an remove it; it is burned into the narrator's retina. The 
"tache", and, by association, the suspicion of her infidelity is in every sight the narrator 
views, making this short passage, in a sense, a mise en abyme of the novel. That is, the 
novel is composed of reports of A... 's real or imagined movements, with their 
associations of unfaithfulness, and there is no escape from it for the narrator, just as there 
is no escape from the "tache" that A... makes in the passage above. Thus A... is strongly 
linked with the act of adultery through the word "tache", which had been used earlier to 
318 La Jalousie, ýp. 13 3 -134. 319 Ibid, pp. 140-14 1. 
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describe the stain left by the. squashed millipede, a stain which is, in turn associated with 
the act of adultery. Thus, descriptions which could have a straightforward and banal 
meaning read in one way can take on a meaning with implications of sexual infidelity 
when read in another. 
In LImmortelle, certain moments in the relationship between the two main 
characters, N and L, could be understood in a sexual or a non-sexual sense. N often 
stares at L's neck, which is not in itself an action which suggests sexual arousal; it is not, 
perhaps, the most obvious part of her body he could have focused upon if he were 
sexually excited by her. In a scene where L and N watch a belly dancer, the dancer lifts 
her hair aside to reveal the back of her neck (shot 69). As the shot changes, we see L 
from N's perspective, as indicated in the screen play: 
Gros plan de la nuque de L, vue d'en haut et de cot6, c'est-a-dire comme 
si c'6tait N qui la regardait, assise A sa droite un peu en avant de jUi. 320 
The camera then moves to show that N is watching the dancer, but places his hand on L's 
neck. Her head bends forwards under the force of his fingers. There is the suggestion 
that N's touch on the back of L's neck, visible to the viewer as if it were seen through N's 
eyes, is motivated by his sexual desire, in that it is juxtaposed with shots of the dancer. 
He focuses upon L's neck, makes it the intentional object of his perceptual field, because 
of his arousal at the sight of the belly dancer. He seems to do so almost without realising 
it - he is no longer looking at L by the time he puts his hand on her neck, but staring at 
the dancer. His actions here seem strange; if he is motivated by sexual desire, then these 
are unusual gestures to make, the neck is not often considered an erotic part of the body, 
so the presentation of a sexual situation here is somewhat ambiguous. Once more, this 
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can be explained by Merleau-Ponty's suggestion that the structure of perception is 
ambiguous both sexual and non-sexual. 
Phenomenology: the master and slave relationship 
The scene just described may be explained further by another point Merleau- 
Ponty makes in relation to the body as a sexual being, concerning the dynamics of power 
in sexual situations. N's actions whilst watching the dancer may be linked to a sadistic 
strangulation fetish; we later see him begin to strangle L (shot 306) and this is again 
described in the screen play: 
L allong6e sur le divan. On ne voit que la t6te, le cou et les 6paules. 
Etendue sur le ventre, elle a le visage dans les fourrures. La main droite 
de N caresse la nuque, puts commence A serrer la base du cou. La 
321 
victime bouge faiblement. 
This shot is again from the perspective of N, his hand appearing as it would if the camera 
were positioned in the same place as N's eyes. Is this a sadistic sexual practice or a 
harmless game? The use of the word "victime" is strongly suggestive of something 
rather sadistic. The sexual nature of this scene becomes more complex when we consider 
that it is immediately preceded by L copying the belly dancer's movements, wearing only 
her underwear. For Merleau-Ponty, we rarely show off our bodies to another person, but 
if we do, it is either in fear, or else in the attempt to fascinate another. That is, the display 
of one's body is a means of seducing another person, of gaining power over them. So, in 
perception in a sexual context: 
320 LImmortelle, p. 73. 
321 LImmortelle, p. 187. 
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11 lui semble que le regard 6tranger qui parcourt son corps le d6robe A lui- 
rnýme ou qu'au contraire Pexposition de son corps va lui livrer autrui sans 
d6fense, et c'est alors autrui qui sera r6duit A Vesclavage. 322 
L's aim is clearly to seduce N in the scene just mentioned; indeed she does succeed in 
enslaving him. He goes to great l6gths in order to find out about her during her life and 
after her death, actions which lead him eventually to his own death. 
These notions of dominance, slavery and capture are to be found in many 
situations in Robbe-Grillet's film and fiction, as has already been discussed with 
reference to, for example, La Belle Captive, where Sara and Marie-Ange capture Walter 
via seduction. Another example of this is to be found in Trans-Europ-Express. In this 
film, Elias is a gangster trafficking drugs and is unsure of whom to trust. Consequently, 
it is a film characterised by many power struggles, chiefly by the struggle between the 
characters in the film for control of events. This struggle sometimes takes the form of a 
sexual struggle for power; the lure of sex is used by both the police and Elias' gang to 
capture him. A key role is in this is played by Eva, the prostitute who attempts to trap 
Elias both for the gang leader and for the police by allowing herself to be tied up by him. 
He clearly thinks that he is in control of this situation, he is paying for her services, when 
in fact it is Eva's use of her body, her display of her body, that is being used to capture 
him so he can be turned in to the police. As Merleau-Ponty indicates, Eva is displaying 
her body in an attempt to captivate another. The plan backfires, however, when Elias 
lives out his fantasies and strangles Eva. 
Similarly, it is the prospect of a woman who appears to be subservient, enslaved, 
who attracts Elias to the night club, Eve, which advertises the performance of a naked 
322 Merleau-Ponty, MnomMologie de la Perception, p. 194. 
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woman in chains. It is in fact a police detective who arranges for the night club 
advertisement to appear in the newspaper next to the story of Eva's murder, knowing that 
Elias will be sure to notice both. It is ironic that Elias should be lured into a situation of 
danger whilst all the time, he himself considers that it is another who is enslaved. (The 
night club performer's act is called Tesclave. ) Elias is in fact subject to the 
manipulation of the police; they are aware of his sexual proclivities, and know that his 
fascination with the female form will capture him for them. 
Conclusion 
Using phenomenology to gain an understanding of the inclusion of sexuality as 
part of a wider project of depicting bodily existence and experience in Robbe-Grillet's 
work certainly explains not only the presence, but also the abundance of his depictions of 
sexuality, since, for Merleau-Ponty, existence is sexual. If feminists are agreeable to the 
idea of describing experience as it is lived, from a bodily perspective, then this may be an 
acceptable way forward in terms of explaining Robbe-Grillet's depiction of sexuality. 
However, given that feminists are also in favour of adopting the phenomenological 
notion of "making strange" the stereotypes of patriarchal society, Robbe-Grillet's film 
and fiction are still problematic. As discussed, women in his works use their bodies to 
enslave men, to control them, and although this can be accounted for in 
phenomenological terms, as another part of sexual, bodily existence, it has the familiar 
ring of an adherence to patriarchal norms. That is, females in Robbe-Grillet continue to 
play out the role of Eve tempting Adam (as is suggested by the names associated with 
women in Trans-Europ Express: Eva and the performer at "Club Eve7') they are still 
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ftnimesfatales. The threat posed by females is sometimes symbolised in Robbe-Grillet's 
work in an obvious way, in an attempt at parody, by fake blood. However, there is also 
evidence that, on a less obvious level, the association of words and colours, suggest a 
more deep-seated unease or paranoia on the part of male characters in Robbe-Grillet's 
works. They frequently resort to violent means to deal with the threat posed by women's 
physical sexuality, the power they hold over men. The men in Robbe-Grillet's films and 
fiction respond with fetishistic behaviour - for example, the neck fetish, the 
strangulation. Far from "making strange", in the manner of the phenomenological 





mirrors, doubles, paranoia and lies 
One observation that emerged from the phenomenological analysis of Robbe- 
Grillet's film and fiction in relation to the theme of sexuality was the frequency with 
which characters in his films and novels experience a degree of alienation, a sensation of 
the otherness of their partner when in a sexual situation. The consideration of sexual 
relationships in Robbe-Grillet's work, then, raises the issue of human relationships in 
general, of the role played by bodily and linguistic communication between human 
subjects in arriving at intersubjective understanding. Therefore, as well as an analysis of 
the questions of alienation, the selt and the other, what is also at issue in the following 
discussion is an exploration of the importance of verbal and non-verbal language in 
Robbe-Grillet's film and fiction. Given that previous chapters have demonstrated the 
value of Merleau-Ponty's notion of the phenomenological body-subject in enlightening 
many aspects of Robbe-Grillet's work, Merleau-Ponty's bodily-based accounts of 
intersubjectivity and language may also prove to be revelatory with regards to the 
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treatment of these issues in the film and fiction of Robbe-Grillet. We have seen how 
Merleau-Ponty's account of sexuality gave rise to an analysis of Robbe-Grillet's work in 
which a female presence could be considered threatening and dangerous to a male 
protagonist, and, following from tfiis, the way in which a sense of general unease and 
paranoia often pervades his works. It remains to be seen whether this applies to 
relationships that are of a non-sexual nature. This observation has, of course, 
immediately to be qualified with the acknowledgement that, for Merleau-Ponty, being is 
always sexual being, since human subjects are incarnated in sexual bodies. The 
consequence of this is that perception is always tinged with sexuality, to however small a 
degree. It seems possible therefore, at first sight, that the intermingling of the sexual with 
the non-sexual may well mean that the perceived threat of the other also impinges upon 
non-sexual relationships. 
The PhMonOiologie de la percepion was a study of perception, and Merleau- 
Ponty's later writings suggest that he felt the need to modify the arguments he set out in 
it. His later work can be read as an attempt to bridge the gap between the self and the 
world, and to provide an account of the knowledge of others that avoids the pitfalls of the 
position he had carved out for himself in PhMoniMologie de laperception. To this end, 
he developed the notion of la chair, the flesh of the world in which all living beings 
inhere. The common inherence in the flesh of the world was, for Merleau-Ponty, what 
would enable him to account for the existence of others. Just as it allowed the human 
body access to objects which are made of the same flesh, it equally allowed access to and 
interaction with other human bodies, which are also made of the flesh of the world and 
which can interact with it in the same way as one's own body can. This "flesh" was, for 
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Merleau-Ponty, not just the living flesh of human beings and animals, but the physical 
stuff of which the world was composed, and part of which was animated by 
consciousness. The relation of intersubjectivity thus no longer took place via 
apperception or analogy, but by a common inherence in the flesh of the world: 
Moi qui vois, j'ai ma-profondeur aussi, 6tant adoss6 A ce meme visible que 
je vois et qui se referme derri&e moi, je le sais bien. L6paisseur du corps, 
loin de rivaliser avec celle du monde, est au contraire le seul moyen que 
j'ai Waller au cocur des choses, en me faisant monde et en les faisant 
323 chair. 
Indeed, the notion of intersubjectivity as it is conceived of in Pheliomenologie de la 
perception is called into question; the direction of intentionality is questioned in Merleau- 
Ponty's later thought, so that, because the conscious subject and the world are part of the 
same flesh, the subject and the world have a reciprocal relationship: 
Le mode d'existence du corps propre vient brouiller la dualit6 entre 
Fimmanence constituante et le transcendant constitu& s'il West pas dans 
le monde comme un objet, il ne saurait en Etre s6par6 substantiellement et 
il ne peut 8tre pens6 en toute rigueur qu'A partir du monde qu'il d6ploie. 
L'intentionalit6. ý2.4 .) ne va pas du sujet vers le monde, mais plutot du monde vers le sujet. 
When phenomenological philosophy has been used in the past as a means of approach to 
Robbe-Grillet's works, the possibility of reading or viewing Robbe-Grillet's works in the 
light of the later ontology of Merleau-Ponty has been neglected. This is of consequence 
to the present study in terms of its original contribution to understanding Robbe-Grillet's 
works. Previous studies have not tackled the question of intersubjectivity; in their 
phenomenological studies of Robbe-Grillet, neither Bemal nor Carrabino mention 
intersubjectivity; moreover, it seems that neither of them had read Merleau-Ponty's Le 
11 Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et Pinvisible, p. 178. 
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Visible et Pinvisible, since it does not feature in either of their bibliographies. 325 The fact 
that neither of them had considered this later work by Merleau-Ponty has consequences 
for the conclusions that they arrive at in studying Robbe-Grillet, particularly in the case 
of Bernal. This is because her study is centred around the notion that consciousness is a 
nothingness that reaches out towards something; it is an intentional consciousness that 
reaches out to the world in which it is situated, as argued by Merleau-Ponty in 
PhMominologie de la perception. However, had she been able to consult Le Visible et 
Pinvisible, she may have discovered a different relation between consciousness and the 
world in which it is incarnated. Merleau-Ponty's notion of la chair changes his ontology 
of being in a way that allows for a new consideration of subjectivity and its relations to 
others and the world around it. 
Oneself 
In terms of the knowledge or awareness that one can have of oneself, then, it is of 
interest to note that a development in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology occurs between 
the appearance of PhMoniMologie de la Perception and Le Visible et Pinvisible. In the 
earlier work, emphasis is placed upon one's bodily positioning and movement through 
space. This notion of the locus of perception in a spatially and temporally situated body- 
subject allowed Merleau-Ponty to argue that self-consciousness, or thought, arose in 
perception; the act of perception was consciousness itself. He discusses the example of a 
person tracing a line through the air with their hand, to illustrate that one can be aware of 
324 R Barbaras, quoted in Zielinski, p. 106. 
325 Bernal's book was published in 1964, ' the year Le risible et Pinvisible was published; it is possible, 
therefore, that Merleau-Ponty's work was unavailable at the time Bemal was writing and appeared too late 
230 
one's position in space without having deliberately to calculate it. This pre-reflective 
awareness of one's body is part of one's being as a corps-1volve or body subject. It 
cannot be denied that examples of this kind of self-awareness exist in Robbe-Grillet's 
works - La Jalousie, for example, contains a description of rubber-soled shoes moving 
across a tiled floor, suggesting, although never confirming, the presence of a narrator. 
Thus, a consideration of Merleau-Ponty's earlier philosophy suggests a self-knowledge 
based upon movement and spatial situation. However, this approach is modified in 
Merleau-Ponty's later Le Visible el Pinvisible, wherein he theorises bodily experience 
around the notion of la chair. The flesh to which Merleau-Ponty refers is the stuff of 
which the world is made, including one's own body, and it is what binds together 
transcendence (the intentional reaching out towards the object of consciousness) and 
immanence (consciousness of transcendence). Flesh is reversible; like the two sides of a 
glove, it has an inside and an outside. In terms of my own body, the visible, outside part 
is the side given to myself (or to others) when I see myself; the invisible part is the part 
that I myself do not see; for example I cannot see the back of my head although others 
can. 326 Just as I cannot see all sides of an object in my visual field, due to my perspective 
in relation to it and its position in space, so there is always a part of myself that is 
invisible to me. 
W mettre la limite du corps et du monde, puisque le monde est chair? W 
mettre dans le corps le voyant, puisque, de toute dvidence, il n'y a dans le 
corps que des "t6n6bres bourr6es d'organee', c'est-A-dire du visible 
encore? Le monde vu West pas "dans" mon corps, et mon corps West pas 
"dans" le monde visible A titre ultime: chair appliqu6e A une chair, le 
monde ne 1'entoure ni West entour6 par elle. Participation et 
apparentement au visible, la vision ne 1'enveloppe ni Wen est envelopp6e 
for her to consider it. Carrabino, however, published his book in 1974, therefore it is surprising that he 
makes no mention of Le Visible et Pinvisible. 
" Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et Pinvisih1e, p. 18 1. 
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d6finitivement. La pellicule superficielle du visible West que pour ma 
vision et pour mon corps. Mais la profondeur sous cette surface contient 
mon corps et contient donc ma vision. Mon corps comme chose visible 
est contenu dans le grand spectacle. Mais mon corps voyant sous-tend ce 
corps visible, et tous les visibles avec lui. 11 ya insertion r6ciproque et 
entrelacs de l'un dans 1'autrL 327 
In terms of self-knowledge, it might be considered problematic that there is a part of me 
that remains invisible, unknowable, to myself, although it is visible to others. Perhaps, 
then, this difficulty could be avoided by viewing oneself in a mirror. This would give the 
perceiving subject access to herself in a way that only others normally have. Merleau- 
Ponty considers the appearance of one's self in the mirror and the implications it has for 
self-knowledge. In this account of human consciousness, the self can never be 
completely known, there is always a part of it that remains invisible. One has, therefore, 
to be seen by another, by the flesh of the world, in order to be fully constituted; to exist 
for others as well as for oneself 
Therefore, Merleau-Ponty's earlier theory of the body and its outward-reaching 
perceptions is a particularly apt way of accounting for the emphasis upon perceptual data 
in a novel like La Jalousie, a novel whose emphasis is on the intentional nature of 
perception, and on the body-subject's position and spatial perspective. It is a novel that 
deals very much with one person's perspective, with one person's relationship to the 
world, and little is mentioned about that individual's reciprocal relationship with others. 
Merleau-Ponty's later theories, which constitute a new way of conceiving intersubjective 
relationships, via the flesh of the world, come into their own when the shared world is 
narrated in Robbe-Grillet's other works. 
327 Merleau-Ponty, Le T isible et Vinvisible, p. 182. 
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There is an intermediate stage in his thought, however, a phase in between 
PhMomenologie de la Perception and Le Visible et l'invisible, characterised by the last 
work he managed to complete before his early death . 
328 L'(Eil el Vesl)ril, written whilst 
on holiday near Aix, in the setting of the landscapes immortalised by Uzanne, contains 
Merleau-Ponty's musings on the relationship between art and perception. Part of this 
work is devoted to a consideration of Cartesian philosophy and the possibility of 
knowledge of others. Merleau-Ponty claims that the question of seeing oneself in the 
mirror poses a problem for Descartes, since for him, the mind and the body are separate 
entities. Seeing oneself in the mirror would, from a Cartesian perspective, be just the 
same as seeing another person, and, just as Descartes claims that moving mechanisms 
covered in hats and cloaks could be mistaken for other people, one's own reflection could 
be just such another ruse. Merleau-Ponty's position undergoes a change between the 
writing of L'(Eil el Pesprit, and the writing of Le Visible et Pinvisible. In the first 
volume, he claims that there are parallels between sight and touch, whereas in the latter, 
he decides that there is in fact a difference between them; one can touch oneself when 
touching, whereas one cannot see oneself seeing in quite the same way. Seeing oneself in 
the mirror, therefore, does not give one such a direct means of perception of oneself as it 
might initially appear. 
Merleau-Ponty considers knowledge of the self in terms of (literal) self-perception 
in looking at oneself in the mirror. This is one apparently obvious way in which one 
might know oneself, yet it begins to pave the way for the knowledge of others too. 
Looking at oneself in a mirror is a way of perceiving oneself as others do, that is, having 
... Le Visible et Pinvisible was published posthumously; it comprises a manuscript and work notes that 
were incomplete at the time of Mirleau-Ponty's death. 
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a de-centred or distanced perspective of oneself. The mirror is clearly a means of self- 
contemplation, as well as a means of considering oneself in an objective way. There 
would appear to be potentially rich'literary and cinematic possibilities in the motif of the 
mirror, a means for a writer or cinematographer to suggest that a character is giving deep 
consideration to their situation, to themselves. It is no coincidence, then, that part of 
Robbe-Grillet's autobiography1romatiesques should be called Le Miroir qui reviem. It is, 
after all, a work concerned with questions of the author's selfhood, with an examination 
of his real and imaginary life. The book's title might also be considered in the light of 
the recurrence of mirrors in PObbe-Grillet's works. His film and fiction contain not just 
mirrors, but also doubles and twins, which, to all intents and purposes, function as 
mirrors; they allow the person perceiving their own double to see themselves as others 
see them and to consider their own identity. Equally, as Ben Stoltzfus has pointed OUt329, 
the many instances of mise en abyme in Robbe-Grillet's works are devices that function 
as formal mirrors, duplicating the structure of the events of a work in miniature. He 
argues that the multitude of viewpoints offered by Robbe-Grillet's various (literal and 
formal) mirrors function in the same way as the many perspectives of a Cubist painting, 
which, like a'shattered mirror, offers many perspectives to its viewer at once. Stoltzfus 
highlights the formal play made possible by Robbe-Grillet's multiple mirrorings and 
reflections, claiming that mifTors allow for 
consciousness to exteriorize being and perceive itself as object. 
What is that Narcissus sees mirrored on the liquid surface? Is it himself or 
another? 330 
329 Stoltzfus, Ben, Alain Robbe-Grillet: The Body ofthe Text, (London and Toronto: Associated 
University Presses, 1985), see chapter 4, 'Mirror, Mirror on the Wall for examples of mise en abyme, 
see especially pp. 91-93. 
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It is noteworthy, from a phenomenological perspective, that Stoltzfus also directly 
mentions phenomenology in his discussion of mirrors in Robbe-Grillet's Muvre. 
However, his is a concluding reference to phenomenology, rather than a discussion 
devoted entirely to the phengmenological implications of the presence of so many mirrors 
in Robbe-Grillet's works. There is a hint at this in his conclusion, which is couched in 
phenomenological terms. His argument has been that the interior/exterior relationship 
offered by specular surfaces and other variants thereof, are used by Robbe-Grillet to ease 
communication between what is inside: "the phenomenological self' and what is 
outside . 
33 1 He repeats a point made by Mikel Dufrenne that consciousness and its object 
are inseparable; the inside and the outside are inextricably linked. What Stoltzfus is 
suggesting is a link between consciousness and its objects that is entirely Merleau- 
Pontyan. There is a reflection of Merleau-Pontyan thought even in the language Stoltzfus 
uses, when he remarks that "the properties of space and peception establish curious and 
reversible relationshipS. "332 - It is remarkable, then, that he does not mention Merleau- 
Ponty in this regard, nor is his analysis of the inside and the outside, the self and the 
other, rooted in phenomenological philosophy, aside from his concluding comments, as 
outlined here. Thus, Stoltzfus' discussion of Robbe-Grillet concludes that 
phenomenology may well be an apt theoretical underpinning in terms of the question of 
the relationship between the self and the other. However, he has not fully worked 
through the possibilities he himself suggests. The present analysis, then, will be an 
attempt to look again at some of the instances of literal and non-literal mirroring in 
Robbe-Grillet's works, but concentrating this time on a thoroughgoing phenomenological 
330 Stoltzfus, p. 95. 331 ]bid, p. 10 1. 
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interpretation of the significance of mirrors in terms of knowledge of the self and of 
others. 
I 
Trans-Europ Express is a film which contains many self-reflexive devices, which 
might be understood as mirroring, or reflecting upon, the process of making film itself 
Structurally, there is a doubling of events over the course of the film. Like Mathias, 
making his double circuit of the island and revisiting places in Le Vojvur, Elias makes his 
journey between Paris and Antwerp twice, re-covering the same ground on each journey, 
performing a dry run before the gang trust him to carry the real merchandise. His first 
journey is mirrored by the sdcond; the presence of mirrors is felt throughout the film, and 
where there are mirrors, there is an effect of reversal - is there an allusion to this in the 
name of Elias' destination: Anvers/envers? He begins and ends the film not as Elias, but 
as the real-life actor who plays the, role, Jean-Louis Trintignant, and constantly reminds 
the viewer of the constructed and artificial nature of film. He looks directly into the 
camera (thus acknowledging its presence, rather than keeping up the pretence that it is 
not there). Elias is killed in character during the film, however he is resurrected as 
Trintignant during the closing frames of the film, and is seen kissing Marie-France Pisier 
(the actor who played Eva), whose character had also been killed during the film. There 
is, of course a difficulty for the viewer in deciding whether or not the person seen on the 
screen is Elias or Trintignant. The idea of making the film in the first place only arises 
by chance when Trintignant boards the train in which Jean, Lucette and the producer are 
travelling. Although the viewer tends to assume that what is then acted out is the film 
planned by Jean, Elias does not behave in ways predicted by Jean, suggesting that he is 
not really part of Jean's projected film, but still Trintignant. These details, then, 
332 stoltzftis, p. 10 1, cmpliasis added. 
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emphasise the self-reflexivity of the film, in their knowing nods to its construction, and in 
so doing, they raise the questions of personal identity (that of the characters and the 
actors). 
This self-reflexivity *extends to the role Robbe-Grillet himself plays in his own 
film; he is seen in the role of a director called Jean; his real-life wife, Catherine, plays his 
assistant, the script girl. Alain Robbe-Grillet, of course, is a director in real life, and 
Catherine Robbe-Grillet has assisted him in his career by typing out copies of his 
manuscripts prior to the publication of his novels, much as the script girl assists the 
director in Trans-Europ Express. There is even a brief scene in the film where Robbe- 
Grillet's character, Jean, is seen directing the film. Whilst the viewer might understand 
this as part of Jean's planning of the film he is to make, it could also be construed as a 
reflection of the real-life Robbe-Grillet directing the film Trans-Europ Express. Hence 
the impossibility of separating reality from fiction, through the use of doubling and 
mirroring in Trans-Europ Express. These, then, are all examples of mirroring, which 
suggest a degree of self-reflexivity in Robbe-Grillet's filmmaking enterprise. However, 
the film also contains literal mirrors. 
There is a moment in the film where Trintignant/Elias, on his return to Paris on 
the train, examines his reflection in a double-angled mirror. This allows him to see 
himself from two perspectives at once; and the viewer of the film has access to an extra 
dimension, as Trintignant is filmed from behind, so that the viewer can see him looking 
at himself Ijaving emptied and re-loaded his revolver, he holds it as though he were 
threatening to shoot at his own reflection. The pose he adopts seems to be an attempt on 
his part to ascertain how he. might appear to another when in a confrontational situation. 
237 
There is something strongly self-reflexive in this action, and, it also represents seeing 
oneself either as another, or from the perspective of another. This, then, is suggested in 
Merleau-Ponty's observation that in the mirror, one sees oneself as one is seen by others. 
Trintignant/Elias is looking at himself, but as if from the perspective of another. 
Another scene in Trans-Europ Express allows us to see a face in a mirror, albeit 
very briefly. There is yet another example of self-reflexivity when this frame, early in 
the film, allows the viewer to glimpse Jean/Robbe-Grillet's face in the mirror of the train 
compartment. He is already a double presence in the film, as Robbe-Grillet is playing the 
role of someone who does what he himself does in real life, i. e., someone who directs 
films. This scene, in which we briefly glimpse the director's own face, is further 
mirrored in a description in Robbe-Grillet's most recent novel, La Reprise. Again, 
Robbe-Grillet seems to be tempting his reader into considering the possibility of linking 
the character described in the novel with himself. The temptation to do so stems from the 
fact that they share the same facial features, and that La Reprise contains details that are 
part of Robbe-Grillet's own life as well as occurring in the life of HR. For example, IIR 
refers to "mon Brest natal", 333 a town which was also Robbe-Grillet's place of birth. 
Further, the novel recounts a traumatic episode from the life of Robbe-Grillet, viz., the 
devastation caused to the formerly magnificent garden of his Normandy home in the 
great storms of winter 1999/2000.334 
Just as Jean/Robbe-Grillet's face is mirrored in the train carriage in Trans-Ellrop 
Express, so HR's face is reproduced by his doppelgdnger in La Reprise. Again, this 
occurs in a train carriage. Jean's face in the mirror in Trans-Europ Express is that of the 
333 La Reprise, p. 10. 
334 Ibid, p. 8 1. 
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young, moustachioed Robbe-Grillet of the 1960s, and the face of HR, as described in La 
Reprise, resembles the young Robb e-Gril let's, even down to the detail of his one unruly 
eyebrow. HR's seat in the train in which he is travelling is occupied by a fellow traveller 
in his absence. The fact that they look so much alike, then, might explain why the other 
passengers in the compartment do not prevent the usurper from taking HR's place - they 
mistake the usurper for HR. Then again, given that he has already inconvenienced them 
by moving in and out of his seat, perhaps they do not care to keep the seat for him. When 
the traveller lowers the newspaper that originally obscures his features, HR realises that 
the face is identical to his own: 
( 
... 
) j'ai reconnu, face A moi, mes propres traits: figure dissym6trique au 
nez fort, convexe (le fameux "nez vexe" h6ritd de ma m6re), aux yeux 
sombres tr6s enfonc6s dans leurs orbites surmont6es d'6pais sourcils noirs, 
dont le droit se rel6ve en pinceau rebelle sur la tempe. La coiffure - 
cheveux assez courts en d6sordre boucI6, parsem6 de m6ches grisonnantes 
- 6tait la mienne 6galement. 
335 
Once more, the last part of this description suggests a link with the real-life Robbe- 
Grillet; just as itait la mietwe refers to the usurper looking like HR, so it could refer to 
the coiffiire that used to be Robbe-Grillet's own. More importantly, it is the realisation 
that this passenger has the same face as HR that causes him to become self-aware, the 
passenger is a living reflection, he forces HR to consider how he himself must appear to 
others. HR is reminded of his own appearance as his double scratches the point just 
below his nostrils, making HR check that his fake moustache is still in place: 
Je me suis alors souvenu de la fausse moustache que j'avais adopt6e pour 
cette mission, imit6e avec art et parfaitement credible, semblable en tout 
point A celle que je portais autrefois. Le visage relev6, de I'autre cZt6 du 
miroir, 6tait, lui, absolument glabre. Dans un r6flexe incontrOI6, j'ai pass6 
un doigt sur ma I&vre'sup6rieure. Mon postiche dtait evidemment toujours 
335 La Reprise, pp. 13 -14. 
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li, bien en place. Le sourire du voyageur s'est accentu6, narquois peut- 
6tre, ou du moins ironique, et it a fait le m6me geste 16ger sur sa 16vre 
nue. 336 1 
The faces described here duplicate the face that was seen in the mirror of the railway 
carriage in Trans-Europ Express. The doubling of the two men constitutes a mirror here 
- HR sees his double's face as if seeing his own in a mirror. It is notable that part of this 
passage could, once again, apply equally to Robbe-Grillet himself; it includes a reference 
to the moustache "que je portais autrefois". Clearly, one cannot equate HR and Robbe- 
Grillet; La Reprise is a nov el and not an autobiography, although it does testify to the 
importance of Robbe-Grillet's remark that "Je nai jamais parI6 d'autre chose que de 
Moi,,. 337 (Notably, his autobiographies are not entirely based on fact, and thus they are 
entitled Romanesques. ) The meeting with his double is also recounted by Robbe-Grillet 
in a brief text (a fictional short story or a factual account? ), entitled 'Mon Double 
cor6en'. 338 From the content of the text, it is impossible to tell whether Robbe-Grillet is 
inventing these events, or whether they really happened. However improbable the story 
he tells may seem, there is no obvious hint to the reader that Robbe-Grillet is joking. 
Having claimed that, as a boy, he saw his double at the beach, he recounts a story almost 
identical to the episode mentioned above in La Reprise, with the difference that it takes 
place on a ferry in Korea, rather than on a train in Germany. On seeing a westemer who 
ressembles him, he claims: "Ses traits m'ont fait croire un instant que je me trouvais 
devant un miroir. ..,, 
339 Thus, whilst alluding to himself and his own life, Robbe-Grillet's 
336 La Reprise, p. 14. 
337 Alain Robbe-Grillet Le. Nfiroir qui revient (Paris: Les Edtions de Minuiý 1984), p. 7. 
338 Alain Robbe-Grillet 'Mon Double corden', in Alain Robbe-Grillet, Le Voyageur (Paris: Bourgois, 
2001), pp. 271-273. 
339 jbid, p. 272. 
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works remain. elusive in their avoidance of any equation between life and art, but at the 
same time, constantly raise questions of personal identity and self-knowledge. 
However, for Merleau-Ponty, one cannot attain self-knowledge via the miffor; 
and any notion that one can is merely a ruse. This is because, in normal vision (without 
looking in a mirror), one cannot see oneself seeing; one only sees a part of oneself and 
there is always a side of oneself that remains invisible. This invisible side can only ever 
be constituted by another, and I cannot be my own object of consciousness in vision as I 
can in touching. I cannot see myself seeing as I can touch myself touching, as Agata 
Zielinski points out: 
Je ne peux pas Etre un objet de connaissance pour moi-m6me, puisque 
dans la vision je m'dchappe A moi-mEme ( ... 
) je ne peux Etre constitu6 que 
par autrui, qu'A partir du moment o6 il ya autrui. Puisque seul un autre 
peut me voir voyant - seul le regard d'autrui dans mon dos me donnera A 
moi-m8me ce doS. 340 
Touching, for Merleau-Ponty, is a different matter; as in the case discussed in 
PhMomMologie de la perception, when my two hands touch, I am both touching and 
touched. The relationship between seeing and being seen is not the same; I am only seen 
by another; I cannot be an object fbi myself in vision. The mirror, then, does not give the 
subject full self-knowledge, only another can do this; the most a mirror can do is to 
suggest how I am seen for another; I can never see myself as another sees me: 
( ... ) le miroir est moins 
Ncho de ma propre vision que l'introduction i 
autrui, me sugg6rant la mani&re dont je suis vu, plut6t que celle par 341 
laquelle je me vois voyant . 
340 Zielinski, p. 87. 
341 Zielinski, p. 87. 
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This seems to be true of the instances of mirrors in Robbe-Grillet's work considered here; 
the characters in each case are looiing at themselves for the purposes of checking how 
they appear to others; Elias is checking that he looks the part of a gangster; HR that his 
disguise is still in place. These actions are aimed at appearing a certain way to others, 
they do not reveal any new information to the characters concerned about themselves. 
Whilst Robbe-Grillet's use of his own features to portray and describe his filmic and 
fictional characters may initially suggest an identification with these characters, the 
temptation to make such a link should be resisted. Robbe-Grillet is neither Jean nor HR, 
although there is of course always some degree of borrowing from himself, from his own 
experiences and imagination to flesh out his artistic universe. 
So, Stoltzfus' assertion that the mirror allows for consciousness to exteriorise k 
itself and perceive itself as an object is only part of the story. One is not an object for 
oneself in the mirror, claims Merleau-Ponty, one appears as an object for others. There is 
always a part of myself that remains invisible, even in the mirror; it is a part of me that 
only becomes visible in the presence of others. For Merleau-Ponty, the solution to the 
impasse of being invisible to oneself is the presence of others. He insists upon the 
necessity for self-awareness of being constituted by another; of their seeing what is 
invisible to oneself. The self that one sees in the mirror is not the same self that one 
touches when one touches one's own hand; it is oneself as seen by others, from a de- 
centred perspective. Being seen by others, then, is the only way of being fully self- 
aware. 
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Oneself and the other 
The notion that Merleau-Ponty puts forward of the human subject not being fully 
constituted until constituted by another, by a common inherence in the flesh of the world, 
is illustrated in the works of Robbe-Grillet. In a striking passage in Le Vojvur, Mathias is 
brought into self-consciousness by the gaze of another. In this novel, it is only through 
others that Mathias begins to realise what he has done. Even in their presence, he only 
slowly becomes aware of himself and of his actions. Without their presence, the reader 
wonders whether Mathias would have ever become cognisant of his behaviour. Hence 
the importance of the novel's title - without others to observe him, Mathias would not 
reach any self-awareness. That is, le vojvur is not necessarily Mathias himself, it is those 
around him who observe his actions. 
At the beginning of the second part of Le Vojvur, after the blank page (during 
which, one might assume, Mathias commits the crime he cannot remember), he is to be 
found standing by the roadside with his rented bicycle. He contemplates firstly the 
desiccated corpse of a squashed frog, and secondly the formations of the clouds scudding 
overhead. The clouds change shape, becoming the animals Mathias has encountered on 
his journey. He detects the shape of a sitting frog, and then of a seagull - the seagull he 
drew as a child. It even has an eye that seems to be watching him, as it has watched all of 
his real, remembered or imagined movements thus far in the novel. Perhaps, then, the 
seagull is the voyetir suggested by the title of the book. There is more than one observer 
of Mathias, however. It is this seagull that leads him to another figure who watches him; 
the cloud-seagull appears to be perched on a post by the roadside where he is standing, 
and coming along the road towards him is Mme Marek. By this point, he is quite lost in 
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his reverie; only when Mme Marek comes along does he realise how odd his behaviour 
I 
must seem. During the passage in question, Mathias begins to consider whether his 
arrival in this place could have been noticed by Mme Marek. The twists and turns of the 
road would, probably, have prevented her from seeing the direction from which he had 
emerged. 
La femme, en revanche, aurait remarqu6 cette pause inexplicable, dont il 
s'6tonna lui-m8me A la r6flexion. Pourquoi se trouvait-il au milieu de ]a 
route, les yeux lev6s vers les nuages, tenant d'une main le guidon d'une 
bicyclette nickelde e't de I'autre une petite valise en fibre? 11 se rendit 
compte seulement alors de Pengourdissement dans lequel il flottait jusque- 
IA (depuis quand? ); il ne parvint pas A comprendre, en particulier, pour 
quelle raison il n'6tait pas remont6 sur sa machine, au lieu de pousser 
celle-ci sans se presser comme si rien ne Pappelait nulle part. 342 
The reader's suspicions are aroused here by the narrative's postulating as to Mathias' 
behaviour. Given that, so far in the novel, there is no evidence to suggest that he has 
done anything to Jacqueline, there is no reason for him to be obliged to be accountable to 
anyone for breaking his journey by the side of the road. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
strangeness of his behaviour is raised at all does begin to indicate some degree of 
wrongdoing on the part of Mathias. After all, there is no reason to consider any possible 
explanation for one's actions unless to allay the fears or suspicions of another. 
Of course, on an initial reading of the novel, the reader will not associate Mathias' 
behaviour with any kind of wrongdoing; it is only towards the end of the novel that the 
reader (and Mathias) can begin to realise in retrospect that something had occurred at this 
point. It is notable that Mathias doýs not register any feeling of guilt at this point for the 
crime he has (perhaps/perhaps not? ) just committed. Indeed, at no point in the novel does 
he feel an explicit feeling of guilt, rather he detects a feeling of indefinable awkwardness 
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or unease. That is, he implicitly becomes self-aware due to the presence of others, but 
never remorseful. The paranoia that often pervades Robbe-Grillet's works does owe 
something to the threatening presence of others. Others are perceived in negative terms 
in Robbe-Grillet's works; either they exist as objects for a human subject, or else their 
presence threatens to invade, to reveal, to objectivise. For Merleau-Ponty, in order for 
the subject to be a subject, to be self-aware and to be fully constituted, the subject must 
exist as an object for another, for the flesh of the world. This, then, is the case for 
Mathias - through the presence of others, he comes to realise the disturbing truth about 
himself 
Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty accounts for this disturbing discomfort experienced 
when the subject is perceived by another person; the decentralising experienced by the 
subject is painful, the subject is no longer the centre of the world. The other is not simply 
a body for me, but I am a body for the other; I am not the only one who can see, but am 
myself seen: 
En affirmant que "Autrui ne peut s'introduire dans Punivers du voyant que 
par effraction, comme une, douleur et une catastrophe', Merleau-Ponty 
destitue le sujet de son privil6ge de savoir ( ... 
). [Autrui] vient comme le 
voleur et sa venue bouleverse Funivers des habitudes solipsistes, 343 jusqu'A la douleur. 
This, then perhaps explains the feeling of unease, of discomfort that Mathias experiences 
in Le Voyeur. Furthermore, it is remarkable that he leads what might be described as a 
solipsistic, self-contained existence throughout the first part of the novel; it is only when 
others bring with them the suggestion of having seen Mathias commit the crime, or 
behave suspiciously, that his unease develops. 
342 Le Voyeur, p. 92. 
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At a later point in Le Voyeur, as Mathias returns to the place where Jacqueline 
disappeared, it is again the presence of someone else that alerts him to the suspicious 
nature of his own actions. Julien Marek's presence is noticed by Mathias just after the 
latter has flung a grey, knitted cardigan into the sea from the cliff top above the place 
where Jacqueline's body was discovered: 
11 fallait A pr6sent relever le visage vers le gargon. Celui-ci avait 
6videmment vu le paletot de laine et le geste incompr6hensible du 
voyageur... Non; il avait A coup sOr vu le geste, mais seulement un 
morceau d'6toffe grise, deJA rould en bouchon peut4tre. 11 6tait important 
de le lui faire pr6ciser. 
Mathias se rendit compte, en outre, de la situation bizarre qu'il 
occupait lui-m8me et pour laquelle il devrait aussi fournir une 
explication. 344 
Once more, it is only the realisation that another is watching him that makes Mathias 
aware of himself In Merleau-Pontyan terms, Julien is part of the flesh of the world that 
makes that part of Mathias that is invisible to himself become visible, and therefore fully 
constituted. Julien claims that the garment belonged to Jacquie, which Mathias is forced 
to contest in order not to give away the truth about his actions the previous day. This, 
and the fact that Julien produces a half-smoked cigarette of the type Mathias usually 
smokes and a sweet wrapper -matching the sweets in Mathias' pocket, lead Mathias to 
imagine an alarming scenario. Julien throws the sweet wrapper over the cliff, perhaps to 
demonstrate to Mathias that he is in control of the situation; he can produce potentially 
compromising evidence and then d6stroy it at will: 
( ... 
) il proclamait son pouvoir sur Mathias: il d6truisait ses traces avec la 
rnýme facilit6 qu'il en suscitait de nouvelles, modifiant A son gr6 signes et 
itin6raires du temps rdvolu. Mais il fallait autre chose que des soupgons - 
343 Zielinski, p. 187. 
344 Le Voyeur, p. 207. 
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m6me precis - pour autoriser une telle assurance. Juilen avait "vu". Le 
nier ne servait plus A rien. Seules les images enregistr6es par ces eux, 
pour toujours, leur conf6raient ddsormais cette fixit6 insupportable. 3J 
For Merleau-Ponty, the other goes beyond their simple presence; the other is always more 
than what they appear to be, more than what is given in sensory experience. There is, 
therefore, a telling significance iP the novel's title, when we consider the above 
quotation: Julien avait "vu". Mathias knows that Julien had seen (the crime), and this is 
what makes Mathias aware of it. This, then, is precisely Merleau-Ponty's point in 
relation to the gaze of the other, as Zielinski points out: "par lui, je suis vu, je me sens vu 
046 
voyant. 
What renders Julien's apparent knowledge of Mathias' crime somewhat alarming 
is the fact that Julien seems unmoved by it. Mathias sees nothing in Julien's eyes that 
suggests that he is horrified, angry, or feels any emotion at all. Mathias considers the 
possibility that Julien may be short-sighted, or simple-minded: 
Ensuite il regarda Mathias... Un d6faut de vision, certainement, troublait 
1'expression du jeune homme, mais il ne louchait pas. C'6tait autre 
chose... Une myopie excýssive? Non, car il consid6rait i pr6sent le 
bonbon en le tenant A une distance normale. ( ... ) Celui-ci n'6tait-il pas un 
peu simple d'esprit? ( ... ) Et il [Julien] le d6visageait de nouveau... OU bien 6tait-ce un wil de veffe qui rendait si g6nant son regard? 347 
Thus, because there is something - something that Mathias cannot quite place - odd 
about the way Julien looks at him, it is Julien's troubling gaze that renders Mathias 
uncomfortable, that makes him aware that he has done something that he feels the need to 
345 Le Voyeur, p. 214. 
346 Zielinski, p. 195. 
347 Le Voyeur, p. 210. 
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dissimulate. What is striking then, 'is that there is no spark of humanity in Julien's gaze, 
it is described in terms of a hole, a lack or absence: 
Cependant c'6taient des yeux tr&s ordinaires - ni laids ni beaux, ni grands 
ni petits - deux cercles parfaits et immobiles, situds c6te A c6te et percds 
chacun en son centre d'un trou noir. ( ... 
) 11 regardait Mathias droit dans 
les yeux, de ses yeux rigides et bizarres - comme inconscients, ou meme 
aveugles - ou comme idiotS. 
348 
Merleau-Ponty's later work suggests that in human perception, the perceiving subject - in 
this case Mathias - would see -that the other person perceives the world in the same way 
that he himself does, due to our existence as part of the flesh of the world. It is strange, 
therefore, that Julien's eyes suggest the absence of a person, an unconsciousness; one 
ought to be able to perceive the other as being a conscious being just as one is oneself, 
under a Merleau-Pontyan theory. One might initially be tempted to conclude that this 
hole in Julien's eyes - the very place that is said to be the window of the soul - reflects 
the nothingness at the centre of consciousness, the intentional consciousness which is 
nothing unless it has an object of consciousness, unless it reaches out towards something. 
Yet, a more convincing solution to this can be found in Merleau-Ponty's theory of the 
other. The very existence of other conscious beings does of course depend upon their 
being to some extent inaccessible to the subject who perceives them. Merleau-Ponty 
explains that: 'Vest en faisant autrui non seulement inaccessible mais invisible pour moi, 
que je garantis son alt6rit6 et que je sors du solipsisme". 
349 That is, if I had access to 
other people's minds, they would not be other than me; they would be the same as me. 
This, then, explains the inability of Mathias to make out anything in Julien's eyes, since 
there must always be a part of the other that remains other to me: 
348 Le Voyeur, pp. 214-215. 
248 
L'experience du monde a pour mod6le celle du monde comme visible el 
invisible: autrui aussi est une 6nigme, autrui a aussi ses obscurit6s, ses 
opacit6s et demeure toujours pour une part "inaccessible". 350 
The protagonist of Djinn, Simon Lecceur, undergoes a similar sense of unease 
when he is surveyed by a dummy Djinn, by a mannequin whose presence he initially 
mistakes for a man, and then a woman who resembles the film star Jane Frank. It is only 
by touching Djinn that he is able to verify that she is a mannequin: 
"Touchez encore, si qa vous fait plaisir", dit avec ironie la voix charmeuse 
de monsieur Djinn, soulignant le ridicule de ma situation. D'oý vient cette 
voix? Les sons ne sortent pas du mannequin lui-m8me, c'est probable, 
mais d'un haut-parleur dissimul6 juste A cOt6. 
Ainsi, je suis surveill6 par quelqu'un d'invisible. Cest tr6s 
d6sagr6able. Fai la sensation d'8tre maladroit, menacd, fautif La fille qui 
me parle est, aussi bien, assise A plusieurs kilom6tres; et elle me regarde, 
comme un insecte darts un piege, sur son ecran de t6l6vision. Je suis su'r 
qu'elle se moque de Moi. 351 
This early encounter in the novel is indicative of the nature of their relationship 
throughout; Simon is always nervous of the power Djinn holds over him, by being seen, 
but unable to see her, he exists as the object of her vision but there is no reciprocal 
perception. It is typical of the suspicion aroused in Robbe-Grilletian protagonists when 
they believe that they are being watched without being able to see who is watching them; 
as with Julien in Le Voyeur, whose eyes are glassy and unreal, Djinn is an unreal 
presence, a dummy with no spark of life behind her eyes (obscured as they are by dark 
glasses), yet Simon knows he is being observed. Before Simon has realised that Djinn is 
a dummy, the dark glasses suggest that she may be blind, yet apparently she can still see; 
349 Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et linvisible, p. I 10. 
350ziclinski, p. 196. 351 Djinn, p. 15. 
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another common motif in Robbe-Grillet's works. Elias in Trans-Europ Express is 
pursued by afaux aveugle (carrying a white stick and wearing dark glasses) who collects 
money from him in the caf6 where Elias' friend works. Thefaux avellgle turns out to be 
in league with the police and the many other people who conspire to bring about his 
death. There is a sense of unease and mistrust, then, on the part of Robbe-Grillet's 
protagonists when the eyes of another are somehow obscured or absent. Perhaps this is 
because the protagonists feel that they are being observed by someone whose eyes they 
cannot observe, whose observation they cannot reciprocate. 
The sense of unease and paranoia often experienced by Robbe-Grillet's 
protagonists, then, is dependent upon the presence of another, or another's gaze. The 
protagonists' self-awareness is heightened, thrown into relief, by the unsettling presence 
of others. Others are frequently the means by which the Robbe-Grilletian protagonist 
feels he is being controlled, manipulated, or threatened. 
Language 
Intersubjective relationships in Robbe-Grillet, discussed above in relation to the 
self and the other, are also negotiated via language. Just as the presence of another often 
fuels a character's sense of unease and reveals a mistrustful relationship, so the dialogues 
between his characters also reveal that they are ill at ease with each other. Language is 
sometimes manipulated by Robbe-'Grillet's characters to achieve their own success or 
safety, or to deceive other characters. In many of his novels and films, there is a process 
of gommage in the dialogues, of denying what has previously been stated, a process 
which questions the extent to which language is a true representation of fact. Victor 
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Carrabino outlines a common purpose between Robbe-Grillet and Merleau-Ponty as far 
as language is concerned. . 
Carrabino indicates, for instance, Merleau-Ponty's 
consideration of literary language, in which he insists upon the creation of a new form of 
language, one which introduces unfamiliar perspectives, rather than re-confirming 
already established ones. 352 Once, again, the idea of bracketing what is familiar, of a 
rejection of convention, is suggestive of the phenomenological reduction; a lifting of the 
familiar and established in favour of a new literary form. This literary form, Carrabino 
suggests, finds a voice in the aims of the nouveau roman. 
353 Robbe-Grillet's vision for 
the New Novel was that it should cast aside the established forms of metaphor and 
anthropomorphism in favour of a new form of literary language. Whilst these remarks 
certainly do indicate a common vision of literary language, Carrabino's analysis tends to 
focus upon the way the novels' narratives are structured, rather than on examples of the 
words the characters speak in Robbe-Grillet's novels and films. The words used by 
Robb e-Grilletian characters is a potentially interesting area of analysis, then, as they often 
use language in a deliberately misleitding, and consequently subversive, manner. 
Carrabino suggests that Robbe-Grillet's writing strips language of its usual 
meaning. it is possible to argue that he strips language of its meaning in respect of 
dialogues spoken by his characters, whose words, on many occasions, cannot be trusted. 
The denigrating of truth in this manner happens both in Robbe-Grillet's novels and films. 
In his films, this is occasionally further complicated by the fact that the words spoken by 
the main character contradict the images that appear on the screen. Thus, language and 
sensory perception are set against each other. There is, in this sense, an undermining of 
352 Carrabino, p. 13 3. 
353 Ibid., p. 134. 
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the faith that can be placed in language, to the profit of the visual image, in LHonwie qui 
ment, as Robbe-Grillet explains in relation to the protagonist Boris, who invents his own 
story, with the aim of usurping the place of a national hero: 
11 parle; il raconte comment, en h6ros, il a sauve le pays A plusieurs 
reprises, comment il a lutt6 contre I'occupant allemand, etc. Ce West pas 
un personnage: un personnage a un passd ( ... 
) Ici, I'homme qui sort de a 
for8t est vide. 11 s'accroche A ce que voit le sp6ctateur, disant parfois le 
contraire de ce qu'on a vu. Peu A peu son discours devient une pure 
invention, bien qu'il s'appuie ici ou IA sur des faits incontestableS. 354 
Of course, the film's title prepares us for this, it is only to be expected of a man who lies, 
whose whole life story is a tissue of lies, but his words are all the viewer or the other 
characters have to rely on for inforination. The viewer, of course, only knows that he is 
lying because what is seen on the screen contradicts his words; but this does raise the 
question of what to believe in film - the dialogue or the visual image, language or 
sensory percep ion. 
Conversely, in LImmorfelle, L claims that what is seen is fake, that her word is to 
be trusted, rather than that of anyone else, or instead of what is seen: 
LE VIEILLARD: Tr6s vieux mosqu6c... tr&s ancien... 
L: Tout qa est faux, naturellement. 
N: Tout quoi? 
L: Ce qu'il disait. Qa West pas ancien du tout, on Va 
reconstruite aprýs la guerre. 
N: Elle figure pourtant sur tous les guides. 
Thus, it no longer seems true to claim that voir, cest croire, if L is to be believed. N's 
claim that the mosque is featured in guidebooks suggests, however, that L may not be 
telling the truth either. Throughout the film, she plays a cat and mouse game with him, 
252 
sometimes reinforcing the notions of the mythical east, sometimes undermining them 
with a throwaway remark. The result is that N no longer knows what or whom to 
believe. Following her death, members of the local population seem to be doing their 
best to throw him off the trail; information given to him by them is never verifiable. The 
interplay of what is claimed to be truth and what appears to be lies makes it extremely 
difficult for N (and therefore also for the viewer) to work out what exactly is happening, 
This was apparently a deliberate ploy by Robbe-Grillet to lead his viewers to question 
their expectations of film: 
Ce qui d6route les spectateurs 6pris de 'Walism6", c'est que I'on n'essaie 
plus ici de leur faire croire A rien - je dirais presque: au contraire... Le 
vrai, lefaux et lefaire croire sont devenus plus ou moins le sujet de tout 
ceuvre moderne; celle-ci, au lieu d'6tre un pr6tendu morceau de rdalite, se 
d6veloppe en tant que r6flexion sur la realit6 (ou sur le peu de realiIJ, 
comme on voudra). ' 
Elle ne cherche plus A cacher son caract6re 
n6cessairement mensonger, en se pr6sentant comme une "histoire v6cue". 
Si bien que nous retrouvons IA, dans 1'6criture cin6matographique, une 
fonction voisine de celle assum6e par la description en litt6rature: l'image 
ainsi trait6e (quant aux acteurs, au d6cor, au montage, dans ses rapports 
avec le son, etc. ) emp&he de croire en m6me temps qu'elle aff irme, 
comme la description emp6chait de voir ce qu'elle montrait. 355 
Thus, the notions of truth and falsity are clearly bound up, in Robbe-Grillet's mind, with 
a new form of writing or film-making. The account given by Robbe-Grillet here is, once 
more, relevant to that which Carrabino outlines in relation to Merleau-Ponty's conception 
of literary language. Robbe-Grillet draws parallels between the genres of film and 
literature, which is significant here in so far as truth and falsity are not the exclusive 
domain of spoken or verbal language in LImmortelle. Since this is a film, it is made up 
of moving visual images and of a soundtrack; these two comprise the language of the 
354 See Robbe-Grillet's interview with Francois Jost in the booklet accompan)ing the -video box set Alain 
Robhe-Grillet. - ffuvres Cinematographiques, p. 30. 
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film just as much as verbal language. Neither element is allowed to dominate, or to make 
greater claims to truth in the film. The viewer no longer knows whether to believe their 
eyes or their ears; indeed the viewer can no longer believe either their eyes or their ears, 
since the evidence presented to both is so often undermined. 
In LImmortelle, it is chiefly the soundtrack in the form of the words spoken by L 
and other characters that challenges the veracity of the image, however in Glissements 
progressifs du plaisir, the non-verbal sounds on the soundtrack are again used in such a 
way as to subvert one of the characters' (and via him the viewer's) expectations as to 
what is "really" happening. Alice, locked in her cell, and apparently bored, amuses 
herself by carrying out various activities which might be interpreted as either innocent or 
highly provocative. For example, she paints Yves Klein-style body prints, daubing 
herself with paint and leaving the imprint of her body on the white walls. She is naked 
during the time she spends in the cell, and this in itself is apparently a means of 
distracting the various (mostly male) authority figures who visit her there. However, on 
the occasion of one of the magistrate's visits to her, there are noises coming from her cell 
that are suggestive of eithef violence, sexual activity, or both. The scene is described 
thus in the cini-roman: 
( 
... 
) un long plan du magistrat attendant derfi&re la porte de la cellule 
d'Alice ( ... 
), sur le point d'y p6ndtrer (une main sur le verrou) mais 
6coutant les sons 6tranges qui viennent de Pautre c6t6 de la porte: une 
femme qui g6mit, des bruits de pas, de verre cass6, des cris encore, des 
hurlements... Sur ce paroxysme, Fhomme se d6cide A entrer, apr6s avoir 
j et6 un coup d'wil par le judas. 
Dans la pi&e, il ne se passe rien du tout un vieux tourne- 
disque portatif, pos6 sur le lit, produit les sons que l'on vient d'entendre et 
qui se poursuivent ( ... ) 
355 Pour Un Nouveau Roman, p. 163. 
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Le magistrat dernande, d'un ton maussade: 
"Qu'est-ce que vous fabriquez avec ce truc? " 
Eh, bien, vous voyez, j'6coute de la musique. " 
Alice a parI6 d'un ton aimable, presque mondain. 356 
Alice's matter-of-fact response is perhaps the most unsettling aspect of this scene. What 
she describes as "musique" is more like a record of film sound effects; perhaps another 
self-reflexive reference? It is unsettling for the viewer because one's initial assumption 
about the scene is that the magistrate is spying on some kind of sado-masochistic activity 
in the cell. The reliability of the film's sound track therefore becomes questionable; any 
possible realist interpretation of the scene becomes impossible. It is unsettling for the 
magistrate because Alice has apparently managed to fool him into thinking that she is 
doing something forbidden, and her claim to have been engaged in an innocent activity is 
belied both by her shameless nudity and by her defiance of an authority figure. 
Of course, instances such as these can be found in Robbe-Grillet's use of literary, 
well as cinematic, language. Proje(pour une rivohilion 6 Neiv York is a novel in which 
there is a constant process of setting out a scenario only to deny the reality of that 
scenario later. This is bound up with the narration of fantasies and dreams throughout the 
novel, yet it has a similar effect on the reader to that outlined above in relation to Robbe- 
Grillet's films; the reader learns to distrust what she is reading; the contents of the novel 
will never be assimilable into a realist piece of narration. The extremely disturbing, 
sadistic scenes of acts of violence against young women narrated in the novel are a case 
in point. Once described, the narration appears to have been carried out by someone 
describing an unreal, fantasised or imagined scene. The horrific saw-blade scene 
involving a woman being mutilated is just such a scene. The events in it, whilst they 
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initially appear to be presented as factual, as a straightforward narration, then become a 
story that is being told to another character in the novel: 
- Ici encore je vous arr&e. Vous employez a plusieurs reprises, dans votre 
narration, des expressions comme celle-IA: "petits seins naissante', 
"fesses charmantes", i "cruelle op6ration", "pubis chamu", "splendide 
cr6ature rousse", "6clatante pl6nitude", et m6me une fbis: "courbes 
voluptueuses des hanches". Est-ce que vous ne croyez pas que vous 
exag6rez? 
- De quel point de vue serait-ce exag&V 
- Du point de vue lexicologique. 
- Vous pr6tendez que ce sont des incorrections? 
- Non, pas du tout! 
- Des erreurs mat6rielles? 
- La question West pas IA. 
- Alors des mensonges? 
- Encore moins! 
- Dans ce cas, j'avoue ne pas voir ce que vous voulez dire. Je fais mon 
rapport, un point c'est tout. Le texte est correct, et rien West laiss6 au 
hasard, il faut le prendre tel qu'il est. 357 
The narrator's reliability is thereby again called into question, just as the reliability of 
characters in Robbe-Grillet's films is constantly questioned by the visual and auditory 
elements of the films' language. In Projet, the chaotic narration (by conventional 
standards), the jumping from one narrator to another, the unreliability and need for 
constant revision of events narrated robs the reader of all confidence in the narrator's 
version and, indeed, their vision, of events. As seems to be the case here, the narrator's 
own obsessions can colour their understanding of what they see; this narrator is obsessed 
I 
with violent sexuality, hence his interlocutor's questioning of the narrator's insistence 
upon those elements of his vocabulary that betray these disturbing interests. This 
question is, of course, linked to the discussion of sexuality in the previous chapter; given 
the fact that the scenes of violence depicted are subsequently undermined by having their 
356 Glissements progressifs du plaisir, pp. 59-6 1. 
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factual status questioned, does this in some way mitigate the horror of the violence 
depicted? 
Conclusion 
The question of intersubjectivity in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological 
philosophy is one which allows for an analysis of various aspects of Robbe-Grillet's 
works. The notion that the mirror only allows one to experience or perceive oneself as if 
for others is reflected in the many instances of mirror images found in Robbe-Grillet's 
works. These mirrors can be literal and non-literal; often a double or twin takes the place 
of a mirror, but it nevertheless lets the character see himself as others would. The mirror 
still leaves part of the body-subject invisible, however, and only the presence of another 
can make this invisible become visible. That is, there is always a part of oneself that one 
cannot see or know; only the perspective of another can achieve this knowledge. Thus, a 
character such as Mathias in Le Voýeur, who is only partially self-aware, begins to gain 
self-awareness by being perceived by another person; and this is a clue to the meaning of 
the novel's title; Mathias is not the voyeur. The voyeur is Julien, the seagull, Mme 
Marek, the odd spectacles or figure of eight shapes that follow Mathias throughout. The 
figure of eights are the flesh of the world, the potential perspective of another from which 
he could be seen. Finally, the question of language, the means by which intersubjective 
communication is possible, reveals yet again the paranoia at the heart of many of Robbe- 
Grillet's works. Following from the aims of the phenomenological reduction, and of the 
nouveau roman as outlined by Robbe-Grillet, the conventional use of literary language is 
to be undermined, at least in formal terms. However, there is evidence that on a diegetic 
357 Projet pour une rMlution a New York, pp. 188-189. 
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level, a similar process of undermining the reliability of language is underway also. 
Characters in Robbe-Grillet's works lie to each other for their own gain, creating a sense 
of mistrust and unease amongst them. The intersubjective world of Robbe-Grillet, then, 
is a singularly negative vision of human relationships. 
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Conclusion 
Any reader of Robbe-Grillet's novels or viewer of his films cannot help but 
conclude that he is a writer and filmmaker whose work is by turns perplexing, enjoyable, 
complex and challenging. The multifaceted nature of his works is undeniably the reason 
for the proliferation of studies devoted to him, and for the continuing fascination he holds 
for academic research. The gauntlet thrown down to such research, therefore, is to 
identify approaches that allow for an examination of the complexities of his works, and 
that can profitably elucidate them. The present study acknowledges that this is a 
challenge that has been taken up admirably by many scholars, adopting their own 
differing approaches. The initial survey of the various studies already devoted to Robbe- 
Grillet's works revealed th6 importance of his artistic endeavours; the sheer volume of 
analyses of his literature and cinema are, in themselves, evidence of the richness of his 
creativity. Whilst recognising the contribution made by all of these approaches, each 
offering their own unique and výlid insights into Robbe-Grillet's works, what has 
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emerged from this study is the range of insight to be gained by a phenomenological 
reading of Robbe-Grillet's films and novels. That is, phenomenology has allowed for a 
reading of Rpbbe-Grillet that examines areas of key importance in his literary and 
cinematic ceuvres, and yet is capable of uniting them cohesively under the aegis of one 
theoretical standpoint. Thus, it has been possible, in this discussion, to consider topics as 
diverse as the subversion of literary and cinematic conventions, as well as the question of 
narrative viewpoint, the depiction of space and time, bodily existence and sexuality, and 
inter-human relationships. Hence the value of using phenomenology as a means of 
I 
analysis of Robbe-Grillet's film and fiction. It has to be acknowledged also that the 
impetus for such an enterprise has been driven by the valuable contributions of some of 
the earliest commentaries on Robbe-Grillet's works, i. e. those who share the same 
theoretical underpinning as this analysis. However, what demarcates this study from 
those early ones is, firstly, their neglect of any reference to Robbe-Grillet as a cilleaste, 
and secondly, their oversight of certain important areas of Robbe-Grillet's work, such as 
sexuality and intersubjectivity. What was all the more surprising about their omission of 
these topics was the fact that sexuality and intersubjectivity are entirely consistent with, 
and indeed, inseparable from, the notion of a corporeal ontology such as is elucidated in 
phenomenological philosophy, a philosophy whose focus is upon describing bodily 
existence. These omissions, then, have been addressed by this analysis, with the further 
benefit that is brought by several years' distance from the earlier phenomenological 
studies, allowing for subsequent developments in phenomenology to be brought to bear 
on Robbe-Grillet's work. In addition to this, Robbe-Grillet has, of course, continued to 
produce novels and films in the intervening years, and, at the time of writing, hardly any 
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studies exist on his twenty-first century works, making this study one of the first to 
subject them to academic analysis. 
A phenomenological analysis of Robbe-Grillet's work allows for insight into and 
comment on various aspects of his work right across his career, even though his aims as a 
writer and filmmaker have evolved over the years. This is supported by the fact that he 
has acknowledged, in interviews from the start of his career up until the present, the 
influence of phenomenological philosophy on his work. That is, whilst his ideas and 
artistic practice have developed over the years, Robbe-Grillet's work continues at present 
to recognisable as the work of the same author who emerged as part of the nouveau 
roman in the 1950s. In other words, certain techniques from his early works are still 
identifiable in his later works, even when these later works have moved in an apparently 
different direction. So, for example, his interests and aims as filmmaker moved, in the 
1970s, towards a method of structuring his works in a way that reflected the structure of 
serialist music. This happened at a time when he had already become interested in 
piecing together examples of cultural stereotypes in a process of bricolage in his novels. 
These were apparently different aims to those identified by early critical reactions to his 
works, e. g., the chosiste, phenomenological or psychological interpretations, in which his 
work was seen, on the one hand, as an expression of neutral, detached, objective 
perception, or, on the other hand, one of total subjectivity. Nevertheless, in spite of these 
developments, Robbe-Grillet did not leave behind his aim of describing experience from 
a viewpoint located in a human subject; even when this subject is splintered or shifting. 
Thus, in a novel such as Projet pour une r&olufion 6 New York, the presence of the 
technique of bricolage is clearly 'noticeable, but also, the narration remains situated 
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within a human consciousness, albeit shifting from one character's perspective to 
another's. Equally, the presence of the hricolage technique, in its exploitation and 
undermining of myths can be identified in his earliest works; the film LImmortelle plays 
on the building up and tearing down of stereotypes and myths about the east and about 
the allure of women. Similarly, Les Goninies is a novel clearly structured by the 
detective story genre, although again, as in LImmortelle, it constantly creates 
expectations in the reader only to undermine them, thus the murder mystery is not 
resolved in the expected way. I 
Before beginning to analyse Robbe-Grillet's works from a Merleau-Pontyan 
standpoint, this discussion provided an account of the thought of Merleau-Ponty. In 
order to pinpoint the aims of the phenomenological philosophy as outlined by Merleau- 
ponty, and its importance in the context of the phenomenological movement, it was 
necessary firstly to ascertain the position of Merleau-Ponty as compared with that of 
other phenomenological philosophers. This is because Merleau-Ponty's philosophy was 
written in response to some of the problems raised by other members of the 
phenomenological movement. The examination of the evolution of the 
phenomenological movement which was the starting point for this study situated the 
contribution of Merleau-Ponty in relation to his fellow phenomenological philosophers. 
Thus, this study outlines the phenomenological movement by charting its development 
from the examination of psychology offered by Franz Brentano which was then taken up 
by Edmund Husserl, widely regarded as the founder of the movement. Following this, 
the French reaction to and development of phenomenology, as found in the work of 
Sartre, was noted. The critique of Husserl and Sartre were, in many ways, the backdrop 
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to Merleau-Ponty's own thought, and it is mostly against the contributions of these two 
thinkers that he fleshes out his phenomenology. 
The phenomenological reduction, then, proved a valuable starting point in 
analysing Robbe-Grillet's works not only because it provides a cohesive framework for 
the development of Merleau-Ponty's thought, but also because, in its basic aims, it strikes 
a chord with the professed objectives of Robbe-Grillet as a nouveau romancier and 
nouveau ciWaste. That is, in stepping back from, or momentarily suspending, the 
conventions to which most readers and viewers are accustomed when reading and 
viewing films and novels, they become aware of the way in which these conventions 
usually influence and structure their reading and viewing strategies and habits. The 
flouting of such conventions is a stated aim of Robbe-Grillet, and is consistent with his 
artistic practice, as well as that of his fellow nouveaux romanciers and nouveaux 
ciWastes. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty suggests that it is only when we step back from the 
natural attitude, in which we are normally situated in perception, that we can loosen the 
intentional threads that are our means of making sense of the world around us. It is at 
this point that we begin to realise that there is a set of scientific or cultural conventions 
that usually structure our perception. In the world of Robbe-Grilletian film and fiction, 
the reader or viewer is constantly reminded of their normal inclination to read and 
understand film and fiction in a conventional, predictable way, because his works 
undermine the possibility of using conventional reading or viewing practices by drawing 
attention to them. Thus the scientific and cultural explanations and strategies commonly 
used to make sense of and to structure perceptual 
data are akin to the reading and viewing 
strategies that are used to make sense of 
literature and film. Robbe-Grillet's artistic 
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enterprises conspire to force us to set aside our usual habits and formuix for making 
sense of the filmic and literary universes. In the absence of such strategies, the world 
appears unfamiliar, claims Merleau-Ponty, and in the same way, the Robbe-Grilletian 
film or novel is unfailingly rebarbative, given the literary and cinematic conventions one 
might otherwise expect. It is this bewildering world seen without a reassuringly familiar 
framework, such as that described by Merleau-Ponty, that Robbe-Grillet portrays in his 
art. 
This question of the subvergion of the reader's or viewer's expectations is clearly 
of importance to Robbe-Grillet, as is evidenced in his literary manifesto Pour Un 
Noliveau Roman. The rejection of literary conventions as practised by nineteenth-century 
realism was one of his chief aims, and a natural consequence of this is that new strategies 
of making sense of the resultant literature must be adopted by the reader. That the 
suspension of conventional reading strategies necessitated by such literature has a parallel 
in the phenomenological reduction is one of the first significant conclusions of the 
present study. As with phenomenological philosophy itself, this discussion takes the 
phenomenological reduction as starting point for all subsequent accounts of the bodily 
locus of consciousness, time, sexuality, and so on. 
Nevertheless, just as Merleau-Ponty insists upon the impossibility of performing a 
complete reduction, and goes on to argue that the world is always perceived via certain 
structures, Robbe-Grillet retains some conventions in his film and fiction. That is, in 
order for the reader or viewer of Robbe-Grillet's works to realise that some subversive 
process is taking place, there has to be a structure in place that can be undermined. His 
works are characterised by a constant setting up and tearing down of conventions, a 
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process of gommage, of undoing what has just been done. It is in this way that the reader 
thinks that they are dealing with, for example, a vampire film, a mystery, or a detective 
story, only to discover that they ýre dealing with its destruction. Hence the violent 
reaction of an audience in Italy to Glissements progressifs du plaisir; since the film was 
shown in a porn cinema, the audience expected pornography. What they were presented 
with proved to be rather more avant-garde, and they consequently tore the cinema apart. 
The notion of "making strange" that stems from the reduction also has an 
application in terms of the psychological state of Robbe-Grillet's protagonists. Whilst 
mental trauma and disturbed states of mind can be accounted for and explained in 
psychological terms, and whilst previous commentaries have convincingly argued for 
such an approach, such notions are also to be found in a phenomenological elucidation of 
Robbe-Grillet's art. For Merleau-Ponty, the world seems strange in situations of crisis, 
the body takes over and conscious thought is momentarily put on hold. Conscious 
thought is something that Robbe-Grillet's protagonists do not articulate; the reader or 
viewer is never privy to any thoughts that may be explicitly occurring to them. Rather, 
their bodily responses to situations of crisis are what is narrated; the perceptions that they 
experience, the objects upon which they focus; these are the nearest the reader of a 
Robbe-Grillet novel comes to finding out what a character is thinking. Also, Merleau- 
Ponty speaks of the sense of depersonalisation that comes with a loosening of one's grasp 
on conscious thought, and this phenomenon is certainly observable in Mathias' deepening 
unease in Le Voyeur. 
Another fundamental conclusion drawn by Merleau-Ponty following from the 
reduction was the incarnation of human consciousness 
in a body-subject, and it was from 
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the notion of the body-subject that the rest of his phenomenological project was to be 
mapped out. Similarly, the incarnation of human consciousness in a body structures the 
narrative point of view in Robbe-Grillet's works. This remains the case whether or not 
the point of view shifts from-one subject to another. Robbe-Grillet has commented on the 
importance he places upon the situated nature of narrative; on a rejection of any God-like, 
or objective narration. Nevertheless, not all of his narratives are situated uniquely within 
one character's perspective; frequently the perspective offered jumps from one person to 
another. Whilst this initially appears problematic for a ronlancier and cilleaste who 
professes to want to present the perspective of one narrator (as in LImmortelle), he never 
steps beyond an incarnated perspective into one that could not be perceived by any given 
human character. Thus, in LImmortelle, the perspective presented is not strictly that of 
N, since his own face appears on the screen, yet the viewer never knows more than N 
does. That is, whilst N is sometimes seen from a perspective that is not his own, there is 
never a realist-type overview of events, the viewer remains as much in the dark as to the 
11truth" as N does. The cinematic technique of showing a character as another might see 
him or her, or of jumping from one character's point of view to another, has apparently 
influenced Robbe-Grillet the romatýcier. That is, his novels contain the perspectives of 
more than one character, although again, these are always human perspectives. 
An absence of conscious thought is strongly linked to the articulation of alienation 
and paranoia in Robbe-Grillet's works. This is frequently notable for the fact that male 
characters feel threatened by females, whereas the fear felt by females in the face of 
threats from male characters is rarely brought to the attention of the reader or the viewer 
from the female's point of view. Female characters, then, are rarely the locus of the 
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narration; more usually, they are the victims of male characters, or else are the focus of a 
male character's paranoia. The examination of sexuality in Robbe-Grillet's works in this 
study highlighted the following points: firstly, that sexuality is inescapably a part of 
bodily existence, and therefore is a necessary consideration in any phenomenology-based 
study; notably, Merleau-Ponty insisted upon the intermingling of the sexual and the non- 
sexual in human existence and perception. By looking at Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology, it has been possible to see how, in some areas of Robbe-Grillet's work, 
the narration or depiction of sexuality is achieved on a very subtle level, consistent with 
Merleau-Ponty's claim that the sexual and the non-sexual are closely entwined. 
Secondly, by examining developments in phenomenology since Merleau-Ponty, it has 
been possible to evaluate Robbe-Grillet's success in his ambition to subvert cultural 
stereotypes, including those surrounding sex. The evaluation of Robbe-Grillet's success 
in attempting to subvert conventional depictions of sexuality via exaggeration has shown 
that, whilst the theoretical aims and arguments that he puts forward in his own defence 
are convincing to a certain extent, his artistic practice fails to make the subversion which 
he aims at sufficiently explicit. His supposedly ironic treatment of sexuality just does not 
come across as ironic, or as a parody of predictable depictions of women as dangerous 
and threatening. Taking the notion of the phenomenological reduction, which has proven 
such a useful comparison to Rbbbe-Grillet's subversive aims in other aspects of his worký 
this analysis revealed the failure of Robbe-Grillet as a novelist and filmmaker in "making 
strange" the conventions surrounding sexuality. 
Another aspect of human existence inextricably linked to the body-subject was 
the experience of time, Merleau-Ponty argued. Once more, the question of time is 
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problematic in Robbe-Grillet's works and can be elucidated by phenomenological 
philosophy. That is, time as it might be measured objectively, by clocks or calendars, is 
not at all the experience of time that is presented in his works. Nor is Robbe-Grillctian 
time merely a matter of flas4backs or flash-forwards, as these techniques in films or 
novels tend to allow the viewer or reader to return to a coherent temporal framework at 
some point. Whilst there are some flashbacks/forwards in Robbe-Grillet's works, they 
are frequently complicated by the possibility that they may be imagined sequences, rather 
than real ones, so that it becomes impossible to recuperate them into any ultimate time 
scheme. Once again, this examination of Robbe-Grillet noted that his aims as far as 
depicting time were concerned could be linked to the phenomenological reduction, in the 
sense that there is a "making strange" of time, an undermining of expectations and of 
strategies for understanding it. The analysis of Robb e-Grill etian time in this study noted 
the likely influence of Proust. As links have been established by commentators on Proust 
between Proustian, fictional time and Bergsonian, philosophical accounts of time, and as 
Bergson was, in turn, a forerunner of Merleau-Ponty, a link between Robbe-Grillet and 
Merleau-Ponty can also be established in terms of their literary and philosophical 
forebears. Moreover, recent develýpments in film theory, as found in the work of Gilles 
Deleuze, argue for a link between Bergsonian/phenomenological accounts of time and 
time as portrayed in modern French cinema. Deleuze noted the complex nature of time in 
Robbe-Grillet's cinema, particularly in relation to L AnWe dernijre 6 Marienbad. The 
analysis of time in this film from a phenomenological perspective was able to smooth out 
some of the difficulties in making sense of time in the film, as identified by Deleuze. The 
notion that time does not flow like a river from the past towards the present and future, 
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but that it emanates from our existence as body-subjects means that we are constantly in 
touch with all aspects of time; the past and the future are lived through the present. This, 
then, explains the mingling of past, present and future in Robbe-Grillet's works. 
The question of intersubjective relationships was, like the question of sexuality 
and sexual relationships, one which had not been explored by phenomenological 
approaches to Robbe-Grillet prior to this study. What was revealed here, through an 
analysis of Robbe-Grillet's works in terms of the Merleau-Pontyan notion of the flesh, 
was the way in which inscrutable interpersonal relationships between Robbe-Grilletian 
characters took shape, consistent with Merleau-Ponty's account of intersubjectivity. 
Thus Mathias in Le Vq), eur is someone whose relationships with others are never 
straightforward, but whose wrongdoings begin to dawn on him once he has been 
I 
observed by other characters. Closely connected to the theme of intersubjective 
relationships is the theme of subversion as manifested in language and lies. The 
examination of the dialogues spoken by Robbe-Grillet's characters revealed the extent to 
which the paranoia and power struggles surrounding sexuality can also be detected in 
non-sexual relationships and situations. Robbe-Grillet's characters subvert expectations 
of truthfulness, denying what is seen and heard, thus further problematising human 
relationships. 
in summary, a re-visiting of the phenomenological approach to Robbe-Grillet's 
works has also allowed for a re-establishment of the link between phenomenology and 
Robbe-Grillet at a time when the consideration of such an approach had apparently been 
I 
abandoned by commentators on Robbe-Grillet. This study has demonstrated that Robbe- 
Grillet's works can still be profitably elucidated from the perspective of 
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phenomenological philosophy, and from developments on it since the death of Mcricau- 
Ponty. Whilst Robbe-Grillet has continued to write and make films, the work of 
Merleau-Ponty has been taken up and developed by philosophers, and by commentators 
on literature and cinema. Thi§ re-appraisal of the connection between the two reveals tile 
many common aims that link them, and the benefit a phenomenological reading of 
Robbe-Grillet's works can bring in terms of understanding his artistic practice and 
evaluating his contribution to literary and cinematic art. 
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